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Perhaps the greatest irony of postmodern American fiction has been the
ascendancy within its broad aegis of the very mode that the early postmoderns of
the 1960s so dismissively repudiated, namely realism. This thesis aims to provide
both a theoretical reading of this ascendancy in relation to the earlier
metafictional irrealism and also readings of selected key texts of the 'new
realism' on their own postmodern terms.
The initial contextualization of the new American realism is therefore
defined very much in relation to the more or less militant epistemic 'ultimism'
('ultimate' in the sense suggested by John Barth in his seminal 'Literature of
Exhaustion') which both precedes and to some extent overlaps its own reflexive
radicalism. Theoretical interest is focused to begin with, therefore, on such texts
as The Literature of Exhaustion', Barth's early fiction, Jerome Klinkowitz's
critical engagements with both metafiction and, as he terms it, 'experimental
realism', and the 'European' new realism ofWalter Abish and Peter Handke.
But in attempting to find a critical vocabulary with which to analyze this new
realism there arises the need for a more than simply comparative
contextualization. The thesis therefore narrows in scope in order to address
more comprehensively the nature and origins of its evidently postmodern
'mimesis'. The fictions of Raymond Carver and Richard Ford are selected as
broadly representative for the purposes of this exploration, not simply because
they have been two of the most influential of the 'new realists' but also because
they offer the clearest methodological route to a reading of the problematic but
fundamentally important relationship between this postmodern vernacular
radicalism and the Modernist vernacular revolution pioneered by Stein,
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Anderson, Faulkner and, most significantly of all as regards this particular
postmodern turn, Hemingway.
The study of both Carver's and Ford's fiction begins with Hemingway, then,
but again a broadly comparative contextualization gives way in the thesis to a
closer, 'integral' methodological analysis of each writer's work. In these analyses
the inherent postmodern reflexivity of the two writers' 'realistic' modes is
approached not from the 'Derridean' position of an ultimist 'in excess'
metafiction, but from the 'Wittgensteinian' position of a transitive, 'horizontally'
'in excess' inessentialism. This 'Wittgensteinian' orientation is applied in Carver's
case to the epistemological problematics explored in and by his fictions and in
Ford's case to the ontological problematics of textualized being which
characterize even his earliest novels.
Finally the study analyzes Carver's Elephant and Ford's The Sportswriter
together, seeing in both an authentically postmodern and yet, paradoxically
almost, adequative 'releasing' of the rhetoric of the 'real' into a kinetic and
exploratory, interfacial textuality of telling and being, even telling as being,




Many thanks to my supervisor Faith Pullin. Above all thanks to my family for
their constant encouragement and support.
iii
CHAPTER ONE
•THIS BORROWED ROOM': ULTIMACY, CONTINGENCY
AND THE RE-SITING OF REALISM
1
By far the most significant dynamic in postmodern American fiction has been the
search not simply for new forms, but for a new mimesis.1 As Allan Lloyd Smith
puts it in his essay 'Brain Damage: The Word and the World in Postmodernist
Fiction':
The arsenal of...postmodernist literary techniques is trained upon
the creation of significant points through epistemic dislocations, in
excess of the real, where new recognitions can be made: 'The mind
orders reality', says Sukenick, 'not by imposing ideas on it but by
discovering significant relations within it'.*
The arsenal of...postmodernist literary techniques' is, in other words, for all
its characteristically 'in excess'3 irrealism, trained upon a more or less classically
mimetic aesthetic goal: the discovery of 'significant relations' in reality. Again in
Ronald Sukenick's words, a fiction should be 'not an ideological formulation of
belief but a statement of a favourable rapport with reality'.4 And as John Barth
has claimed: 'More and more, as I get older, I nod my head yes to Aristotle. I
want my fictions to be not only passionately formal...but passionately about
things in life as well'.5
This embracing of a mimetic principle by American postmodernism may
well seem incongruous, since the antipathy towards literary realism is obvious
not only in Barth's influential essay 'The Literature of Exhaustion', where he
finds it so 'dismaying to see so many of our writers following Dostoevsky or
Tolstoy or Flaubert or Balzac'6 but also in possibly the best compendium of
postmodern aesthetic (rather than theoretical) thought, David Bellamy's The
New Fiction in which the metafictionists interviewed seem to share an almost
doctrinaire distrust of realism, often reasoning along similar lines to those found
in Barth's essay.7
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Arguably, this much vaunted antipathy is not properly directed at a literary
style at all however, the tension rather being the result of an essentially
epistemological, and mistaken, presumption, namely the automatic association of
any use of literary realism's modes and tropes with a naive, semiologically
evasive representationalism.
Certainly, a seemingly deliberate confusion between the epistemic and
stylistic is inherent in many of Barth's arguments in The Literature of
Exhaustion'. His primary distinction between a Baroque, exhausted literature
and the 'new' fiction associated with Borges for instance is developed from the
assertion that the modernity of Beckett and Borges lies in that:
[I]n an age of ultimacies and 'final solutions' - at least felt
ultimacies, in everything from weaponry to theology, the
celebrated dehumanization of society, and the history of the novel
- their work in separate ways reflects and deals with ultimacy, both
technically and thematically.(p.73)
The obvious reductionism of this epistemic ultimacy and the banality of its
pseudo-apocalyptic presumptions is only unconvincingly countered in Barth's
essay by his holding up Borges (and any author who responds to the 'felt
ultimacy' equally authentically) as a mythic hero, either a Menelaus clinging to
Proteus in a heroic attempt to exhaust the guises of reality or a Theseus in the
labyrinth, plunged into the type of epistemic confusion but able 'with the aid of
very special gifts' to penetrate straight to the heart of the maze(p.83). In the end
however the glamour of the rhetoric masks little more than an almost formulaic
reductionism. The centre of Barth's maze is not described, but undoubtedly is
the 'core perception' that life itself, all 'reality', is fictive: the only theme, after all,
of both Borges and Barth.
But of course this 'perception' carries little weight against realism as a
literary mode, since whether life is 'fictional' or not, its textuality, its semiology
(physical, gestural, verbal and lexical) is phenomenal, and realism is essentially
concerned with the phenomenology of existence. Moreover, 'the 'postmodern
turn' is, if nothing else, the reflexive recognition that the semiological is the very
stuff of experience.
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In short then the whole stylistic issue as presented in Barth's essay rests on
epistemological presuppositions which never even begin to engage with realism
as a postmodern aesthetic possibility, only with the concept as a historical demon
to be epistemologically exorcised. Consequently, the sceptical Idealism of Barth
which is the motive force behind the formal and epistemic dislocations and
experimentation in his fictions is also the yardstick used by him to measure the
'modernity' of contemporary texts, again harnessing, conveniently and
polemically, the metaphysical critique of a rival epistemology contained in The
Literature of Exhaustion' to a by no means essentially (though perhaps
historically) correlative literary mode. Perhaps not surprizingly, then, the
general attempt to establish a coherent postmodern mimesis, or adequative
'rapport with reality', may be seen as being primarily an aesthetic consequence of
this initial metafictional emphasis on epistemic ultimacy-as-originality, the shift a
clear response to an epistemic rather than typological challenge. In reacting
against the 'straw man' of a 'literature of exhaustion' the new fiction itself
becomes typologically banal, tied as it is to an epistemological stake far more
rigid and reactionary than any consonant with literary realism as such; having far
more in common with the conceptual absolutism of Naturalism, in fact, since as
Barth in his essay had insisted, the epistemological must govern the aesthetic in
order that the necessary literature of 'ultimacy' should emerge. As Allan Lloyd
Smith goes on to write:
The openness came to look like closedness, as reality balefully
(and joyfully) persisted in the face of fiction's dismissal of it.
Barth's 'used-upness' of certain forms came to look like an apt
description of his own prose experiments, sailing off in amphorae
on mythical waters. The challenge then became the re-attachment
of words to things: in the certain knowledge of arbitrariness of
signification a new kind of adequation is called for; making the
shock of connection across the prised-apart worlds.8
The challenge, then, is for fiction to go beyond the 'security' of epistemic
scepticism (though without necessarily abandoning that scepticism itself) and its
blandly presumed corollary of formal self-reflexiveness just as metafiction went
beyond the security of an existentially orientated representationalism. The
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challenge is for the construction of correspondences, of 'significant relations'
without any metaphysical blueprint whether of transparency or ultimacy,
presence or absence.
There is then, it seems, a clear case for re-evaluating the early epistemic
presumptions of American postmodern (overwhelmingly metafictional)
literature, though again without necessarily abandoning the crucial grounding of
such a re-assessment in what may be called the postmodern reflexive turn. The
potentially farcical redundancy of fiction in the absence of this 'new kind of
adequation' is seen not only in the implications of Barth's essay, but also of
course throughout his fiction.9
Even in Barth's first, broadly 'realistic', novel The Floating Opera there can
be found the seeds of a (for Barth intractable) tension between the semiological
and the phenomenal, the latter all but helplessly undercutting and even
deconstructing the Ideal constructs of the former. Todd Andrews' existential
inquiry into his failure to commit suicide is exhaustively presented, the narrative
teleology becoming that of a free-ranging pre-mortem inquest, mirroring the
post-mortem psychological inquest Todd has been conducting regarding his
father's suicide. Put crudely the novel is an exploration into modes of survival in
the face of absurdity, in the face of ultimacy. It is a novel of systems, then, of
modes of analysis which deconstruct life and reduce it to metaphysically
meaningless components. But what is more telling than all the angst-ridden
analyses of motive and action is the simple fact that Todd is 'living in the shadow
of the great fact of his life' as Tony Tanner puts it, which is no great metaphysical
nausea at root, but the far more banal reality (the deconstructive 'pollutant') of a
weak heart.10
In other words, Todd's tortuous introspection, his sense of alienation from
the rest of humanity, stems not from any painful awareness of his own fictiveness
and the consequently absurd arbitrariness of life (both symptoms), but from a
physical dis-ease. Obviously there are two very different ways of interpreting the
significance of Todd's weak heart in relation to the 'metaphysic' of the book. It
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can be argued that the physical ailment, doubling as the figural index of an
existential, even ontological, disability clears the way for Todd to perceive 'truths'
too uncomfortable for the 'healthy' to dare look into: the metaphysical 'truth' of
absurdity preceding existential awareness if only revealed through it. On the
other hand, the hollow (other) heart of the novel - Todd's nihilism - can be seen
as central but self-deconstructive, the point being not Todd's nihilistic reasonings
of ultimacy, but the phenomenal reason for those reasonings. The text is indeed
a study of the patterns and constructs which create worlds for (even of)
individuals, but Todd's constructs are themselves generated by 'the great fact' of
his weak heart, by a phenomenal fact, the epistemological status of which goes
beyond reasoning and, like Scherezade's predicament, touches directly on the
fiction- and all construct-transcending issue of (an undeniably real) death. The
implication is that underlying the complex epistemic concerns of Idealistic
ultimacy is a phenomenal immediacy which has clear primacy over the constructs
of validation.
The role sex plays in the novel arguably confirms this fundamentally binary
reading: the account of Todd's affair with Jane Mack sets up a clear polarity
between the liberating physicality of sex and the reflexive discourses attendant
on it - here Harrison and Jane Mack's ambivalent sexual liberalism and Todd's
own cynical sexual self-reflexiveness. It is Todd's inability to see through the
intractability of this opposition that prompts his attempt at suicide, of course -
ultimism once more rests on a perceived though by no means unquestionable
(particularly in the context of the postmodern) polarity, a perceived dissociation
between the phenomenal and the semiological, the immediate and the reflexive.
Perhaps the key image in this novel is that of the young Todd bursting into
helpless laughter as he catches sight of Betty June Gunter and himself in the
bedroom mirror whilst strenuously losing his virginity.11 For Barth, in this early
work as in the later novels, the depiction of sex involves a clear distinction
between basically separate, polarized modes of being, the phenomenal and the
discursive, which in constantly clashing can create only the ultimacy of farce or
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the ultimacy of despair, categories which for Barth are finally not at all easily
separated.
In Giles Goat Boy Barth again effectively reworks the same perceived binary
intractability through sexual farce. In a much commented-on passage we see
Giles, hidden behind a bush, watching the love-making of two students, Chickie
and Harry. The farce differs from the farce of Todd's laughter only in that it
revolves not around the sexual act itself, but around the mode of seduction, a
ludicrous and very funny blending of the ersatz epistemological (indeed, ersatz
'ultimate'):
'So it's all meaningless,' the bearded one went on. There
aren't any Finals; there's no Dean o' Flunks at the South Exit to
punish us if we don't pass. Every question is multiple choice;
there's no final point or meaning in the University, it's - look here,
it's like this: a naked physical fact!'
with the sexual:
'Like the Ismists say, it all comes down to distinctions in our minds;
we can't ever get to the things themselves. We can thrust, and we
can thrust...'12
and so on. The parody consists in the physical fact of sexual desire (the very
primacy of which is being ironically denied, of course) deconstructing the
reflexive 'textuality' employed as a valorizing, validating, seducing construct by
Harry. The physicality of sex is then left to complete the comedy by asserting its
dominance over the semiology of seduction: the seducer ends up having shot his
physical as well as verbal bolt and is left helpless at the mercy of the just-gotten-
started Chickie:
As is the way of does, the girl called Chickie, having Been,
craved yet again to Be; put off her wools, unhobbled her udder,
and pled to Harry that he school her more in that verb's grammar.
He, however, seemed done with conjugating.13
This episode highlights not only the humour in Barth's work, but more
importantly for the purposes of this study an almost pastoral element to it, an
internal reaction as it were which tends to gnaw at Barth's disabling
epistemology. At the point of the seduction scene quoted above Giles is just
beginning on the road to 'humanisation' (a type of self-fictionalization) under the
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all-pervasive influence of the computer/putative author WESCAC. Barth is very
much pointing the finger at himself and, ironically since the pointing itself is of
course reflexive, his own authorial reflexivity, finding himself guilty not of
realism's alleged crime of transparency, but through a Harry-like seductive
sophistry, the 'shot bolt' of 'ultimacy'. Again then, as in The Floating Opera, the
presumption of an oppositional (between the physical and the semiological) and
potentially disabling ultimacy is evident, the terms by which it operates seeming
little more, in the final analysis, than re-workings of far from new binary
oppositions which are in many ways out of keeping with the more fertile
dissolutions of postmodernism. Barth does of course offer a dissolution of sorts
in the novel - as Tony Tanner writes of Giles' final 'letting go' of his binary
judgement systems after his night with Anastasia inside WESCAC:
The final sanctuary beyond all harrowing divisions, categorizations
and discriminations of existence is found through love...The
difference between this and his earlier notion of the seamless
university seems to be that then he tried to insist on the identity of
opposites, whereas after his night in the computer he seems to
have passed beyond the whole problem of meaning...It seems that
he has become indifferent to his own teachings, indeed to all
verbalizations of life.14
Again however, this movement on Barth's part is more evasion than true
dissolution - discourse and reflexivity (Tanner's 'all verbalizations of life') are still
held in implicit opposition to a strangely though familiarly naive conception of
phenomenal, physical 'authenticity'. For all the apparent dissolution of polarities
Barth's metafictional muse is working against itself here as surely and in many
ways simplistically as it is in the farce of Todd's coital laughter, Giles' voyeurism
and the minstrel of the 'Anonymiad's' 'humping the jug' - yet another figure which
elides the notion of the written, the fictive, the discursive and the masturbatory,
the sterile.15
Not surprizingly, perhaps, it is this working of the metafiction against itself as
attemptedly pure construct which is continued and extended as the dominant
feature of Barth's later 'parodic' fictions. In the title story of Lost in the Funhouse
for example we see a clear paradigm of the metafictional (or Barthian at least)
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writer's dilemma, and again sex, or the erotic, features as the figure of that
dilemma. In the first place the narrative both explicitly parodies Active
conventions and uses them in order to charge the story with an ambiguous and
'erotic' sub-strata of plot, the text constantly veering from self-betraying
frankness ('description of physical appearance and mannerisms is one of several
standard methods of characterization used by writers of fiction'16) to narrative
seduction as the reader is plunged into an adolescent sexual power play between
two brothers, Peter and the ineffectual Ambrose, for Peter's girlfriend (and, we
are to learn, one time seducer of Ambrose) Magda: 'Her figure was very well
developed for her age. Her right hand lay casually on the plush upholstery of the
seat, very near Ambrose's left leg, on which his own hand rested.'(p.79)
This pattern of revelation of technique followed by the immediate use of the
technique to 'charge' the story continues throughout the text. We see Magda
demonstrating 'her ability to hold a banana in one hand and peel it with her
teeth'(p.81), comically echoing Ambrose's experience with her in the toolshed,
the thematic 'epicentre' of the story. Ambrose's seduction provides for the
dramatic, thematically sublimated tension which keeps the narrative taut on a
purely teleological level, but also affirms the power of fiction to transcend
contrivance through contrivance: despite technically 'showing his hand', Barth
with such moments as the banana peeling scene still manages to set up comic
and provocative thematic resonances in the text.
The essential rigidity of ultimacy nags here again however. The reflexivity
trope works at two levels in the story, one playful and aesthetically provocative,
but the other 'moral', 'ultimate'. Oppositional ultimacy in fact seems to gradually
oust the playfulness as the narrative progresses; the device of Ambrose's
seduction thus becomes foregrounded as a tropological 'arena' for a by now all
too familiar binary separation. It emerges that at the time of his seduction,
[W]hat he'd really felt throughout was an odd detachment...strive
as he might to be transported, he heard his mind take notes upon
the scene: This is what they call passion. I am experiencing z7.(p.88)
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Ambrose, like Todd and Giles before him, is shown as being unable to respond
'healthily' to experience (he is in fact referred to as sickly at several points in the
text). Along with Todd he is existentially cauterized, and it is only through
memory and fantasy (the equivalent of Todd's introspection) that he can respond
to experience. In the same way that Giles is 'artificially' aroused by the verbiage
that precedes Harry and Chick's lovemaking, Ambrose is 'artificially' aroused by
an obsession which leaves him, like Giles or the exiled minstrel of the
'Anonymiad', in the position of sexual outsider: 'If you knew your way around in
the funhouse like your own bedroom, you could wait until a girl came along and
then slip away without ever getting caught, even if her boyfriend was right with
her,' Ambrose reflects. But the fact is, 'it would be better to be the boyfriend,
and act outraged, and tear the funhouse apart. Not act; be'(p.87).
The final sentence, 'not act; be' articulates quite explicitly the 'moral' of the
oppositions insisted on in this passage and the way in which the morality 'hijacks'
the initial provocative playfulness seen in the eliding of the reflexive and the
phenomenal, of 'acting' and 'being'.
Again, this oppositional dynamic invades the text's formal 'provocations' and
elisions also. Towards the close of the narrative the authorial debunking of
technique becomes prominent once more, but this time with more rigid intent.
Instead of using Freytag's triangle to once again playfully collapse distinctions
between reflexive and seductive, Barth uses it as a static counterpoint to the
irresolution of the ending - an image of Ambrose as he imagines himself to be,
lost in the funhouse, telling overheard stories to himself in the darkness whilst
starving slowly to death, to silence. Ambrose becomes a (fairly predictable) type
of the reflexive author, a constructor of funhouses within funhouses, but never
able to partake of the 'fun', an image which is, finally, wearisomely 'moral',
wearisomely 'ultimate'.
Ambrose, then, is condemned to 'acting, not being', as is Todd, the actor with
an endless array of masks, and as is Giles, a goat condemned to the charade of
'manhood'. Yet another moral/epistemic dichotomy has been set up between
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the semiological and phenomenal, the writer as compulsively reflexive
manipulator and patterner of experience (who, like Ambrose in the toolshed can
only ever in this scheme of things 'take notes upon the scene') and the lover, the
unselfconscious Magda or Peter. The final sentence tells us: Therefore
[Ambrose] will construct funhouses for others and be their secret operator -
though he would rather be among the lovers for whom funhouses are
designed'(p.lOl). The sentiment echoes in many ways Giles' reflection that what
he was 'saying bye bye to' when he left the goat herd to be 'humanized' by
WESCAC was nothing less than his happiness.17
From The Floating Opera to Lost in the Funhouse, then, Barth can be seen as
delineating a fundamental dilemma for the epistemologically militant writer.
Since fiction can, in Barth's view, only parody in its reflexiveness, 'authentic'
alternatives to referential naivety are limited to one of two options: either the
'martyrdom' of silence, or a representation, a mimesis of the reflexive/parodic
condition itself. Such 'solutions' very much embody The Apocalypse of Style' as
Louis Zamora puts it,18 an aesthetic of the Derridean 'glimpse beyond and the
parody of parody'19 and, in a phrase of Kierkegaard's perceptively applied by
Tanner to Barth's later fiction, 'the despair of possibility'.20 As Barth has
commented on Giles Goat Boy and The Sot-Weed Factor. 'I thought it might be
interesting to write a novel which simply imitates the form of the novel...In other
words, it pretends to be a piece of fiction'.21
The novel as imitation of the novel is indeed the ultimate in ultimacy, but is
also representative of the final epistemological exhaustion of the self-reflexive
form. The ten year silence that followed the publication of Chimera seems the
result not of any imaginative lack, but simply of epistemic exasperation, 'the
despair of possibility'; after having parodied the novel form itself not once but
twice, such repetition could hardly be more excusable to Barth than the
epistemic repetition and exhaustion supposedly afflicting Baroque fiction.22
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The shared epistemic bias of postmodern writing has not meant that the
ultimacies pursued by Barth have been accepted so zealously even by fellow
metafictionists, however. Gerald Graff has noted:
[T]wo strains can be discerned within the general complex of
attitudes which have become associated with postmodernism: the
apocalyptic and the visionary...The first strain is dominated by the
sense of the death of literature and criticism; literary culture
assumes a posture acknowledging its own futility. The second
strain, involving the resurrection of the new sensibilty out of the
ruins of the old civilization, expresses hopefulness for
revolutionary changes in society through radical transformations in
human consciousness.23
Clearly the John Barth of the works discussed above belongs to the
'apocalyptic strain' (though in the light of his renewed career and the essay The
Literature of Replenishment' this would seem to be no longer the case24) but the
'visionary strain' demonstrates if nothing else the possibility of positions beyond
ultimacy within the postmodern context, even within the metafictional context,
simply through avoiding Barth's (curiously dated after all) binary structures, his
epistemological dogmatism. Jerome Klinkowitz in his study of this Visionary
strain', Literary Disruptions, sees Barth's epistemic rigour as actually harmful to
postmodern aesthetics, the younger metafictionists having had to struggle
through the potentially paralyzing sense of aesthetic fatalism fostered by Barth's
theory and practice:
That a newer style of fiction did become popular in the late 1960's
was beside the point, since anything designed in the wake of
Barth's parody and subversion seemed a hopeless or even
reprehensible cause.25
Klinkowitz goes on to establish several younger 'visionary' metafictionists
including Robert Coover, Donald Barthelme, Ronald Sukenick and Raymond
Federman as writers who use the 'liberating imagination' as a means of
countering the ultimacy of Barth. Thus, writing approvingly of Federman's novel
Double orNothing, he states:
Federman knows that literature fails when it claims to represent
the other, so in his own novel he simply lets it represent itself. As
such it is a system, an aesthetic one, but by claiming to be nothing
else it becomes a real entity. Its substance is more vital because it
reflects man's imagination, instead of a second hand lie about what
in a whole other world is real.(p. 133)
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But though avoiding the sterility heralded by Barth (Klinkowitz refers to
'The Literature of Exhaustion' as 'a literary suicide note'(p.5)) the above
aesthetic itself never truly escapes an epistemic ultimacy of its own: Barth's
Idealism at least avoided a binary opposition between world and text as such in
co-opting reality as fiction; here the naively oppositional separation ofworld and
textuality 'liberates' only at the potentially equally debilitating cost of an absurdly
separatist aesthetic. Klinkowitz alleviates this extremism by advocating a
literature of 'confession', a literature not simply acknowledging its reflexivity, but
actually deriving aesthetic justification from the fact of its anachronistic status.
But again the epistemic precedes the aesthetic. The fictional consequence can
only be yet more narratives on the case of narrative, yet more of the pure
diegesis of 'the glimpse beyond and the parody of parody'.
The problem expressed by several of the writers dealt with by Klinkowitz
however, the problem of establishing a 'shock of connection', a 'favourable
rapport with reality', is hardly answered by such a formulation, and certainly the
vision the writers themselves have of their work apparently differs significantly
from Klinkowitz's. As Federman has said of his novel The Twofold Vibration: 'it
reconnects with a certain vision of history and the self-consciousness of the text
emerges only when necessary"26, and in the words of Steve Katz:
I'm sick of those passages in our work which refer however suavely
to how the work is being made or how it should be made...although
in a broader sense I still deal with self-referential condominiums.
The former seems to be at this point like nothing more than
another dull literary convention to be purged.27
Postmodern fiction, acutely conscious as it must be of the fluid interface
between world and text, thing and sign, the 'broader sense...[of] self-referential
condominiums', can certainly be seen as having moved beyond the despair of
Barth's exhaustions, but not deeper into binary opposition and separation.
Federman goes on to comment on the novel as form, and far from positing the
'new' novel as becoming ever more hermetically sealed off from reality, suggests
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that 'the novel is going to reconnect with what is often claimed to be missing in
my novels - not ideas, but actions'.28
In the light of Barth's more recent retreat from ultimacy and the obvious
concern of Klinkowitz's 'disruptionists', or Graffs 'visionary strain', for 'a new
adequation...making the shock of connection across the prised-apart worlds', the
postmodern dynamic may be seen as moving towards at least exploring the gulf
mapped out by contemporary epistemic scepticism, and no longer towards
repeatedly emphasising its width, depth and the inadequacy of the traditional
realist mimetic bridges. It is in this 'exploratory' dynamic that the postmodern
'performance' arguably finds itself as a fiction of possibility in reaction, not
abeyance, to an 'impossible' epistemology.
So far it has only been the more radical metafictionist s of the 1960s and 70s
that have been mentioned as examples of a shift in the postmodern aesthetic
sensibility from a wholly reflexive Idealism to a desire for a mimetically
orientated aesthetic; a shift which has seen the dislocations of signifier and
signified in the fictional sign no longer serving simply to automatically distance
and dissociate, but to shock into an awareness of fresh metaphorical
correspondences, a symbolic rather than contiguous 'continuity and wholeness'.
Thus Federman as postmodern 'symbolist' ('my role, once I have set up the
metaphor, is to decipher the meaning of that metaphor and write its symbolic
meaning'29) can claim an all but classically mimetic motive for his fictions: 'I'm
not destroying illusions simply for the sake of destroying illusions. I'm destroying
illusions in order that we may indeed face up to reality, and now what passes for
reality'.30
There is another, radically different approach to the problem of a
postmodern mimesis however, an approach epistemologically consonant with but
not necessarily descended from metafiction. Arguably as postmodern in spirit as
any of the modes of metafiction it can be seen as revealing in its outworking the
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same semiological, epistemic and ontological problematics confronted by many
of the authors discussed in Literary Disruptions.
The epistemologically 'aware' symbolism of the intensely metaphorical
'Disruptionists' has been challenged by a new, 'aware', intensely metonymic
realism, a fictional mode which is as radical a departure from the
epistemologically secure realism that preceded and exists alongside it as from the
'mythical waters' ofmetafictional irrealism.
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Postmodern realism is neither a continuation of naive representationalism nor a
continuation of the irrealist response to scepticism. It is a distinctive aesthetic
direction, reacting out of the aesthetic antagonism which preceded it. As Jerome
Klinkowitz has noted, the nature of the new realism is not static but a
'progression':
The first point to make about experimental realism, whether
in fiction or, under its more common name in painting,
superrealism, is that it is not a return to simple realism. Indeed, it
is not a return to anything, certainly not to the tradition of
verisimilitude, but is rather a logical progression from innovative
fiction in literature and abstract expressionism in art.31
Not surprizingly, then, any epiphanic quality in the new realism tends not to
be existentially orientated, not concerned primarily with concepts of 'depth' and
psychological/spiritual insight, since it is the very concept of the possibility of
meaningfully communicated perception that is at stake. Instead, it seems
concerned overwhelmingly with a 'surface tension', an adequation not of
'universals' to self but of a precarious, essentially contingent 'reality' to an equally
precarious, contingent 'self. The scepticism of William Gass's Fiction and the
Figures ofLife fits this new realism as well as any metafiction:
Souls, essences, the bickering legions of immortals, the countless
points of view which religion and philosophy have shaped, are
seldom understood as metaphorical, as expressions of our wishes
and fears, as desperate political maneuvres, strategies of love or
greed, as myths 3^
As Frederick Barthelme, defending the new realism in America, puts it:
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As I get it, the charges against so-called 'minimalist' fiction
center on some ideas of what fiction used to be, or is thought to
have been. In particular, the main charges are (A) omission of big
'philosophical' ideas, (B) not enough history or historical sense, (C)
lack of (or wrong) political posture, (D) insufficient 'depth' of
character, (E) commonplace description too reliant on brand
names, (F) drabness of 'style', (G) moral poverty.33
The epistemological tenuousness of this postmodern 'minimalist' reality as
opposed to the epistemologically stable, if naive, reality assumed by traditional
realism is well illustrated in Naomi Schor's essay on Balzacian realism, 'Details
and Realism: Le Cure de Tours'. Discussing the difference between Balzac's
'sublime details' and the postmodern New Novel's 'promotion of a detail which is
desacralized, detotalized and definalized'34 Schor writes:
Doubtless, it has taken our modernity to shake the hegemony
of the sublime...since the beginning of the twentieth century we
have witnessed a far ranging attempt to desublimate what was
sublimated, an attempt spearheaded by all those, aestheticians and
artists, who make up the avant-garde 33
In other words, in questioning and ultimately rejecting the basically
metaphysical aesthetic common to orthodox realism, where the detail is invested
with a universality of signification, (is 'finalized', is, in effect, made sublime) the
postmodern sceptical turn has limited the possibilities of mimesis. The
possibilities for a meaningful representation of a stable, coherent world give way
(since, as Schor puts it, 'the detail can not at first have full access to the field of
representation without God's guarantee'36) to the basically reflexive possibilities
of either a form of 'process mimesis' where the desacralization itself becomes the
aesthetic principle, or a radically sceptical 'product mimesis' which is
representational, but which seeks to represent not the old, epistemologically
stable world which arguably no longer even exists, but the world which has
replaced it; a world stripped of all cloaks of metaphysical signification.
The former option of 'process mimesis' can quite clearly be seen as the
option taken by the American metafictionists of the 1960s and '70s. As Linda
Hutcheon puts it in her study of these fictions, 'Mimesis is transmutation, not
reproduction...Diegesis is a part of mimesis, as Aristotle perceived'37 and, in
concluding that the diegetic nature of metafiction may be predicated as a form of
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process mimesis: 'the roots of modern metafiction are obviously in such a
realization'38.
The latter option, that of retaining the referential mode but with a new,
sceptical awareness of the impossibility of any authoritative aesthetic of
Balzacian 'sublime details' can be seen as being an aesthetic motive force not
only in the French New Novel analyzed by Schor, but also, and perhaps most
self-consciously, in a fundamental aesthetic shift of consciousness in the domain
of visual art, and it is precisely this desacralizing, desublimating influence in art
that Jerome Klinkowitz has taken as paradigmatic for his analysis of the rise of
experimental realism in literature.
Klinkowitz's opening thesis in the essay in question, 'Experimental Realism',
is in fact virtually a (more polemical) re-statement of Schor's closing remarks
quoted above:
[Cjulture has in no sense regressed to the high realism of the
nineteenth century...No artist of 150 years ago was faced with the
plethora of highly polished reflective surfaces such as confront
Abish and Estes on every urban street corner; no Victorian or
Belle Epoque writers might suspect that so much of contemporary
reality lay on the surface.(p.63)
The point seems valid enough: apart from clear correspondences Klinkowitz
points to between the superrealists of visual art and the more overtly
experimental fictional realists such as Dixon, Gangemi and Abish, other
important 'new realist' writers are being linked and/or consciously see their work
as being close in spirit to the new post-abstract expressionist realism in visual art.
Daphne Merkin, contrasting Flaubert's comment that he was 'baffled by the
psychology of (his) characters' with what she terms Frederick Barthelme's
'radical authorial bafflement' claims that Barthelme's is a 'photo-realist
bafflement',39 a bafflement in other words deriving not from the psychological
'reality' of the created characters but their characteristically postmodern
'delinquent'40 lack of it in the face of a world of reflexive texts and codes which
hide rather than reveal the existential myths of depth and authoritative because
stable significations of 'meaning'. Again, in a recent interview Carver himself
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acknowledges an empathy with Gerrit Henry's definition of photo-realism41: 'I
think that's a fair comparison,' he says. 'I like that',42 and also significantly
echoing Klinkowitz's comments on Abish and Handke's 'surface' or 'reflective'
mimesis, Alice Bloom writes of Bobbie Ann Mason's fiction:
Mason's prose does not work to go deeply into [her characters']
lives but to distort their surface images as though they were being
reflected off loose hubcaps. Diane Arbus, not Sherwood
Anderson.43
Klinkowitz's own argument proceeds along these lines of comparison, the
avant-garde, postmodern spirit being identified not with an ideological
homogeneity, but with what is essentially a question of perspective, of focus. The
epistemologically sceptical in visual art is associated above all with a refusal to
penetrate, whether psychologically, morally or figurally, and so the completely
abstracted, 'pure' line of a Pollock canvas is intimately akin to the far more
readily identifiable, more overtly representationalist fines which go into the
making of a superrealist canvas such as Richard Este's 'Escalator'.
The point is not one of interpretation but of the choice of perspective, the
wilful myopia, the visual pathology inherent in that choice. This 'pathological',
delinquent aspect of the aesthetic is traced in fiction to a 'new realism', which,
bearing in mind works such as Gangemi's Olt or Leonard Michael's 'In the Fifties'
(a section chosen by Klinkowitz as representative is given below) seems quite
justifiable:
In the fifties I learned to drive a car. I was frequently in love.
I had more friends than now.
When Kruschev denounced Stalin my roommate shit blood,
turned yellow, and lost most of his hair.
I attended the lectures of the excellent E.B. Burgum until
Senator McCarthy ended his tenure. I imagined N.Y.U. would
burn. Miserable students, drifting in the halls, looked at one
another.
In less than a month, working day and night, I wrote a bad
novel.
I went to school: N.Y.U., Michigan, Berkeley - much of the
time...44
and so on.
A similar point has been made regarding metafictional postmodernism by
Philip Stevick when he compares the beginnings of Donald Barthelme's City Life,
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Brautigan's The World War I Los Angeles Airplane' and Robert Coover's 'A
Pedestrian Accident'. Stevick comments:
It is obvious at first that there are certain common
characteristics of method, voice and sensibility in the three
beginnings...a readiness to confront certain extremities of life...but
an investing of these extremities with an odd and terribly distant
artifice...that is very different from the classic toughness,
knowingness and irony of the dominant modernists...what unites
the three fictions is the common presentation of the kind of
event...that must be led up to, or explained, or prepared for or set
in context, but is, in these three cases, simply told. It is the chilling,
almost pathological directness of beginning in the three fictions
that is likely to seem to us most striking.45
Stevick's interpretation of course seems equally applicable to the passage
from the Leonard Michael's text quoted earlier, or even to many of the less
methodologically extreme fictions of Handke, Carver, Mason or Ford. The
unifying principle seems to be a pathology of focus deriving from the recognition
that for postmodern realism as much as for metafiction the raw material of the
mimetic textual episteme is no longer psychological insight, far less a
straightforward 'revealing' of the 'real'; rather the fiction must be built on the
awareness 'that the materials of (such) fictions are signs', as Klinkowitz puts
it(p.69).
The distinctiveness of postmodern art therefore can arguably be seen above
all in its focus, in the epistemological myopia of its vision, deriving primarily
from the postmodern refusal to take the epistemic security of what Schor calls
'God's guarantee' (of depth) for granted. Postmodern representationalism then
will be too busy clinging to the shifting surface of a barely gravitational (in the
sense of the 'mass' of meaning behind the lex) world to worry too much about
digging towards whatever universal sub-strata may (or may not) lie underneath.
In fact this aesthetic overview of Klinkowitz's is, as regards the fiction of
Abish, Handke, Carver and Ford, as problematic as it is useful. The analysis may
be seen less as providing a truly accurate account of the postmodern aesthetic in
contemporary experimental realism, and more as simply transferring the older
aesthetic principles of Robbe-Grillet and other theorists of the the nouveau
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roman, (which would certainly appear to mirror in principle and execution much
of the thought behind the ventures in the visual arts towards new forms of
'realism') into a reading of fictions that have clearly moved far beyond the rigid
epistemological principles of the French New Novel and into a certainly sceptical
but also radically engaged (in an epistemological rather than in any
straightforwardly ideological sense) aesthetic.
So far, all of the above analyses fit the writers under discussion quite
comfortably. Abish's modes of 'distancing', of shattering any illusion of textual
transparency, of characters as embodiments of existential truths, are central not
just to his fictions and to Handke's, but also to the less overtly postmodern
techniques of the new American realists. As Thomas LeClair has commented,
'Carver's economy is as much an artifice as Theroux's excess, a way of speaking
explicitly chosen...to avoid the invisible mid-range of style'46 and exactly the same
could be said of Mason's exploiting of the puns, slippages and distortions
foregrounding her characters' country idioms, or of Ford's mannered,
parodic/gothic prose inA Piece ofMy Heart. The 'invisible mid-range of style' is
characteristically absent from the work of all these writers then, but more
importantly, even Abish and Handke, dealt with at some length in Klinkowitz's
essay, arguably display aesthetic principles and practices far removed from the
epistemological extremism ultimately advocated by Klinkowitz: 'Once we
humanise, Abish implies, we become subject to the same flawed rules of
communication from which his characters suffer'(p.73). This interpretation of
Abish's methodology in How German Is It, the attributing of an anti-humanizing
significance to the novel, takes the epistemological problematics foregrounded
by the fiction and elevates them, in the absence of a psychological or existentially
coherent 'moral' or 'message', to the status of a value, a 'comment'. In fact to see
the dehumanized nature of the text (stripped as it is of any psychological depth)
as an implicit comment on the desirability, or even necessity, of an equivalent
response in life to the ambiguities of textualized twentieth century existence can
be seen as a response not condoned by Abish, but exposed in, and indeed by, the
19
text ofHow German Is It as hypocritical and morally outrageous. To argue that
the main significance of the book is a warning against humanizing reality is as
epistemologically totalizing, and hence as reductive, (aesthetically, even morally,
as well as epistemologically) as any principle underlying the nouveau roman.
Klinkowitz sees only an aesthetic of semiological opacity signified by the
'new Germany's' attempts to efface all evidence of the war years: "what remains
is a self-apparency of signs that mean only themselves'(p.73) he claims, but in
fact 'what remains' is far more than just architectural self-apparency. The new
architecture is a moral mirror, a 'depthless' surface for sure, but one reflecting
(and hence still signifying) hypocrisy and a refusal to acknowledge fully the
atrocities of the past: after the mass grave is accidentally revealed under the
town of Brumholdstein the obvious explanation, that the bodies are Jewish
victims of the Durst concentration camp on which the town was built, is
consistently evaded in favour of theories of Russian atrocities against retreating
German forces.
The philosopher Brumhold, in many ways the personification of this cultural
and ideological aphasia, this inability on the part of the 'new Germany' to link
morally loaded signifiers (such as the mass grave) to their inescapable moral and
ideological signifieds, can be seen as figuring not just a form of aesthetic
attitudinizing (the bias of Klinkowitz's reading), but the enormous dangers which
inevitably haunt any theory that refuses to attribute moral and ideological
significances to signs and things. He is certainly, on the one hand, a type of the
theoretical 'New Novelist' in his arguing for the notional purity of essential
'things in themselves', as Klinkowitz argues, but finally the point is not the
theoretical position itself, rather the moral ramifications and consequences of his
thought. Significantly, the town of Brumholdstein, named after him, is the
apotheosis of morally culpable surface realities; it is, after all, a wilfully
unmarked, unacknowledged gravestone over bodies which are, by implication, as
much the moral and ideological responsibility of Brumholdstein as Durst. The
point Klinkowitz seems to miss is that in terms of the culpability of those who
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uphold facade under a pervasive, covert ideological aphasia, the position he
himself holds up as a complete contrast to the nouvecai roman attitude of
Brumholdstein can be damned by the same criticisms Abish implicitly levels at
the philosopher. According to Klinkowitz:
Alain Robbe-Grillet and the other makers of the nouveau roman
followed a somewhat similar practice [to the surface art of Abish]
but with the precisely opposite goal: to capture the thing itself, the
pure object now clearly seen through a purified signifier, rather
than the absolute opacity of sign to which Abish and Estes
aspire.(p.67)
But whether 'purity' or 'absolute opacity', the significance is the same: the
desacralized detail becomes not simply divorced from metaphysical significances,
from 'God's guarantee', but, should the doctrines be reduced to their epistemic
extremes, the detail or sign is absurdly denied any contextualisation whatsoever.
It is precisely this dehumanizing to the point of a decontextualizing of the thing
that Abish satirizes through Brumhold, and Klinkowitz falls under the moral
(and 'comic', as Anthony Schirato rightly terms the novel's 'deconstruction of
contemporary German innocence'47) implications of the satire in applying
Brumhold's treatment of the thing to the sign. The fictional theory of Robbe-
Grillet and the semiological extremism of Klinkowitz's essay are essentially just
the opposite sides of the same epistemological coin.
In his essay 'A Future for the Novel', Robbe-Grillet writes:
Around us, defying the noisy pack of our animistic or protective
adjectives, things are there. Their surfaces are distinct and smooth,
intact, neither suspiciously brilliant nor transparent. All our
literature has not yet succeeded in eroding their smallest corner, in
flattening their slightest curve.45
Quite clearly this statement echoes the aesthetic of surfaces which has been
discussed above. Also clear however is the fact that, as Klinkowitz contends,
there is a major difference in the way in which Robbe-Grillet views the concept
of a world of surface reality and the way in which Abish or the other new realists
would view it. For Robbe-Grillet the significance of the surface is the durability
of the material thing, its aesthetic autonomy from the previously sacred
hegemony of linguistic and hence conceptual signification. For Klinkowitz on
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the other hand the properties of desacralized opacity are more significantly
present in semiological as opposed to material reality, in the ambiguous nature
of the supposed semantic correlative of the thing itself. In a very important sense
however this difference is unimportant as regards the fictional outworking of the
one basic dilemma both views pose from their different angles of approach: the
mimetic dilemma, the dilemma central to an understanding of the postmodern
progression from epistemological ultimacy and redundancy to a vital concern
with adequation, with the challenge of 'the re-attachment of words to things' as
Lloyd Smith puts it.
Basically, both concepts of signification rest on false ultimacies in that the
governing perspective in both sets of apologetic is not truly linguistic but
epistemic. This epistemic bias leads to a disturbing (given the implications of the
historical, moral and political nature of the themes dealt with in Abish's novel)
reductionism in Klinkowitz's essay (The joy of self-apparent signs is the lack of
hierarchy and informed meaning'(p.68)) and arguably causes Robbe-Grillet to
retreat into a form of Idealism even as he is asserting the primacy of the thing
itself over the false constructs of significance that the human mind, especially
through art, attaches to material reality: The contact, then, which the novelist
makes with the material presence of objects in the world via his imaginative
faculties', Patricia Deduck tells us in her elucidation of Robbe-Grillet's theories,
'is what, in essence, creates the reality of the world and its objects in the novel'.49
In both cases therefore the epistemological ultimacy seems inadequate when
dealing with what is, after all, on the most basic of levels, a context-constructing
as well as constructed, and, in the postmodern text, more or less reflexively
construct-revealing art form: fiction. In other words, the epistemic extremism is
inadequate in dealing with the implications of a world of multivalently referential
signifiers. Klinkowitz, even when discussing a novel wrestling with the
implications of the dislocation of the holocaust from the signs of the modern
world can only rejoice in the significances of 'the lack of heirarchy and informed
meaning' in the semiological world, the very view of language which can re-write
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history, the very 'aesthetic' which can hide a concentration camp under a fortress
of middle-class complacency and historical indifference. As Gavin Edwards
writes of postmodern fiction's relationship to semiological dislocation: 'It's a
game of hunt-the-referent which you always lose. Some people enjoy losing;
some people find the circles vicious.'50 Indeed, examples of this 'hunt' in the new
realists are almost invariably of the 'vicious' kind. Thus Carver's Ralph Wyman
and Handke's 'left-handed woman', both wandering through an urban maze of
dislocated, dissociating signs51, and more extensively Mason's post-Vietnam
novel In Country which sets up several 'hunt the referent' games, all challenging
epistemic 'hierarchy and informed meaning', though the challenge can be
malignant as well as liberating: the government's resistance to fixing a diagnosis,
an 'informed meaning' to the empirical signifiers of Emmet's apparent Agent
Orange poisoning; Sam's attempts to understand her dead father through his
diaries and through the again empirical and futile course of mimicking his
experiences 'in country' by hiding out in the swamp; finally the 'pilgrimage' to the
Washington Monument, a nation's ur-referent to an overwhelmingly vicious,
futile search for the most slippery referent of all - ideological stability.52 In the
same vein so many of Richard Ford's characters, often Vietnam veterans, in both
his novels and stories live outlaw lives of a seemingly helpless restlessness and
rootlessness; life itself as 'hunt the referent', and again the circle is one of
deprivation rather than liberation, loss and not release.
The gulf between Klinkowitz's (basically metafictional) attitude and the new
realists seems to lie in just this distinction of Edwards' then. It is, arguably, a
distinction between the atrophying or the furthering of the postmodern dynamic
in the furnishing of it with a truly postmodern mimesis, a mimesis not of what
Roland Barthes ironically termed 'the romantic heart of things' but of power
codes, of the texts which compose and reflect the synthetic nature of so much of
modern life cut adrift from 'God's guarantee' of epistemic security.
Both Klinkowitz and Robbe-Grillet, then, tend to conflate all significances,
whether social, psychological or ideological as simply constituent parts of one
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scorned principle: the metaphysical, a process by which all notions of 'clarity' and
'opacity' as applied to things and signs become, again, ultimacies.
The postmodern realistic mode, as seen in Abish, Handke and the new
American realism is characterized by the same epistemological scepticism that
underlies both these ultimacies, but the fundamental difference is that the
scepticism is integral to the text, not reliant on the epistemic 'knowingness' which
must be brought to the 'New Novel', nor on the ultimist, ultimately sterile
diegesis of metafiction. The scepticism is inherent in the very use to which
contiguity and referentiality are put. The texts do not simply deny semiological
and epistemic contiguity, nor do they parody it through excess as does Barth for
instance. Rather they use it in ironic, restless as opposed to playful ways; ways
which emphasize less a gleefully welcolmed disintegration of meaning under
semiological anarchy, more the terrible vulnerability of connection, the real
dangers inherent in an uncritical, 'ultimist' embrace of ideologically and morally
precarious indeterminacies.
In the fiction of any of these writers the hallmarks of postmodernism are
more or less evident: 'discontinuity and openendedness and contingency',53
hallmarks shared of course by both metafiction and the nouveau roman. But
whereas these characteristics serve a playful, resolutely non-referential irrealism
in metafiction, in the new realism of Abish, Handke, Ford and Carver the
openendedness is as much disconcerting, even threatening (though still
potentially liberating); the discontinuity is as alienating as it is potentially
revitalizing. The contingency does not naively signify only the unlimited
possibilities of an undefined and so textually untrammeled self54 but the
semiological dissociations of what may be termed epistemologically dislocated
existence.
In Carver's story The Student's Wife' this distinction is particularly
harrowingly seen. The narrative opens by deceptively setting up a secure,
comforting, 'classical' opposition between a 'pure' textuality (Rilke's lyrics) and a
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prosaic, seemingly contained (in implicit opposition to the 'spillage' of
semiology/dream) reality:
He had been reading to her from Rilke, a poet he admired,
when she fell asleep with her head on his pillow. He liked reading
aloud, and he read well - a confident sonorous voice, now pitched
low and somber, now rising, now thrilling. He never looked away
from the page when he read and stopped only to reach to the
nightstand for a cigaret. It was a rich voice that spilled her into a
dream of caravans just setting out from walled cities and bearded
men in robes. She had listened to him for a few minutes, then she
had closed her eyes and drifted off.55
But this 'classical' opposition, so well poised, is, as in any postmodern text,
primarily an occasion for its subversion: the safe harmony of the "balance', its
securities structured four square on an epistemic presumption, is progressively
and ruthlessly dismantled by Carver. The implicit proposition of the first
paragraph, that the semiological is 'other' is systematically inverted. Whereas in
metafiction the inversion often works to celebrate the anarchic possibilities
heralded by the breaking of the classical text/being divide, the release from
'grand narrative' to discourse56, Carver's inversion works to show the terrible,
heartbreaking (heart also as figure of identity, the 'centred' self) lostness
consonant (for the 'innocent') with such a dissolution. Thus we find that far from
'securing' the couple, the husband's reading is in fact a masking of a fundamental
division and alienation:
He went on reading aloud. The children had been asleep for
hours, and outside a car rubbered by now and then on the wet
pavement. After a while he put down the book and turned in the
bed to reach for the lamp. She opened her eyes suddenly, as if
frightened, and blinked two or three times. Her eyelids looked
oddly dark and fleshy to him as they flicked up and down over her
fixed glassy eyes. He stared at her.(p.94)
The faintly grotesque picturing of the wife's face in this second paragraph is
soon followed by further indications of dislocation in the relationship, a type of
the dislocation in the semiological relationship of textuality to the 'real' we have
simultaneously, through the same tropes, been initially (mis)led to assume as
being secure:
Then: 'Make me a little sandwich of something, Mike. With
butter and lettuce and salt on the bread.'
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He did nothing and he said nothing because he wanted to go
to sleep. But when he opened his eyes she was still awake,
watching him.
'Can't you go to sleep, Nan?' he said, very solemnly. 'It's late.'
'I'd like something to eat first,' she said. 'My legs and arms
hurt for some reason, and I'm hungry.'
He groaned extravagantly as he rolled out of bed.
He fixed her the sandwich and brought it in on a saucer. She
sat up in bed and smiled when he came into the bedroom, then
slipped a pillow behind her back as she took the saucer. He
thought she looked like a hospital patient in her white nightgown.
'What a funny little dream I had.'
'What were you dreaming?' he said, getting into bed and
turning over onto his side away from her. He stared at the
nightstand waiting. Then he closed his eyes slowly.
'Do you really want to hear it?' she said.
'Sure,' he said.(pp.94-5)
That the nature of this dislocation is rooted firmly in the postmodern irony
which simultaneously emerges as permeating the opening passage soon becomes
evident. A series of exchanges take place, all based on the wife's attempts to
engage the husband, to be 'located' with him, through narrative, through a
conscious textualizing of experience: her dream, her memory of a camping
holiday as newly-weds, 'one of the best times they'd ever had', her memory of
growing pains, her list of favourite things. All these narratives desperately strain
to achieve the security-through-narrative promised by the opening passage: "'Do
you remember that time we stayed overnight on the Tilton River, Mike? When
you caught that big fish the next morning?" She placed her hand on his shoulder.
"Do you remember that?"'; and:
'O God, yes,' she said, wiggling her toes, glad she had drawn
him out. 'When I was ten or eleven years old I was as big then as I
am now. You should've seen me! I grew so fast in those days my
legs and arms hurt me all the time. Didn't you?'
'Didn't I what?'
'Didn't you ever feel yourself growing?'
'Not that I remember,' he saia.(p.97)
When all these attempts fail she gets up, leaving her husband sleeping, and,
significantly, turns to textuality again, (it is interesting that Carver 'doubles' this
passage very carefully with the opening one, with the same mention of cars
passing outside and an ironic counterpointing of the husband's performance
against the wife's distracted 'paging') though this time for security, or comfort,
through diversion:
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She looked in on the children. She pulled the covers up over
her son's shoulders. She went back to the living room and sat in
the big chair. She paged through a magazine and tried to read.
She gazed at the photographs and then she tried to read again.
Now and then a car went by on the street outside and she looked
up. As each car passed she waited, listening. And then she looked
down at the magazine again. There was a stack of magazines in
the rack by the big chair. She paged through them all.(p.99)
Even the wife's watching of the sunrise is loaded with a clear ironic
commentary on the false textual securities which have underpinned so much in
their marriage, its degeneration now mimicking a deconstruction of that
semiological artificiality:
When it began to be light outside she got up. She walked to the
window. TTie cloudless sky over the hills was beginning to turn
white. The trees and the row of two-story apartment houses across
the street were beginning to take shape as she watched. The sky
grew whiter, the light expanding rapidly up from behind the
hills...she had seen few sunrises in her life and those when she was
little. She knew that none of them had been like this. Not in
pictures she had seen nor in any book she had read had she
learned a sunrise was so terrible as this.(p.lOO)
The semiological ('not in pictures she had seen nor in books she had read')
and the phenomenal are not only intimately but terribly bound together in this
passage as in the narrative as a whole. If, Carver seems to be implying, there is
no 'ultimate' separation to be made between being and textuality, then the
narrative potencies of fiction are not simply a release from the 'mythic'
limitations of essential identity, totalizing facticity and the Truths' of 'grand
narratives'; they are also a deprivation of the 'innocent' securities which once
deferred can deconstruct lives in a postmodern world such as Carver's, not just
aesthetic complacencies in the postmodern funhouses within funhouses of
metafiction:
She went through the dim apartment, back into the bedroom. He
was knotted up in the center of the bed, the covers bunched over
his shoulders, his head half under the pillow. He looked desperate
in his heavy sleep, his arm flung out across her side of the bed, his
jaws clenched. As she looked, the room grew very light and the
pale sheets whitened grossly before her eyes.
She wet her lips with a sticking sound and got down on her
knees. She put her hands out on the bed.
'God,' she said. 'God, will you help us, God?' she said.(p.lOO)
It is this deprivation or deferment that lies behind the fact of so many of
Carver's stories being haunted by questions which are never answered,
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explanations which are never articulated. What We Talk About When We Talk
About Love, for instance, ends in a typical state of semantic paralysis with the
story 'One More Thing'. The story, like The Student's Wife', focuses (though
here far more explicitly) on the disintegration of a marriage and can perhaps be
seen as a last ironic parting shot at the title of the collection, ending the book as
it does with:
L.D. put the shaving bag under his arm and picked up the
suitcase.
He said, 'I just want to say one more thing.'
But then he could not think what it could possibly be.(p.284)
L.D.'s confusion, linguistic, existential and social is perfectly captured in
these few spare lines; the fracturing of communication is not a new topic in
postmodern fiction, but what is distinctive in both this fragment and in The
Student's Wife' is the uncompromising contextualizing of the semiological within
the representational, metonymic domain of the social in a way which captures
not only the fact of a disjunction between word and world, but also its
phenomenal implications in an unsophisticated blue-collar world where meaning
and interpretation are not negotiable epistemic counters, but all too often, life-
breaking absences.
Again, in a less harrowing though equally 'realistic' manner Richard Ford
constructs his story 'Communist' in a way which seems to exploit
straightforwardly representationalist tropes and yet which in fact subtly employs
through the very nature of those tropes textually reflexive, even textually
dissociative strategies. On the one hand there is the very 'simple', 'naive'
vernacular narrative constructing a basically linear series of metonymically
revealed significances: on this level the narrative is simply a story of a mother's
failed love affair and the 'rite of passage' into adulthood its failure comes to
represent for her son, the narrator. But on the other hand we find this 'secure'
linear patterning disrupted at several key points, points where attention is drawn
to a more fundamental 'dis-ease' in the narrative - the unease created by a
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radical dislocation between the narrator-as-youth, as teller, whose voice
(concrete, naive, descriptive) we hear almost throughout the text:
Glen looked back at me and his face was distorted and
strange. The air around him was full of white rising geese and he
seemed to want them all. 'Behind you, Les,' he yelled at me and
pointed. They're all behind you now.' I looked behind me, and
there were geese in the air as far as I could see, more than I knew
how many...The air around me vibrated and I could feel the wind
from their wings and it seemed to me I could kill as many as the
times I could shoot - a hundred or a thousand - and I raised my
gun, put the muzzle on the head of a white goose, and fired.57
and the invasive, ambiguously 'knowing' and yet detached voice of the narrator-
as-commentator, as meta-narrator so to speak: 'the door slammed behind her
and he looked at me then with a look I think now was helplessness, though I
could not see a way to change anything'(p.228-9) and 'I could only see the small,
dark top of her head, low in the back seat of the Nash, staring out and thinking
what I could not then begin to say'(p.231).
Very simply what these disruptions achieve is a haemorrhaging, as it were, of
the metonymic, linear narrative's significances. Such intrusions situate the realm
of significance not within or behind the narrated events, but within the 'now' of
the narrator's commentary. Invariably there is the implication that the narrator
could now "begin to say', but for some reason still does not. 'Meaning', then, far
from being a disguised presence, the presence of classic realism, becomes subtly
'in excess' of the linear narrative's authority.
The significance of this story arguably resides then not in a traditional
mimesis whereby certain events are selected and thereby become contiguously
revelatory, metonymically figural. Rather it resides in a 'slippage' or perhaps
more accurately elision of narratives whereby the linear telos, far from containing
figural 'meaning' becomes itself a figure, a trope. Thus the 'delinquent'
conclusion-denying boy's narrative of 'Communist' can be seen as a textual
figuring of the 'negative meaning' of the 'adult', commentating narrative - this
'negative meaning' being a postmodern condition of dissociation. Thus the
extreme metonymy of the boy's narrative is typologically aphasic, not simply
prosaic:
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A light can go out in the heart. All of this happened years ago,
but I still can feel now how sad and remote the world was to me.
Glen Baxter, I think now, was not a bad man, only a man scared of
something he'd never seen before - something soft in himself - his
life going a way he didn't like...I don't know what makes people do
what they do, or call themselves what they call themselves.(pp.242-
The metonymy is a form of narrative 'protection', a meta-mode so to speak,
reflexively mirroring a protective self-enclosure best illustrated by the boy's
response to Glen's attempt at getting to know him, at getting beneath the
(typically postmodern) opacity of his defensiveness, an opacity and defensiveness
shared by Glen, the communist, the 'other', always suppressed, under threat from
the dominant, but always there, 'everywhere now':
There were communists everywhere now, he said. You didn't
know them, but they were there...He said that communists were
always in danger and that he had to protect himself all the time.
And when he said that he pulled back his VFW jacket and showed
me the butt of a pistol he had stuck under his shirt against his bare
skin...And we kept walking. Though in a while he said, 'I don't
know much about you, Les. But I'd like to. What do you like to
do?'
'I like to box,' I said. 'My father did it. It's a good thing to
know.'
'I suppose you have to protect yourself too,'Glen said.
'I know how to,' I said.
'Do you like to watch TV,' Glen asked, and smiled.
'Not much.'
'I love to,' Glen said. 'I could watch it instead of eating if I had
one.'
I looked out straight ahead over the green tops of sage that
grew to the edge of the disked field, hoping to see the lake Glen
said was there. There was an airishness and a sweet smell that I
thought might be the place we were going, but I couldn't see
it.(pp.232-3)
Ford's text, however 'realistic', enters the realm of the postmodern not simply
by adopting a 'theme' of dissociation, then, but rather by mirroring such a
dissociation, even creating such a dissociation, within the text itself through
rupturing the secure then of the text with a typologically destabilizing,
deconstructive now.
Abish too confronts this dimension of semiological dislocation on intensely
metonymic, 'realistic' grounds, though How German Is It is of course far more
historically and culturally focused than the personal or domestic 'flashpoints' of
alienation, dissociation and dislocation characteristic of the American 'dirty
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realism'.58 But the text is as 'time-haunted' (and to the same end of epistemic
disjunction) as Ford's 'Communist', though for Abish it is the 'then' that ruptures
the text's 'now'. It is also, of course, 'question-haunted', like so many of Carver's
narratives, and as with Carver's questions we are never given any answers which
are not open-ended, multivalent and indeterminate. Again, Abish's characters
are as threatened as Carver's (or Ford's) by their own sense of personal or
existential contingency. Ulrich Hargenau is a 'man without qualities', a writer
(significantly) out of touch with his identity, his society and above all his
ambiguous history (he is officially the son of a German nobleman executed by
the Nazis, but in fact is illegitimate) all of which casts him existentially adrift.
'We were all in need of fortune tellers,' Jayne Anne Phillips writes at the opening
of her story 'Rayme - A Memoir of the Seventies',59 and Ford has Frank
Bascombe in The Sportswriter acting on that need. Ulrich instead turns to
hypnosis, but the impulse is similar to that felt by the threatened selves of
Phillips' West Virginia, Mason's Kentucky, Ford and Carver's Mid-West.
Common to all is the insistent depiction of crises of identity in a terrifyingly
contingent history and world. Ulrich, a peculiarly and chillingly 'I-less' type of
the postmodern author, never needs the terrible moment of realization common
to the American new realists' epistemologically 'innocent' men and women
without qualities, but the book ends with the symbolic, or iconic crystallization
(rather than an 'epiphanic' realization) of his equally fundamental dislocation: 'I
returned to my car' he tells the psychoanalyst he visits at the close of the novel,
'musing over the fact that had I arrived at the bridge a minute sooner I would
have died without knowing my real name'.60 Then he is hypnotized:
And Ulrich, who felt pleasantly relaxed,slowly raised his arm,
perhaps for no better reason than a desire not to impede the
hypnosis, or a wish to please the doctor. For no other reason...He
knew, he was convinced, he was positive that he was not a good
hypnotic subject as he opened his eyes, with his right hand raised
in a stiff salute.(p.252)
Existing somewhere between the 'innocents' of the 'dirty realists' and the
European aesthetic self-awareness of Abish's Ulrich, Peter Handke's
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protagonists also find themselves dissociated from themselves and others
through the impenetrability of the (post)modern world's reflective semiological
surfaces, the texts which surround them and cut them off from meaning and
contextualization. Joseph Bloch of The Goalie's Anxiety at the Penalty Kick
begins the novel in a state of typical 'new realist' alienation:
When Joseph Bloch, a constniction worker who had once been
a well-known soccer goalie, reported for work that morning, he
was told that he was fired. At least that was how he interpreted
the fact that no one except the foreman looked up from his coffee
break when he appeared at the door of the construction shack.61
The situation is wholly postmodern; the 'firing' itself is indeterminate, our
reading of Bloch's interpretation of the foreman's sign is wholly open-ended,
Handke never telling us the facts of the case. Bloch's life-changing dilemma is
precipitated by nothing more than an indeterminate, finally opaque, multivalent
sign. Again, there are intimations of a dislocation, of a dissociation of self: one
of the first things we learn about Bloch is a 'sign' from his past, his 'textual'
identity as a well-known soccer player as opposed to a psychological
characterization. His identity as a soccer player has the security of a public,
'coded' identity in much the same way that a Victorian realist could provide a
character with a security of identity through the codes of 'God's guarantee' in
humanism and moral rationalism. By the time Handke's narrative opens
however this security of being has passed, and in a very short time even the
secondary security of a working identity has been removed or forfeited. It is only
a small step from here to Ford's restless drifters, Mason's culturally shipwrecked
rural Southerners, Frederick Barthelme's 'eccentric' (in the full sense of the
term), mysteriously disposessed narrators. And it is no coincidence that like
Joseph Bloch so many of Carver's characters are presented in a characteristically
'Handkean' state of indeterminacy, between jobs, drying out, in the midst of or
recovering from failed marriages, in the wake of arbitrary death.
For Robbe-Grillet, the postmodern open-endedness of the text is absolute,
his things in themselves, severed from all humanizing referentiality and
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significance stand at the very edge of an epistemological and (theoretically at
least) phenomenological vacuum. Arguably however, for Abish, Handke and the
American writers under discussion the open-endedness of the text implies not an
absolute shearing off of significance, but the necessary incompleteness of an
interface. The postmodern realist text is not the self-contained world-unto-itself
of the epistemologically secure, 'well made' texts of 'high realism'; neither is it the
equally epistemologically complacent, equally self-contained Idealist icon of the
self-referential metafictional text. But whereas Robbe-Grillet, an early initiator
of a desacralized realism, starts from a conception of the object which is,
ironically enough, as metaphysical (since it is, in effect, designed to render the
object as meta-social, meta-personal and meta-functional; ultimately therefore
meta-physical,) as any held by earlier realists under 'God's guarantee' the new
American realism is prepared to start from the phenomenal texts of life. The
inarticulate discourses of divorce, alcoholism, redundancy common to this new
realism are far from rarefied, are in fact meticulously concretized, naturalized,
social situations, though no less textual for that: Wittgenstein's 'rough ground' as
opposed to the 'slippery ice' of ultimist Ideal scepticism.62 Its resonances are
authentically postmodern, are enigmatic and open-ended, never 'sacralized' into
universality. Its 'epiphanies' are sceptical epiphanies, revelations not of any
transcendental or metaphysical meaningfulness (or even meaning/essness) but of
a root textuality which is not safely separated from life by the textual narrative,
but is in fact the very texture of postmodern life itself; is, in Michel Butor's
words, 'that fundamental narrative in which our whole life is steeped'.63 Thus
Joseph Bloch finds himself in the same state of epistemic confusion as the
postmodern author, finding himself having to verbalize reality, having to
textualise the visible before he can imaginatively appropriate or even simply
accomodate it, since in a world where signs are not under 'God's guarantee' any
more than things, the thing itself can only be 'narrated', textualized, never
authoritatively named:
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He had barely closed his eyes again when the flowers and the tea
kettle were unimaginable. He resorted to thinking up sentences
about the things instead of words for them, in the belief that a
story made up of such sentences would help him visualize things.64
This dislocation of the ability to name, to semiologically fix, that Bloch is
undergoing is once again paralleled in typical 'dirty realist' texts. Here the stories
themselves perform Bloch's 'archetypal' dissociation, their narratives
characteristically forming around the absent centres where meaning, where
'fixture', is expected: absent names, absent identities, of things as well as people.
Such narratives (common to any of the contemporary realists so far mentioned,
and several besides) often settle on a physical signifying focus which invites and
yet resists valorization - a place (Shiloh, Alaska or Rock Springs); the act of
taking a bath; bicycles, muscles and cigarettes.
Carver's story The Bridle' throws a great deal of light on this recurring trope.
At a key moment in the narrative, the first mention of the bridle, we see the
narrator, on impulse, writing her name on each one of a bundle of one hundred
dollar bills:
I watch them unload their boxes, suitcases and clothes. Holits
carries in something that has straps hanging from it. It takes a
minute, but then I figure out it's a bridle. I don't know what to do
next. I don't feel like doing anything. So I take the Grants out of
the cashbox. I just put them in there, but I take them out again.
The bills have come from Minnesota. Who knows where they'll be
this time next week?...They could go anyplace, and anything could
happen because of them. I write my name in ink across Grant's
broad old forehead: MARGE. I print it. I do it on every one.
Right over his thick brows. People will stop in the middle of their
spending and wonder. Who's this Marge? That's what they'll ask
themselves. Who's this Marge?(p.421)
The linkage is not incidental. At the close of the story the family has moved
on, but the bridle, their 'sign', or 'referent', has been left. Again it is an
irreducibly 'physical' significance and as such denotes the familiar 'absence' noted
above; but through the subtle linking of the marking of the notes and the
appearance of the bridle this absence becomes consonant with lack, with a lack
of integrated identity, of secure being, which physical referents (the bills, the
bridle) can semiologically 'carry' but not, as in traditional, 'symbolic' realism,
redeem. Thus the bridle does not finally figure as a valorizing, fixing referent of
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the Hollits family, but as an inducer of movement, of (in the context of the sort
of movement seen in the story) dis-location, displacement, a dynamic of absence
consonant with the 'diffraction of the self, [the] transgression of the identity
principle'65 which is the dynamic behind Marge's signing and 'dispersing' of the
bills. Instead of the physical-as-denotive, as revelatory, we find the physical-as-
dislocative opacity, in the same way that Bloch confronted with the flowers and
the tea kettle does. Both bills and bridle induce a 'diffraction' rather than
security and fixture, a diffraction where 'the subject is dispersed...enmeshed
within and finally lost among the endless relay of signification, the infinite
substitutions in the chain of the signifier'.66 One thinks of Marge's 'they could go
anyplace and anything could happen because of them', her figural 'losing' (or
loosing) of her 'identity' to 'the infinite substitutions in the chain of the signifier'
('I can imagine one of the Grants finding its way out to Waikiki Beach, or else
some other place. Miami or New York City. New Orleans. I think about one of
those bills changing hands during Mardi Gras...'(p.421)) represented by the
endless transactions ('infinite substitutions in the chain') involving the bills.
Much the same can be said of the bridle, and indeed of the postmodern realist
text itself, the metonymic 'physicality' of which is fully consonant with the
semiological diaspora-inducing 'physicality' of its objects:
'Bridle,' I say. I hold it up to the window and look at it in the
light. It's not fancy, it's just an old dark leather bridle. I don't
know much about them. But I know that one part of it fits in the
mouth. That part's called the bit. It's made of steel. Reins go over
the head and up to where they're held on the neck between the
fingers. The rider pulls the reins this way and that, and the horse
turns. It's simple. The bit's heavy and cold. If you had to wear this
thing between your teeth, I guess you'd catch on in a hurry. When
you felt it pull, you'd know it was time. You'd know you were
going somewhere.(p.433)
In another story of Carver's, 'Why Don't You Dance', we see this
semiological/epistemic dislocation and the dynamic of 'diaspora' that results very
clearly. The story opens with a disrupting of codes, the domestic codes which
equate 'bedroom suite' with anything but 'front yard'. A simple but highly
effective inversion has occured, an epistemic dislocation whereby all the things
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that are taken for granted as signifying domesticity and privacy (bedroom
furniture) have been wrenched out of their textual context and harnessed to a
new, dissociating 'text': that of the public, open significance of a front yard. And
this dislocation takes the form of dispersal; what was in is now, disturbingly and
desperately, out:
In the kitchen, he poured another drink and looked at the
bedroom suite in his front yard. The mattress was stripped and the
candy-striped sheets lay beside two pillows on the chiffonier.
Except for that, things looked much the way they had in the
bedroom - nightstand and reading lamp on his side of the bed,
nightstand and reading lamp on her side.(p.l87)
The disruption continues as a young couple arrive and assume that the
scenario signifies a yard sale. Again two codes clash, one a 'code' of dispersal
and the other a 'code' of structuring, of accumulation - we are told that 'this girl
and this boy were furnishing a little apartment'. It is no surprize to find at the
end that like Joseph Bloch and Ulrich Hargenau the girl has undergone an
experience of semiological, even epistemic dislocation; a gulf has opened up
between signs she has never needed to articulate previously (since they have
been epistemelogically 'guaranteed' by her domestic presuppositions) and their
new, ambiguous and even disturbing re-alignment and consequent divestment of
'identity'. The result is a postmodern need to articulate, to somehow reaffirm the
'naming spell', to narrate out of this 'mise en abyme': 'She kept talking,' the story
ends. 'She told everyone. There was more to it, and she was trying to get it
talked out. After a time, she quit trying'(p.l91).
Abish is characteristically more overt in his exploration of the problematic
nature of communication in a semiologically dislocated, textual world, where the
text has a reflexively paradigmatic rather than simply interpretive or referential
relationship with reality:
The innovative novel is...a novel of disfamiliarization, a novel that
has ceased to concern itself with the mapping of the 'familiar'
world, for to do so would compel the characters to adopt a
perception of the everyday predicated on an unquestioning
affirmation of the function and role of the 'self in society, as rigidly
governed by the 'reality principle' and as subsumed by the logic of
everyday existence as we are.6'
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In principle this aesthetic of 'disfamiliarization' fits the fiction of both
Handke and the new American realism quite comfortably, and though Abish's
style and methodology is very different from, say, Carver's, the following
comment on Abish's 'Minds Meet' where Harry shoots a bank teller because he
embarrasses him by playing on the confusion of codes in criminal cliche ('Dough,
mocks the teller. What do you think this is, a bakery?"68) could very easily be re¬
cast to fit the situation of the girl in 'Why Don't You Dance' (and for that matter
Bloch in The Goalie'sAnxiety):
Abish emphasizes that the familiar in an aberrant situation is
enough to destroy orientation: that the violent act of shooting the
bank teller is a result both of exasperation with the familiar, and of
the shock of discovering it juxtaposed with unfamiliarity 69
In all these 'new realist' writers then we can see a definite shift away from
both the metafictional and nouveau roman orientations (which in their different
ways equally foreground the author/text relationship) towards a foregrounding
of what might initially be broadly termed a text/world relationship. This is
achieved not through representationalism as such however, but through a
paradigmatic contiguity between the fictional text and the texts of the
phenomenal world.
In short then the novel or story can 'represent' the world meaningfully not
because the text falsifies its textuality and masquerades as an invisible,
transparent vessel of either metaphysical or existential 'truth', but because the
world is not other than the text in the way that 'high realism' has more or less
supposed. This is a result not of the text becoming ever more 'lifelike', whether
through transparency or through the theory of the 'novel as action' proposed by
Katz, Federman and Sukenick,70 but of the world becoming ever more text-like.
The world/text dichotomy which has haunted twentieth century aesthetics no
longer properly exists in the fictions of the new realism. What is represented in
postmodern realism is, typically, textuality. Its themes are the phenomenal
effects and moral/ideological implications and consequences of that textuality,
whether in the humble domestic sphere of Carver's fictions, the intensely
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personal, psychotic sphere of Handke's tragedies or the socio-historical,
ideologically engaged sphere of Abish's sceptical dissections of a whole culture.
Aesthetically, what now exists in these postmodern epistemes is a world/text
interface.
Postmodernism has arguably come of age in the fiction of Abish, Handke
and Carver in that it is no longer about, but of, a reflexive condition of life.
Handke writes his fictions then 'in a world defined by Wittgenstein, Chomsky,
and other theorists of language and reality', not about such a linguistically self-
conscious, postmodern world, and so it does seem to be the case, as Klinkowitz
claims, that 'if the self-reflective works of Ronald Sukenick, Gilbert Sorrentino,
Robert Coover and Steve Katz represent innovative fiction in its adolescence,
Handke's work serves as a good example of what the post-innovative novel may
be like'.71
It would appear therefore that a postmodern mimesis, or engagement with
reality, is made at least possible by the new realism. A mimesis not of the
postmodern author's dilemma, (a mimesis which is pure diegesis in its self-
consciousness and so which loses all mimetic impact) but of the postmodern
condition. The dilemma is not so much central as integral to the fiction of the
new realism, whether European or American; it has ceased to be the disabling
epistemic concern it was for the Barth of 'Lost in the Funhouse' and also the
formal concern it was for the 'Disruptionists'. For the new realists the awareness
of reflexivity remains, and is implicitly acknowledged, not simply to highlight the
postmodern author's predicament but to highlight the more important issue of
the problem of contact, contact with the past through the texts of history, with
morality through the texts of ideology, power and desire, with contemporary
society through the texts of cultural discourse, with the self through the tangled
deferments of 'identity'.
This postmodern mimesis is perhaps best seen, as was argued earlier, as a
synthesized progression from the epiphanic tradition of realism and the radical
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epistemic scepticism of metafiction, thus avoiding the sterility of the nouveau
roman's attempts to forge a self-consciously postmodern form of realism by
generating the necessary 'interface' between reader and text without abandoning
the reflexive awareness of textuality. The mimetic 'shock of connection' is
therefore characterized by both product and process mimesis, and it is this
integral duality that is ignored by Klinkowitz in his essay on the new realism, by
the novelists of the nouveau roman and 'Barthian' ultimism.
This duality is the essence of the 'sceptical epiphany', the 'lateral' epiphany of
signs as opposed to the 'vertical' epiphany of transcendence or existential insight.
As Carver observes in his essay 'Fires': 'I'd had, I realized later, an insight. But so
what. What are insights? They don't help any. They just make things harder'.72
The mimetic contact is achieved not through the supposed referential (in its
psychological or 'truth-telling' representational sense) potential of the text, but
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through a 'p^formative' dimension akin to Hortwig Isernhagen's 'pragmatic
dimension of the text...its Leserappell'73; basically its phenomenal or interactive
qualities which communicate not a referred-to world of stable, sacralized
meanings, but its own interaction as text with text; a 'performing' not of 'meaning'
but of 'significances':
The most fundamental way in which the form can, then, mirror
the themes of loss is through a denial of that activity of ordering
that is automatically ascribed to everyday languages as well as to
more conventional literary ones as their basic function: semantic
reference. In the terms or Charles William Morris's semiotics, the
semantic dimension of the fictional text breaks down or becomes
unstable. There results a shift to (again in Morris's terms) the
pragmatic dimension of the text: its interaction with the reader, its
Leserappell, one might also say, there occurs a shift from meaning
to significance.74
The concept of this 'pragmatic dimension,' this Leserappell,' is a useful one
for beginning to theoretically 'picture' the strategies that the texts of postmodern
realism use in order to 'relate' to the world and progress from the
epistemological quandaries that condemned much of metafiction's attempts at
escaping from a progressively more trite self-reflexiveness to failure. The
scepticism is still clearly present and there is therefore no return to a pure
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'product mimesis' of meaning rather than significance; the strategy is not
representational but pragmatic. Abish, certainly, is explicit about the contrived
nature of the fictional Germany he has created in How German Is It, and yet on
the other hand is not willing to push this aesthetic given to a purely reflexive
freeing of the text from all strings of (epistemic, ideological, historical and
moral) significance. The iconic, the signs we live by, are no less significant and
affective for their irreducibly 'textual' as opposed to 'essential' nature. After all,
as Abish concludes the novel: 'Is it possible for anyone in Germany, nowadays, to
raise his right hand for whatever reason and not be flooded by the memory of a
dream to end all dreams?'(p.252).
The text should be seen therefore as drawing attention not to the text as
pure artifice, pure aesthetic play, but to the text as, despite its inherent
artificiality, significantly and affectively relating to, performing as opposed to
representing in any 'high realist' sense, the dynamics of an equally textual, also
phenomenal, textually determining as well as determined, world. As Carver puts
it in his essay 'On Writing': 'If writers haven't taken leave of their senses,
they...want to stay in touch with us, they want to carry news from their world to
ours'.75
Isernhagen's concept of the Leserappell is derived from and applied to
Modernist as well as postmodern works, and in both cases he sees a duality
between product and process mimesis at work. There is, however, a valid
distinction to be drawn between the mimetic function of the Leserappell in the
Modernist and postmodernist realistic repertoires. John Updike's The Centaur
has been read by Keith Opdahl for instance as an example of realism employing
a technique of process mimesis: 'in The Centaur Updike uses myth for the
purposes of verisimilitude, creating a more subjective and certainly more
powerful mimesis'.76 In other words, the irrealism of the narrative is subsumed
by the greater realism of effect. This seems a good example of Leserappell, but
the text remains distinctively non-postmodern. The Leserappell is generated by a
psychological affinity manufactured by the text between the reader and the
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characters of the fiction, which in turn makes the myth, the blatant fictiveness of
the work, authoritative and mimetic. But this is of course a Modernist
methodology, traceable to many more works than just its epitome Ulysses.
The postmodern Leserappell however foregrounds the semiological, not the
psychological; it too utilizes a 'universal' (language itself as opposed to discrete
myth) but with no pretences towards 'mythic' verities or insights into the human
heart; the focus is on the surface of things, there are no centaurs lurking under
the skin, only the semiological mass of the 'other' under the language:
Where Hemingway's purified style was meant to imply volumes of
unspoken knowledge, like the seven eighths or an ice-berg
underwater, Carver's method suggests that the other seven eighths
either isn't there or isn't knowable...As in a relentless close-up, we
hear and see exactly what these people do, but why they do it - or
whether anything intelligible goes through their minds as they do it
- we cannot confidently explain.77
as Dean Flower puts it. Or, as Abish in How German Is It more laconically
suggests:
Could it be that an inner turmoil, an absence of serenity, an
unresolved entanglement, self-doubt, self-hatred may be due to
nothing more serious than a person's inability to appreciate the
idyllic weather?(p. 16)
t
The mimetic contact derives not from a 'soft' interface, maj^able enough,
like myth, to fit a variety of existential moulds but from a 'hard', problematic
interface, capable of drawing as much attention to its intractibility as to its
'universality'. In the postmodern realist text, despite its apparent referentiality,
language, as relentlessly as in any metafictional work, sets its own terms: There
were things that needed talking about,' reflects the protagonist of Carver's 'A
Serious Talk', 'important things that had to be discussed...He'd tell her the
goddamn ashtray was a goddamn dish, for example'(p.256).
The postmodern Leserappell is very much a matter of language as opposed to
'meaning', therefore, though the fact that the sign is often dislocated from
meaningful (in the sense of orthodox or epistemologically secure) signification
should not obscure the fact that the dynamic of the texts is, if not always towards
a re-attachment or redeeming of significance, consistently directed towards
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foregrounding the need or at least longing for such a re-connection. And so the
narrator of Handke's Short Letter, Long Farewell tells us:
[Wjhen in telling someone what I had just been doing I
compulsively described all the partial actions of which the total
was composed. If I went into a house, I never said, 'I went'into the
house', but, 'I wiped my shoes, turned the door handle, pushed the
door, went in, and closed the door behind me'.78
As Klinkowitz comments on the above passage:
In this manner, Handke's work takes the logical next step beyond
metafiction. The narrator is performing for himself the same act,
with the same goal, that he would for the reader.79
It is in a form of Leserappell therefore that Klinkowitz identifies the moving
on from metafiction, in the eliding of the semiologically problematic,
paradigmatic interaction of the fictional text with the texts of the 'real'. It is here
that the postmodern realistic methodology, and with it a postmodern mimesis,
may be found. The fictional practice of the new realists is a practice geared
above all to the exploration of and re-engagement with, the phenomenal realities
of a textually shattered world.
Frederick Barthelme, recalling the enormous influence the work of the
metafictionist's of the 1960s had on his own early fiction and the early fiction of
much of his generation, has identified the aesthetic 'moment' of metafiction's
exhaustion, and by extension the 'moment' of his own turning to a fictional re-
engagement with the phenomenal, away from the 'trick...at the center':
Some people were thinking, 'Well, so much for irony.' Because
once you'd been to the big 'all over' irony of the post-modern, you
couldn't very well go back to the periodic...I'm not sure everybody
was thinking 'So much for irony,' but it was talked about a lot, even
though the big guys had said irony was all the way of it, the only
way, said the world was broken and could not be apprehended
without it. That looked and sounded right...The trick was a
suspension-of-disbelief thing, with the real world viewed as the
fiction. This is a reverse whammy: the real treated as if it requires
suspension of disbelief, becomes unreal, and knowable (by reason
of being self-determined). That trick was at the center back then,
but the problem was you figured it out, and once you figured it out
it wasn't interesting any more.80
And in the light of this American experience of Barthelme's, it is interesting
to note that despite their working within and out of very different cultural and
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even aesthetic milieus, both Abish and Handke also began their careers with
work which was self-consciously metafictional: Handke with the play Insulting the
Audience and Abish with Alphabeticcd Africa, but that even in a work as formally
self-conscious as the latter, a broadly parallel impulse towards a break with the
more unquestioning self-reflexiveness of the 'Disruptionists' is emergent. At the
aesthetic epicentre of Abish's first novel is not an epistemological irreverence,
Barthelme's 'trick', Barth's ultimacy, but a question, a question as to how the
world outside of the text can be reached given the inescapably reflexive material
of words that the writer works with, this being the point of the novel's
uncompromisingly artificial construction. As Abish himself puts it, he was,
fascinated to discover the extent to which a system could impose
upon the contents of a work a meaning that was fashioned by the
form, and then to see the degree to which the form, because of the
conspicuous obstacles, undermined that very meaning.81(Italics
mine)
In other words, the relationship between form and meaning has become a
matter of degree; the dogmatic rejection of any such relationship, or at least the
significance of any such relationship, has been undermined. Richard Martin
comments:
[Ejven as the erasor rubs out the physical word 'Africa', the reader
is tempted to ask whether it can be true for the narration that
Africa has ceased to exist. There is a very real sense in which
words, for Abish, have power. The importance of the individual
word is inextricably bound up with questions of signification.82
The keynote for Abish even in the 'extremist' Alphabetical Africa is not
sceptical certainty but sceptical ambiguity, the same sense of ambiguity which
runs through both his own and Handke's later work.
James Knowlton has noted in Handke's career 'a turning point' reached with
the publication of The Goalie's Anxiety, a change to a fictional vision which is
intimately akin to the worlds of semiological entrapment projected by Abish and
Carver. According to Knowlton, Handke's earlier works are characterized by 'an
obsession with the notion that language stands as a barrier, a pre-fixed, falsified
system of signifiers no longer representing a coherent world' while the later
works indicate:
43
a new direction in which more directly human concerns begin to
supplant the rather abstract view of humankind found in his earlier
work. In these novels of the middle period, real, living human
beings suffer in the semiotic process; their alienation often stems
from their inability to break through the language structures
surrounding them to reach the world 88
Handke's concern, then, according to Knowlton, is to provide an answer as it
were to the faintly dismissive rhetorical question posed by Alice Bloom regarding
Bobbie Ann Mason's work, a question equally applicable to any of the writers
under discussion:
The source of deepest terror in this novel is not the plot or the
characterization, but the style; and the recurrent, pervasive image
of terror is brand-name junk...When this is the junk that furnishes
the words that the characters are given to think with, as though this
ungodly man-made landscape of garbage were the only text
available to our time, then what thoughts can people think? Sam
is given...no language to talk or think or feel with. When Sam
describes a woman she really seems to like and admire, she thinks,
'Anita smelled nice, like a store at the mall that had a perfume
blower in the doorway.'84
This 'brand-name terror', Sam's 'inability to break through the language
structures surrounding [her] to reach the world', though figured here through
brand names, is closely identifiable with the more historically and ideologically
focused semiological 'terror' lacing How German Is It, a novel also constantly
juxtaposing human contact with the 'terror' of semiological opacity/evasion. The
same alienation suffered by Handke's or Mason's or Carver's characters as a
result of their 'inability to break through the language structures surrounding
them to reach the world', can be found early on in Abish's novel:
One runs little or no danger in speaking about the weather or
writing about the weather, or in repeating what others may have
said on that subject. It is safe to conclude that people discussing
the weather may be doing so in order to avoid a more
controversial subject, one that might irritate, annoy, or even anger
someone, anyone, within earshot.(p.ll)
This sentiment, that words serve as a blanket over more brutal codes (the
above passage immediately precedes an account of what Ulrich takes to be a
mysterious attempt on his life) is very much the ruling spirit not only of How
German Is It but also the works of Handke, Carver and indeed all the new
American realists. The very question 'how German is it?' may be seen in fact as
virtually paradigmatic for the question 'how postmodern is it?' as regards the new
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realism, implying as it does: how are we to locate 'meaning' in a textual world? a
question formulated in the light, or shadow, of a root contingency and
vulnerability: 'If I am ever asked,' says the narrator ofAlphabetical Africa, 'how I
could erase history, I can answer at once. It's easy. I bought an eraser.'85
These are the larger, socio-political implications, but the problem bleeds
down essentially unaltered into the equally contingent texts of familial and
personal life, into the lives of Joseph Bloch, Carver's Joe and Arlene Miller,
Mason's Sam and Emmet Hughes, Ford's Quinn in The Ultimate Good Luck.
Whether on a national or familial or even personal scale the dynamics of the
postmodern realist text are broadly the same: the struggle to apprehend
significances, the struggle to elevate contingent significances to meaning; the
struggles 'to break through the language structures surrounding them to reach
the world'.
More often than not this 'breaking through' signifies not illumination or
apotheosis however. There is a network of semantic enslavement at the heart of
almost any text by these writers; a network woven between the poles of
existential inarticulacy and Brumhold's dictum that 'existence does not take part
within the skin'(p,18). Thus while Carver's characters for instance are presented
'concretely' enough through the physical and signal minutiae of their lives, the
double sense implicit in William Stub's claim that 'nearly all Carver's characters
are "ex-s" of one sort or another' is far from fanciful.86 The confusion and
entrapment which results is not epiphanic in the Modernist sense, by virtue of its
cohering or transcendent qualities; it is 'epiphanic' by virtue of its revelation of
textuality (and hence the root differance in semiological 'otherness'), its decoding
properties, whether the message decoded (the 'otherness' revealed) is one of
mute brutality, true release or simply further confusion and an extension of
ambiguity. It is achieved through the typological 'self-betrayal' of the fictional
text. In simultaneously coding existence as a fictional construct and decoding
existence as part of that construct's function the postmodern realist text works as
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a 'double agent' as it were. This is the ambivalent, restless ground of the new
realism's postmodern mimesis.
Thus in How German Is It we see not only the ultimate example of society-
as-construct, the town of Brumholdstein, the world of surfaces which Klinkowitz
identified as the type of the postmodern literary 'canvas', but also that scene's
epistemological 'rupturing'. In prompting an interpretive response, the
disruptively unfamiliar, the 'epiphanic' (the discovery of the mass grave) decodes
and deconstructs the covertly ideological texts of that response; in this case the
responses of the town as a body of opinion, of Helmuth and, perhaps most
tellingly of all, the teacher, Miss Heller:
Helmuth was working in his makeshift office in the house
when Gisela, returning from school, raced up the stairs, eager to
inform him that the diggers had uncovered a grave, some even said
that it was a mass grave of German soldiers killed by the Russians
during the war.
The trouble with that theory, Helmuth pointed out, was that
the Russians had never reached Brumholdstein, or Durst, as it was
called at that time.
Gisela stared at him blankly. Then it must have been the
Americans?
Americans or the French or the English, but it is unlikely that
they encountered any resistance at Durst. What did Miss Heller
say in class? Or didn't she mention it?
She said, Rubbish. She said she didn't want to talk about it.
She said that a lot of people were killed in the war, and that it was
very sad.(p.l38)
The dynamic of the novel, and of Abish's work in general, is, broadly, one of
constant disruption, a constant pitting of 'humanized' against textualized reality,
meaning against significance. As Bradbury observes in his introduction to In the
Future Perfect:
We are confronted with situations that defy explanation...Abish is a
writer of a world with reduced meanings...But under flatness dark
meanings still hide, troubling the surface, so that the careful
inquiry of writing must go on, always sceptical about itself.87
Of course this tension is also at the thematic and methodological heart of the
fictions of Handke and the American 'dirty realism'. The stylistic techniques vary
greatly, but the integral epistemic dynamic of the fictions is constant.
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In How German Is It we see a wholly textualized world, a world where
'existence does not take place within the skin': Gisela and Egon, for instance,
posed for the cover photograph of a glossy magazine,
Participants in an ongoing German drama...
...Egon, in a double-breasted white gabardine suit, leaning
against the car. To be precise, he was casually (incidentally, this
casualness cannot be overemphasized) leaning...(p,125)
and so on. As Abish ironically comments, they are 'A picture, really, of the new
democratic Germany'(p.l29).
The opacity of their coded life is not constant however; their complacent
status as dehumanized signs, as signifiers of the 'new Germany', is ironically
undercut:
Something that is not shown is a shot of Gisela sulking...Gisela
crouching in a corner of her room. An atavistic return to the
corner of her childhood? Mouth tightly clenched, body perspiring,
tense. Eyes focused on some distant point in space.(p. 130)
'Something that is not shown': something that is not code, not surface text,
but intensely existential. This is the antithesis to the thesis of opacity and
textuality that so characterizes the Germany of the book, and by extension the
whole postmodern condition. The synthesis is the sceptical, negativized
'epiphany' of disruption, of deconstruction: Rita, the photographer involved in
the affair that sends Gisela into the corner exits the narrative in a sudden, though
not really surprizing, explosion of ideologically loaded violence:
In tearing the photographs out of her hands, he also tore her
denim shirt. When he took the prints to the table, under the
watchful eyes of Gisela, tiny dots of blood formed a beaded arc on
his left cheek. Screaming, Rita lunged at him, clawing at his face,
while he laughingly defended himself with one hand, with the other
gripping the jumbled pile of photographs, some bent, some
torn.(p.202)
The discovery of the mass grave follows directly on from the beginning of the
affair, and this primary disruption is intimately linked with the 'secondary'
disruptions such as the power struggle between Helmuth and Egon over Rita,
and the power struggles of Helmuth and Egon with Rita. For instance, the
photographs that Rita and Helmuth fight over are photographs of the open
grave. Between the two poles of Rita's codifying, textualizing photographer's
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impulse (significantly she considers titling a projected book of the photographs
'The New Germany: Brumholdstein Past and Present', the irony being on Abish's
part, not her own) and Helmuth's equally questionable architect's impulse to
destroy with his own built 'New Germany' all evidence of the past lies the
impulse to violence. Opacity, by definition signally unyielding, when polarized
can induce only conflict. The ideological opacity characterizing both Rita and
Helmuth's identities is not so much deciphered as acted out, performed (a
recurring motif in the novel's critique of power: 'Does Franz accurately mimick
power when he apes the self-conscious buffoonery of the mayor of
Brumholdstein?'(p.158)) in a 'body-language' of violence.
Many other events in the book reinforce this presenting of signally opaque,
physically performed power as not simply text, but 'the text to end all texts' (a
sinister extension of Butor's 'fundamental narrative in which our whole life is
steeped') to modify the concluding lines of the novel. For instance, Egon and
Gisela's dog is ironically shown as a consummate product of postmodern opacity,
functioning only within a matrix of 'floating' signifiers, its existence consequently
lost 'among the interstices of language', the 'prolonged void between one signal
and the next', helplessly contingent, in 'doubt':
Like any guard dog taught to respond instantly to a variety of
urgent signals, he had grown accustomed to the uncertain existence
- the state of doubt - in that prolonged void between one signal and
the next.(p.l26)
But the authority, the power of the signs, does not limit the physical fact of
the dog's own power, they merely provide a system whereby that 'semiotic'
opacity of power can be naturalized, made familiar, semiologically 'built over'
just as Brumholdstein is built over Durst. We learn later that the dog has to be
destroyed for devouring a neighbour's smaller dog; the coded 'familiar' text of the
dog's notionally contained behaviour is ruptured by the event, a small but
significant (and blackly comic) mirroring of the more obviously significant
disruptions in the text: Brumholdstein becoming an unmarked gravestone, the
close of the novel where all the codes of intrigue, deferment and alienation
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focused in Ulrich are crystallized into the Nazi salute, the 'gesture to end all
gestures', 'text to end all texts' as much as 'dream to end all dreams'.
This key notion of textuality as not antithetical to the 'representable',
phenomenal 'other' of the world but as the very form, the 'fundamental narrative'
of that world, can be seen equally clearly in a fairly representative 'dirty realist'
text - Carver's 'Chefs House'. Here, just as in the superficially so dissimilar Hoy.'
German Is It we can identify the presence of codes which cannot be finally
separated out into distinct categories of semiological and physical; rather there is
a persistent fusing or eliding of the two, recalling Ford's 'Communist' where it is
ultimately impossible to prise apart the apparently referential significances of the
physical (the narrator's boxing, say) from the reflexive significances of the
typological (the metonymic, 'protective' narrative mode). Thus in 'Chefs House'
the initial 'power struggle' which is to occur between Wes, a struggling to reform
alcoholic, and alcohol (or more accurately the code of the familiar, the 'text' of
the alcoholic lifestyle which Wes is trapped by just as Egon's dog is enmeshed by
its primitive semiological matrix of commands) is put immediately, if obliquely,
into a semiological context: 'He called again and said, Edna, you can see the
ocean from the front window. You can smell salt in the air. I listened to him
talk. He didn't slur his words'(p.308).
Wes and the narrator, his estranged wife Edna, get back together at Chefs
house (a recovered alcoholic out to help Wes) and the summer they spend
together is a success. The codes that form the 'text' of a marriage are gradually
re-established:
I knew better, but after being a month with Wes in Chefs house, I
put my wedding ring back on. I hadn't worn the ring in two years.
Not since the night Wes was drunk and threw his ring into a peach
orchard.(p.308)
Communication and reciprocity are established against such 'opaque', random
significances (it is interesting to note again the dynamic of divestment, of
dispersal in this recollection) and the 'marriage text' becomes coherent and
cohesive enough to dominate the alcoholic, 'centrifugal' code of fragmentation.
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In place of divestment, we see 'accumulation' through gifts and Wes's 'taking' of
the narrator into his arms:
One Sunday afternoon Wes went out to get a sprinkler and came
back with something for me. He came back with a nice bunch of
daisies and a straw hat. Tuesday evenings we'd go to a movie.
Other nights Wes would go to what he called his Don't Drink
meetings...At night, Wes would take me in his arms and ask me if I
was still his girl.(pp.308-9)
ft,
But significantly these gestural codes of reconcilijtion are inescapably
precarious; there is always lurking the sense of 'the uncertain existence - the state
of doubt - in that prolonged void between one signal and the next' which has
been left behind. An underlying tenuousness is constantly indicated, the
seasonal nature of the reconciliation, for instance: 'I found myself wishing that
summer wouldn't end', says Edna, the inevitability of seasonal change instilling a
crushing sense of fatalism into the narrative.
The feared 'crack-up' finally begins when Chef himself turns up, telling them
they have to make way for his daughter. Again the dynamic of break-up, like the
dynamic of reconciliation, is heralded and sustained in semiological terms, we
know the bubble has burst when an alcoholic code first intrudes on the new
marriage code. 'Chef said his daughter, Linda, the woman Wes used to call Fat
Linda from the time of his drinking days, needed a place to live and this place was
it'(p.309). The semiological displacement of a naming habit becomes the index
to their physical displacement from the house, and, ultimately, from each other:
'Fat Linda's going to live here now instead of us, Wes said. He held his cup, but
he didn't drink from it'(p.310).
Likewise the tenuousness of the 'domestic code' with which the couple have
'sacralized' the physical objects of the house is emphasized:
Wes came inside the house. He dropped his hat and gloves on
the carpet and sat down in the big chair. Chefs chair, it occured to
me. Chefs carpet, even...
...We'll get another house, I said.
Not like this one, Wes said. It wouldn't be the same, anyway.
This house has good memories to it.(pp.309-10)
The semiological sacralizing of the house is what matters to Wes, a man at
the mercy of texts who has briefly, for a summer, found relief from the 'inability
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to break through the [encoding] structures surrounding [him] to reach the world',
from Abish's 'state of doubt...between one signal and the next'. Chefs house is
finally one of many fictional manifestations of Carver's 'borrowed room',88 the
almost archetypal postmodern space and site of the new realist performance.
The rest of the story charts the inevitable disintegration, and again it takes
place in a context of semiological dissociation which elides the phenomenal,
physical breakdown and an epistemic, even ontological, 'seizure' of being:
He said, I'm sorry, but I can't talk like somebody I'm not. I'm
not somebody else. If I was somebody else I sure as hell wouldn't
be here. If I was somebody else, I wouldn't be me...
...I said his name to myself. It was an easy name to say, and I'd
been used to saying it for a long time. Then I said it once more.
This time I said it out loud. Wes, I said.
He opened his eyes. But he didn't look at me. He just sat
where he was and looked towards the window. Fat Linda, he said.
But I knew it wasn't her. She was nothing. Just a name.(pp.311-2)
The gulf which has opened up between them is a semiological divide. His
name no longer 'identifies' him and evokes a reflexive opacity rather than a
referential transparency. Fat Linda becomes an empty signifier, 'just a name';
the defeat is in this breakdown of 'naming' (as it was for Handke's Bloch,
Mason's Sam Hughes), in the 'terror' of Abish's 'state of doubt', the real
inducement to the at least doubt-free oblivion of drink.
In Handke's Across we see the same process enacted on a scale somewhere
between the historical/cultural generalities of Abish and the domestic
particularities of Carver. In a key scene preceding his murder of a man daubing
swastikas on trees we find the protagonist, Loser, kicking up political sign-boards
along a canal bank. The soon to follow murder and the vandalism are clearly
connected. There are undertones of a disruptiveness which goes far beyond
vandalism in his small war waged on the signifying world: not only are there links
with the murder (apart from anything else, the murdered man is in one sense
simply an erector of political 'sign-boards') but also hints of the moral ambiguity
latent in such an impulse (setting aside for a moment the obvious moral
problems raised by murder). 'No one was watching me, and if they had been,
they might have thought they were witnessing some anonymous official act',89
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Loser tells us, a reference certainly to the totalitarianism lurking under the
destruction of signs as surely as under the erection of certain signs. The
threatening dynamic is the same: the binary polarizing of the ambiguous,
contingent texts of life against the 'crystallized' semiology of 'action'; not
revelatory, 'epiphanic' action, rather the disruptive breaking through of the
textual matrix into an 'unknowable' opacity, the incarnation in violent action of
Alice Bloom's 'terror(ism)' (one thinks of Bloch's murder of the cinema cashier,
prompted as it is by his frustration at her 'impenetrably' phatic conversation). It
is the opacity evoked in Frederick Barthelme's recognition 'that experience itself
was a language, even if it was a language mostly unknowable'.90
'Chefs House' ends with Wes pulling the drapes and shutting out the ocean.
It is an image of a retreat into the extreme epistemic 'security' of the alcoholic,
the final glimpse of his defeat by 'textuality', by his inability to live in a
desacralized world. It mirrors Ulrich's final gesture, his Nazi salute. Both
endings reveal the eruption of codes sublimated through the length of the lisible
narrative. Both are more or less 'iconic' moments which crystallize in action the
'fluid' semiological tensions and ambiguities that haunt the 'referentiality' of the
fictions. Both reveal the 'terror' of the crucial interface between the textual and
the 'real', and both texts, in embodying this interface in themselves, occur as both
referential and reflexive. As Irving Malin says of Abish, he is 'less interested in
plot and character...than in the words which contain them',91 and as Wes puts it
for himself, 'I'm sorry, but I can't talk like somebody I'm not'.
The mimesis of such an interface then may be seen as both a 'product' and
'process' mimesis, neither identifiable with the pure diegesis of metafiction nor,
as Marc Chenetier comments, the unreflexive 'tit-for-tat, sign for thing
journalistic investigation into the existence of mainstream alienation and the
marginality of the self of traditional, psychological realism.92 These 'interfacial'
texts deal with epistemic elision, not the ultimist polarizations of opacity and
transparency.
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A recurring figure in Handke's Across is that of the threshold; Loser in fact
describes himself as 'a thresholdologist (or seeker after thresholds)'(p.ll) and of
course the threshold is a form of interface, a figure which finally takes us beyond
the binary, oppositional terms of ultimacy and towards a 'rhetoric' more suited to
the exploratory dynamics ('every step, every glance') of the new realist aesthetics:
For a threshold, he says, is not a boundary - boundaries are on the
increase both in inner and in outer life - but a precinct...Every step,
every glance, every gesture, says the teacher, should be aware of
itself as a possible threshold and thus recreate what has been
lost.(p.67)
Against the 'literary suicide note' of postmodern ultimacy then, it is possible
to hold in almost direct opposition the far more fruitful texts of a new, equally
postmodern apprehension of what an adequative, mimetic literature in such an
age might mean, and above all it means not exhaustion and silence, but the
Leserappell of narrative, of story: 'You see I've noticed', Loser reflects, 'there's no
better way of getting people to tell stories than to ask them about
thresholds'.(p.70)
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In the introduction to his bio-bibliographical guide to postmodern fiction Larry
McCaffery, commenting on the variety of Modernist influences on the new
fiction, writes that:
looming over the entire literary landscape, is the figure of James
Joyce, the Dead Father of postmodern fiction, who must be dealt
with, slain, the pieces of his genius ritually eaten and digested.93
And indeed, so far it has been in the context (or shadow) of Joyce, or at least
of European Modernism, that both Richard Ford's and Raymond Carver's fiction
has been set. The epistemic contextualization undertaken in the preceding
sections has been with reference first to implicitly post-Joycean metafictional
tabulation and then to the very European postmodern realism of Abish and
Handke, writing as they seem to be in the Modernist wakes of Mann and Musil
in particular.
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The reason for this is simply that postmodernism, like Modernism before it,
has generated an epistemological homogeneity, however variously that epistemic
unity may be incarnated through differing fictional methodologies. As David
Lodge comments on the Modernist Stein:
[T]he point I want to stress about Stein's work is this: though The
Making ofAmericans and Tender Buttons tend toward the opposite
poles of metonymy and metaphor, they are both recognizably
'modernist' and both pursue the same general artistic aim - to
render that elusive quality, 'existence'.94
As regards more recent literature we find John Barth basing his critique of
'exhaustion' on an Argentinian fabulist, an Irish minimalist and an exiled Russian
aesthete, finding convincing epistemic correspondences between all three,
despite the obvious methodological contrasts between, say, Beckett and
Nabokov.
The two previous sections of this chapter have largely passed over questions
of methodological heterogeneity in order to highlight these important epistemic
correspondences which, as has been argued, occur not only within the loose
ranks of the metafictionists but also within the emergent phenomena of a new,
postmodern realism. But to approach Carver's work primarily epistemologically,
or even 'internationally', is, in a very significant sense, to bastardize it. American
postmodern realism has its own supremely influential 'Dead Father' 'who must
be dealt with, slain...ritually eaten and digested'; not Joyce but Hemingway.
In moving on from the generalizations of this introductory chapter the legacy
of Hemingway's re-shaping of the American realist tradition becomes ever more
central to anything like a full appreciation of the new American realism's
aesthetic radicalism. Consequently this study will now focus most closely (though
not exclusively) on the work of just two of its most representative voices, since it
is arguably these voices, Raymond Carver's and Richard Ford's, that have most
clearly and self-consciously 'ritually eaten and digested' their 'dead father', in
markedly different ways but to perhaps surprizingly, and certainly significantly,
similar ends.
54
What distinguishes postmodern fiction from other contemporary fiction
which is mindful of Modernism's achievements is, to stretch McCaffery's
metaphor, the extent of digestion. The nature of postmodernism's digestion and
organic transmutation of Modernism is twofold, is both epistemic and stylistic,
and, crucially, does not lead simply to a 're-hashing' of Modernist premises and
ambitions in either sphere, but to both ritual assimilation and, equally
importantly, ritual excretion. Those writers still working in a broadly 'Modernist'
mode, such as Bellow and Updike, tend to re-work a distinctly Modernist
methodology of reconciliation, supremely evident in Joyce.
Craig Werner, in his book Paradoxical Resolutions: American Fiction since
James Joyce, analyses this trend in depth, discovering the Joycean pattern of
resolution between the poles of romance and realism, the natural and the
symbolic, the metaphoric and the metonymic in many major contemporary texts,
including the perhaps obvious examples of Bellow's Herzog and Updike's The
Centaur. More interesting however is the attempt made by Werner to include
several unmistakeably postmodern writers in his claim that though
writers of this generation only occasionally 'copy' specific aspects of
Joyce's work...[tracing] their literary lineage more directly to either
Wright or Faulkner... the aspects of Faulkner's and Wright's work
which seem most appealing to them are those which parallel the
romantic-realistic reconciliation pioneered by Joyce.95
The claim is interesting because when held against Werner's in-depth
analyses of specific postmodern texts not only is its inadequacy as a general
formulation for a postmodern aesthetic made clear, but more importantly it
throws into relief the sort of approach which could be more fruitful. For
instance, in order to fit Sukenick in to his synthesis of Joycean legacies, Werner
has to concede the all-important fact that 'Ronald Sukenick's 98.6, while sharing
the desire for a constructive interraction between symbol and reality veers off
towards ultimate, though..not unintentional, irresolution,96(Italics mine). In
other words, though Sukenick is engaging with the familiar dialectics of
Modernism, that fact being Werner's justification for including him in the
'resolutions' thesis, his aesthetic attitude to those classic polarities is far from
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Modernistic, or reconciliatory. Werner's problem, which lead him into this self-
contradiction over Sukenick, is his failure to take into account the essentially
dual nature (assimilation/excretion) of postmodernism's development from its
undoubted roots in classic, Joycean Modernism. Thus, Werner, committed to a
thesis of 'paradoxical resolutions', is left with several critical 'indigestibles'. For
the new realist writers Modernistic resolution (the epiphanic) is itself simply one
vector in the search for a postmodern adequation, a postmodern 'paradoxical
resolution'; the classic synthesis of the mythopoeic has been recast as only a
constituent of less certain 'post-dialectical' explorations. Werner is left with a
'split' thesis: on the one hand the Joycean lineage is intact in postmodern
literature, as seen in ongoing attempts to extend formal innovation, lj^uistic
playfulness and the exploitation (though for different ends) of the mythopoeic;
on the other hand of methodological significance, the lineage is not - the
hallmark of the great European Moderns, the struggle for epistemic
inclusiveness, for resolution, is absent.
To usefully approach the question of postmodern debts, and from there to
address Carver's debts to Hemingway as 'Dead Father', then, a very different
critical methodology is required. One such approach is David Lodge's The
Modes ofModem Writing where postmodern American literature is discussed not
in terms of a thematic reconciliation between the principles of romance and
reality, but in terms of typological discriminations between, and exploitations of,
the semantic modes underlying Werner's terms: metaphor and metonymy. In
short, Lodge defines the general characteristics of a postmodern methodology as
being posited not on reconciliation, but on omission, on a typological extremism
(again, Lloyd Smith's 'brain damage'). As Lodge puts it:
[I]t [postmodernism] seeks to find formal alternatives to
modernism as well as to antimodernism. The falsity of the
patterns imposed upon experience in the traditional realistic novel
is common ground between the modernists and the
postmodernists, but to the latter it seems that the modernists, too,
for all their experimentation, obliquity and complexity,
oversimplified the world and held out a false hope of somehow
making it at home in the human mind.97
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And so, whereas Werner uses The Centaur to establish thematic 'proofs' of
the continuity of structural resolutions through Joyce, Lodge draws attention to
textual 'proofs' which illustrate structural irresolution in postmodern writing:
The Unnameable...is representative of a text in which the narrator is condemned
to oscillate between irreconcilable desires and assertions'(p.229); sexual
ambivalence in Giles Goat Boy and Federmann's Double or Nothing is pointed to
as a signifier of the binary oppositions embedded and elided in the texts'
structures, as are the stock postmodern devices of alternative narratives, random
text generation and reception, and so on. Lodge's discussion of metaphor and
metonymy as binary poles is concluded with a study of the extremism to which
the structuralist concept of that polarity has been appropriated by postmodern
fiction, and the implications are clear: the structural typologies underlying
Werner's notion of 'paradoxical resolutions' are open to and have undergone
aesthetic exploitations which themselves structurally govern the epistemic
significances of the text. In other words, though a Modernistic aesthetic of
reconciliation may find new formal and thematic ways of merging the two
structural forces into a necessarily mythopoeic whole, a postmodern aesthetic
tends always towards a recognition (explicit or implicit) of the structural
typologies as textually determinative, or even deconstructive (as a result of their
essentially binary nature) imperatives. Thus Lodge sees postmodern fiction as
an attempt to 'deploy both metaphoric and metonymic devices in radically new
ways'(p.228) and, far from subsuming such deployments under a single banner of
'resolution', Lodge offers in conclusion the following possible 'headings' for an
attempt at classification: 'Contradiction', 'Permutation', 'Discontinuity',
'Randomness', 'Excess' and 'Short Circuit'. Lodge, arguably, shows clearly the
contradictory, disruptive nature of the crucial structural and linguistic dynamics
of continuity and reaction characterizing postmodernism's debts to Modernism,
dynamics fuelled by an eclectic and yet sceptical assimilation, not extension. The
broadly New Critical position that Werner adopts is useful in discussions of a
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textual icon such as Ulysses, but is inevitably strained when applied to an
aesthetic which is, in its modal extremism, performative rather than iconic.
The preceding section closed with Handke's claim that: 'Every step, every
glance, every gesture...should be aware of itself as a possible threshold and thus
recreate what has been lost'. And indeed, the struggle for fictional and yet
meaningful adequation mapped out in the earlier sections can be seen as being
resolved not through classic Modernistic resolutions at all, but through an
aesthetic grounded in the narrative act, and that act functioning not as metaphor
but as coherer, looking not to unite or resolve mythopoeically, but to offer a
means, grounded in metonymy, of communication from one side of the
Saussurian gulf to the other.
In a very similar way, using a methodology which clearly foreshadows
Carver's own (though essentially foreign to Abish's and Handke's) Hemingway
also of course more than any other Modernist foregrounded the act of narration
itself as an epistemologically and aesthetically homogenous, self-sustaining
imperative. Hemingway had no need of the imposed, extraneous mythopoeic
framing common to, say, Joyce and Faulkner, for the aesthetic fulfillment of his
fictions. This is, in essence, why for Carver as postmodernist, the Modernist
'Dead Father' he has had to ritually 'deal with' and assimilate has been the writer
of, in James Mellard's words, 'the cooler, performative exhibits' of In Our Time
and The Sun Also Rises rather than the '"classic" modernist...iconic' Dubliners and
Ulysses.98
But just as the iconic, mythopoeic tradition of Joyce has been assimilated
and transmuted by John Barth, the vernacular performative tradition has been
'dealt with' by the new realism of Carver; his fictions are no more an extension of
performative Modernism than they are of iconic, 'Wernerian' Modernism. The
problematics involved in understanding his postmodern debts can, however, only
reasonably be unravelled in the methodological light of Hemingway and
Anderson.
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CHAPTER TWO
'WHAT WAS THERE': RAYMOND CARVER'S
DELINQUENT MIMESIS
1
The early Hemingway, Hemingway the Modernist 'Dead Father', is above all
preoccupied with an epistemology and methodology not of representation, or
even of Modernistic resolution and adequation, but rather, following Cezanne
and Stein, of a prior, unwritten aesthetic deconstruction of 'consensus reality'
which could then be followed by a written re-construction; a process not
designed to bind sign to thing, or even 'romance' to 'reality' as Werner would
have it, but to dissolve both conventional and Modernistic bindings in the
creation of a pure world of prose style, There is no room for the symbolic or
imposed mythopoeic in Hemingway's early work because the prose is its own,
architectural Ideality and myth.
The essence of this point is, in many ways of course, a critical commonplace;
there have been innumerable studies of Hemingway's aesthetic, most, if not all,
recognizing the primary importance of style in approaching the significances of
his work, whether epistemic, thematic or structural. An examination of
Hemingway's methodology is, however, a very necessary key to the opening up of
the characteristic methodological techniques employed by American
postmoderns ranging from Vonnegut to Leonard Michaels, and perhaps pre¬
eminently by Ford and Carver. This is not to claim that Hemingway has
somehow more affinities with postmodernism than with Modernism; it is simply
to claim that whereas Joyce's extreme stylistic heterogeneity opened a way ahead
for Faulkner's fragmentations, postmodern methodological playfulness and an
ongoing tradition of formal innovation, Hemingway's extreme stylistic
/zomogeneity opened up possibilities for the postmodern phenomena of
rigorously metonymic 'obsessional' narration, a mode which embraces narrative
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strategies from the 'naive' narrations of Russel Edson to the elliptical ambiguities
of Raymond Carver.1 In James Mellard's words:
Having lost an ability to 'believe' in modernism's modes...For them
[postmoderns, or, as Mellard terms them, sophisticated moderns]
the act of writing becomes the 'reality' imitated, rather than any
conventional objective reality. As performance becomes a
modernist mode of reality, the rituals of authorship and
storytelling become 'authorities', as well as content, and the modes
of Stein, Hemingway, and Anderson have thus regained status they
had lost while subjectivity reigned after Faulkner.*
Though Mellard here doesn't have Carver particularly in mind, the
assimilation of Hemingway's methodology, a postmodern re-casting of his
performative, resonantly metonymic mode, is a fundamental aspect of Carver's
fiction. This assimilation is not significantly imitative or derivative, however; in
Carver (and to a greater or lesser extent almost any of the other new, 'dirty
realists') Hemingway (and the American vernacular realist tradition he, along
with Stein and Anderson, transformed with his Modernism) is digested fully on
behalf of the late Twentieth Century, and it is the implications of this fact rather
than the fact itself which are crucial to an understanding of Carver's
achievement.
There are several possible ways of approaching a comparative study of the
two writers. Three approaches which most usefully serve the purpose of
highlighting the 'slippage' between a distinctively Modernist and a distinctively
postmodern consciousness can perhaps be isolated however. The first is a
thematic study of the treatment of initiation, whether seen as an adolescent 'rite
of passage' or as a more general coming to terms with, or coming into a definitive
conflict with, a new order of experience. The second perspective is stylistically
orientated and concerns the use of the performative mode by both writers, in
particular the employment of narrative as a potential stylistic 'redemption' of
existential chaos. Finally, the third approach engages with epistemic slippage at
a typological level, exploring the uses of metaphor and metonymy by the two
authors and consequently the nature of silence, or omission, as generated and
given significance by the interraction of the two typological modes.
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Many stories offer themselves for analysis as regards the theme of initiation
in both writers' works. Almost all of Hemingway's stories deal with it in some
form or another and a high proportion of Carver's deal (on the surface at least)
with initiations into much the same felt 'ultimacies' that Ihab Hassan sees Nick
Adams as being progressively initiated into, namely, 'death, evil, love and
failure';3 death in 'The Ducks' for instance, evil in Tell the Women We're Going'
and 'Why,Honey?' and love and failure in almost any text of Carver's one could
choose to mention.
For both Hemingway and Carver, then, initiation is a highly significant index
to experience. The scale this index of initiation is 'measured' against however is
not uniform for the two writers, and two very different epistemic and aesthetic
'processes' or 'phenomena' are involved when Nick Adams confronts and is
initiated into the world of 'The Killers' and when Carver's adolescent protagonist
Jack is intiated into the more prosaic but no less brutal world of The Third
Thing That Killed My Father Off. The point is not simply the differences in the
static, situational backgrounds: what is far more significant is the vector of
initiation as it were, the structural dynamics of experience. Both Nick and Jack
are presented as adolescents at a critical, formative stage of their initiations into
adulthood, or 'experience'; but the force of this initiatory dynamic is not simply
emotional, or existential, as it would be in Sherwood Anderson for instance. It
has clear epistemological implications in the works of Hemingway and Carver
which serve not just to discriminate tentatively between the works, but to reveal
them as generating aesthetic significances which are wholly distinct in direction
and effect.
In short, Hemingway's vectors or dynamics of initiation lead inwards,
culminating in an obsessive, Cezanne-like re-structuring of conventionally
encoded perception. Carver's lead outwards into a de-structuring of those codes;
into uncertainty, increased contiguity, the consciousness left unassimilating and
unassimilated, left at the mercy of metonymous, contiguous forces which, for the
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protagonists, are wholly relative and largely incoherent. Nick, wading Big Two-
Hearted River, stalks his own ('stream' of) consciousness, leaning into it, braced
against its current, imposing a rigid, obsessive Ideal order on the experience
through the ritual of his fishing. Jack's story ends with fragmentation, with an
ironic diffusion of even the tenuous coherency he had begun to impose on it by
singling out Dummy's death as the most significant cause of his father's demise.
The narrative itself is the supposed vindication of this teasingly arbitrary
'selection' - a vindication, a certainty or ordering which, highly significantly, the
last sentence deconstructs utterly: 'But as I said, Pearl Harbor and having to
move back to his dad's place didn't do my dad one bit of good, either'(p.250).
In this story of Carver's and in the Nick Adams stories we see the existential
directions in which the two adolescents' initiatory experiences are taking them,
and those directions, however superficially analagous, in fact run counter to each
other. The shared reliance on an initiatory structure reveals fundamental
contrasts between a Modernist and a postmodernist use of vernacular 'realism';
the directionally contrasting existential dynamics that can be traced result from
an epistemic (even ontological) slippage between two structurally similar
methodological modes. Those existential dynamics, then, are not simply of
thematic significance. The general initiatory structures are wholly contrasting at
an epistemological level. Carver's structure channels experience outwards from
the dissociated self, towards a threatening, uncomprehended world of broken or
dislocated codes of meaning; Hemingway's structure channels experience
inwards to an epistemology of valorization, of aesthetic and stoic Idealism.4
Perhaps the aesthetic implications of these dynamics can be most clearly
seen in the greatest of Hemingway's 'culmination' narratives (which include 'Now
I Lay Me' and 'A Way You'll Never Be'), namely 'Big Two-Hearted River', where
every meticulously described physical event resonates through a finely tuned
artistry with ambiguous and powerful significances and correspondences - Nick
setting up camp 'in the good place', smoothing out his blanket, playing the great
trout that breaks free and contemplating the swamp. The epistemological
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'ground' of this story is not in any conventional, iconic sense symbolic, but neither
is it identifiable with an unreflexive, transparent, 'innocent' representationalism.
It is clearly one of ritual, ofperformance. As William Carlos Williams puts it:
To copy nature is a spineless activity; it gives us the sense of our
mere existence but hardly more than that. But to imitate nature
involves the verb...we then become nature, and so invent an object
which is an extension of that process.5
In 'Big Two-Hearted River' this aesthetic is fulfilled in the internalized
drama of Nick's Ideal reconstruction of the physical world, his 'extension of that
process' which is his psychological ritual of re-structuring. The earlier Nick
Adams stories look forward to this re-structuring in that the process of initiation
throughout the texts drives Nick inwards to ever deeper intimations of the
maxim: 'Know thyself, and the Hemingway corollary: 'Control thyself, even
'Ritualize thyself, and, thus, the world to thyself. As a result there is never any
real externalization, or more accurately socialization, of moral existence. Ole
Andreson in 'The Killers' for instance has a complete lack of faith in an outside
world of possibilites, of undetermined potentials:
He looked at the wall.
There ain't anything to do now.'
'Couldn't you fix it up some way?'
'No. I got in wrong.' He talked in the same flat voice. There
ain't anything to do. After a while I'll make up my mind to go
out.'6
The lesson Nick is initiated into in The Killers' is, quite simply, the
inadequacy of the world as an arena of moral, existential possibilities. All one
can do is live with oneself with restrained stoic dignity; the world as a harbour of
phenomenal possibilities is morally irrelevant almost (even To Have and Have
Not rings hollow in the context of the early work) and this vision is the powerful
heart of the story. The moral arena in Hemingway's work is always the enclosed,
self sufficient 'clean, well lighted place'. The furies and ultimacies are always
confined within the cafe, the metonymous consciousness, the boxing and the bull
ring.
In Carver's case the epistemic implications of his equally performative,
(closer in spirit to Carver's postmodern method than Carlos Williams's 'imitation
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of nature' is Chenetier's reading of his 'imitative exploration of the„.gap...at the
heart of experience'7) even delinquently ritualized, methodology are different to
the point of opposition. For Carver the textual re-structuring of the encoded
world is not a dynamic of internalization, of re-adequation according to Ideal,
rigidly stoic principles of moral/physical craftsmanship, though this contrast is
not to imply that Carver's protagonists do not try to make their own adequations
since their trying is what ironically links the two writers' methodologies at a
stylistic level. The point is that they lack the capacity to make an adequation
such as Nick does in 'Big Two-Hearted River'. Hemingway's aesthetic is founded
on a conception of knowledge as an unstated resource, and this knowledge,
mediated by a dignity of form, is the index to feeling in the best stories. In the
same way, the sometimes poignant, sometimes terrible rather than strictly
dignified epistemic absences in Carver's work are an index to feeling. Structural
method, then, for both writers mediates an index to epistemic and ontological as
well as existential correlatives. In fact the existential indices are inseparable
from these more fundamental indices; when comparing the capacities for feeling,
for existential signification in Hemingway and Carver's works, the true area of
inquiry is not the psychological but the epistemological. It is a question of
epistemic and ontological, structural rather than existential, capacities.
It is vital then to an understanding of the relationship between Hemingway
and Carver to appreciate not only that there is a significant slippage between
their ostensibly similar methodologies, but also to understand the nature of the
forces behind this dislocation since the slippage is not incidental to the two
writers but is in some ways paradigmatic for the problematic nature of the whole
of postmodernism's assimilation of Modernism. Very simply, what separates
Hemingway's world from Carver's is not differing capacities for experience and
feeling, but rather differing capacities for articulation and hence Being."
Hemingway's silences can be articulated, and sometimes are (embarrassingly by
Macomber and Robert Jordan); Carver's cannot. Adam Mars-Jones has written
of The Third Thing That Killed My Father Off: 'If three things can kill your
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father off, why not three thousand, or three million?'9 and though intended as a
criticism it highlights an important aspect of Carver's aesthetic, namely the
essential indeterminacy undermining the necessarily randomly grasped at
possibilities for explanation in a world that has to be 'artificially' reconciled to
the contingent self. Carver's silence, then, is not witheld knowledge, is not a
determinate verbal immanence behind the text; it is true absence, it is reflexively
aphasic, and it is this distinction that lies at the core of Carver's identity as an
American writer in the vernacular realist tradition in a postmodern age.
As suggested above, this distinction can be seen on a stylistic as well as
thematic level. Just as a thematic homogeneity (the common use of an initiation
experience) can be 'split' to reveal an underlying epistemic heterogeneity, so the
similarities in style can be shown to mask epistemic oppositions.
Both Hemingway's and Carver's fictions are performative (and implicitly
reflexive) in that the narrative mode is not 'transparent' but mannered, so that
the way of telling ultimately is what is told. The relevance of Carlos Williams'
aesthetic of 'performance' to Hemingway's fiction has already been noted, and in
Carver's case Chenetier comments: 'Discussing Carver's stories one cannot know
"what we talk about when we talk about them" without considering the rhetorical
model governing the manner in which, time after time, Carver performs them.'10
But epistemic oppositions emerge when attention shifts from the fact of
typological similarities in performance to the very different aesthetic ends
towards which the similar stylistic strategies are employed. Chenetier goes on to
say of Carver's use of rhetorical performance:
The tactical operations lexically bear on the use of indefinites (the
recurrence of 'it', 'what', 'something', and 'thing' is paramount
here); a permanent recycling of words from one sentence to the
next that generates semantic abrasion and anaphorically carries
the reader away from the original and already moderately
contextualized occurence.11
This observation is significant in that it develops Chenetier's earlier
proposition which could reasonably be applied equally appropriately to either
writer, in such a way as to sharply divide them. Basically, Chenetier has gone on
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from the stylistic to consider the epistemic foundation on which Carver's style
rests and towards which its disintegrative, 'levelling' tactics of dissociation and
absence tend. This epistemic destructiveness, where words are recycled in order
to leech them of their significances, is in complete contrast to the Cezanne-like
re-creative aesthetic of the early Hemingway. Where Carver's recycling leeches
and drains away, Hemingway's liturgical repetitions suffuse with a natural
symbolism, raise up the linguistic 'host' of the text. To use Naomi Schor's
terminology, where Carver 'desacralizes', Hemingway re-sacralizes, though it is
the epistemic status of the lex rather than the object which is at stake.
A comparison of Carver's story 'Nobody Said Anything' with 'Big Two-
Hearted River' shows up this distinction and its implications quite sharply. To a
certain extent, 'Nobody Said Anything' can be usefully read as a Carverian
'commentary' on 'Big Two-Hearted River', in fact: however much slighter
Carver's story is, the narrative frameworks of the two stories are very similar in
several key respects. In both a fishing trip is undertaken which becomes almost
an objective correlative for a deeper, unstated sub-text of encounter and
attempted resolution. More interesting than this very general structural parallel
however are the several lesser parallels, or correspondences, which Carver seems
to subvert, undermining the structural homogeneity by inverting the epistemic
authority associated with the ritualistically metonymic narrative mode. Thus, in
'Big Two-Hearted River' we read the following account of Nick's strike and
contest against the trout that he loses below his camp:
There was a long tug. Nick struck and the rod came alive and
dangerous, bent double, the line tightening, coming out of water,
tightening, all in a heavy, dangerous, steady pull...the line tightened
into sudden hardness and beyond the logs a huge trout went high
out of water...he felt, as he dropped the tip to ease the strain, the
moment when the strain was too great...Then it went slack...
...Nick reeled in. He had never seen so big a trout. There was
a heaviness, a power not to be held, and then the bulk of him, as
he jumped.
In Carver's text on the other hand we read the following account of the boy's
catching of his fish (he's in the middle of an erotic daydream and about to start
masturbating):
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Just as I was going to unzip, I heard a plop in the creek. I looked
and saw the tip of my fly rod jiggling.
He wasn't very big and didn't fight much. But I played him as long
as I could. He turned on his side and lay in the current down
below. I didn't know what he was. He looked strange. I tightened
the line and lifted him over the bank into the grass, where he
started wiggling. He was a trout. But he was green. I never saw
one like him before...It was as if he had been wrapped up in moss a
long time and the color had come off all over him...I wondered if
he was all right. I looked at him for a time longer, then I put him
out of his pain.13
There are several key 'subversions' which can be identified here, the
principal ones being the binary oppositions between vitality and exhaustion ('the
rod came alive and dangerous...a huge trout went high out of water...'/'I heard a
plop in the creek...he wasn't very big and didn't fight much...'); a natural majesty
and a faintly grotesque strangeness and dissociation (There was a heaviness, a
power not to be held...'/'He looked strange...I never saw one like him before...');
and finally, throughout the texts, between an Ideal immersion in a highly
physical, morally stoic world of hunting and absorption in the debased 'parodic'
Ideality of sexual pubescent fantasy.
Basically, what we can see in Carver's story, reading it in the light of 'Big
Two-Hearted River', is a desacralizing of the verbal and structural; in short, of
the methodological principles apparently common to both texts. The sentence
structures and metonymic constructions and even subject matter of the two
stories are strikingly similar, and yet any meaningful comparison of the two is
forced to proceed along lines not of direct correspondence but of epistemic
opposition. The leitmotif, almost, of 'Nobody Said Anything' is masturbation as
compulsion; the leitmotif of 'Big Two Hearted River' concentrated decision. The
epistemic authority of Hemingway's reconstruction of a world in 'Big Two-
Hearted River' rests firmly on Nick's psychological self-control, a correlative of
aesthetic authority. In 'Nobody Said Anything' however we read:
I decided I would wait until night before I thought about the
woman again...Then I thought I had better stop doing it so much.
About a month back, a Saturday when they were all gone, I had
picked up the Bible right after and promised and swore I wouldn't
do it again. But I got jism on the Bible, and the promising and
swearing lasted only a day or two, until I was by myself again.(p.48)
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In Hemingway, aesthetic discipline is nothing less than an epistemic value,
functioning on every level of the artistic creation, a methodology born out of and
reciprocally vindicating an epistemology of re-structuring, re-creating through
strictly controlled art. For Carver compulsion 'smears' the figure of textual
authority. There is, instead of stoic harmony, a postmodern unease in the face of
'iconic' authority and coherence, echoing the postmodern author's uneasy
relationship to the text as an epistemic authority ordering, and even, in
Hemingway's case, re-creating experience. The method, the style, pulls towards
such a presumption, but the unease is itself a subversion, an undermining of
Ideal methodological implications.
The action of 'Nobody Said Anything' culminates in the chase and capture of
a stranded fish, correlative for the tensions that run through the text. A measure
of reciprocity is reached between the protagonist and the other boy who finds
and tells him of the fish, this reciprocity being achieved through their joint
hunting of it. Despite quietly longing for friendship however, Carver's narrator
and the other boy are soon locked in covert rivalry over the capture of the fish.
The epistemic resonances behind these behavioural tensions emerge when the
fish is eventually caught. After nearly coming to blows the boys agree to halve it:
I pulled the stick out and laid the fish in the grass beside the
kid's bicycle. I took out the knife. A plane taxied down the runway
as I measured a line. 'Right here?' I said. The kid nodded. The
plane roared down the runway and lifted up right over our heads.
I started cutting down into him. I came to his guts and turned him
over and stripped everything out...I took the halves and worked
them in my hands and I tore him in two.(p.52)
Again, it's interesting to compare a 'parallel' action in 'Big Two-Hearted
River':
Nick cleaned them, slitting them from the vent to the tip of the
jaw. All the insides and the gills and tongue came out in one piece.
They were both males; long, grey-white strips of milt, smooth and
clean. All the insides clean and compact, coming out all together...
...He washed the trout in the stream. When he held them back
up in the water they looked like live fish.(p.l83)
Several oppositions stand out, of course; Nick's cleaning of his trout bears all
the hallmarks of 'Big Two-Hearted River's' inherent code of valorization, of
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epistemic authority. The job is 'clean' (a key word) and ritualistic, the style and
language ('smooth', 'clean', 'compact',) sacralizing the process until the re¬
creation of the event has taken on its full epistemic authority, containing chaos
and death behind the metonymic bars of the prose just as Nick contains death
behind the ritualizing of the fact: 'When he held them back up in the water they
looked like live fish'.
In Carver's story the key concepts of cleanness, compactness and smoothness
are all overturned; Nick's fish is 'slit', Carver's is "worked' apart and then torn in
two. In the passage from Hemingway the focus is on the fish, a focus that works
the natural into the symbolic, the phenomenal into the Ideal that, as a result,
harmonizes and heals. As Ficken puts it: 'It was important for Hemingway to
"write out" of himself the Nick stories, just as it was important for Nick to camp
and fish and cook out his problems'.14 In Carver's passage the focus is on the boy,
a focus interrupted only by an account of the aeroplane taking off over their
heads. Instead of an Ideal symbolism providing an index to some epistemic
valorization and harmonization, Carver provides a structural microcosm of the
destructive tensions inherent in the situation (and in the narrative as a whole)
which functions as a very different epistemic code, being less a legitimizing index
and more an extension into the epistemic of the desacralizing of the constructed
world of the text. In the structural microcosm of the gutting the plane ascends as
the knife descends; the transcendental image of escape and release, an ironic
correlative of the boy's fantasies, is held in a binary opposition to the violent
mutilation of the fish, echoing familial and psychological tensions and
functioning as an inversion of religious ritual (alongside the passage concerning
the Bible quoted above), specifically the Mass. The significance of this has
nothing to do with any religious 'sub-text'; the significance lies in the
desacralizing implications regarding ritual as transcendence, implications which
denote an epistemology of fragmentation (the metonymic principle of
unsacralized action held as it is in opposition to the metaphoric principle of
transcendence, the flight of the plane, the transcendence of the downward cut as
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it were which Nick achieves in 'Big Two-Hearted River' when he holds the
cleaned trout up in the water) and deconstruction rather than the
Hemingwayesque aesthetic of reconstruction.
To return to the initial contention: what Hemingway sacralizes through style
and language Carver desacralizes through a similar style and similar idiom, both
using narrative performance as, in Mellard's phrase, 'a mode of reality'. Thus
both utilize an aesthetic reductionism to an epistemic end, Hemingway in order
to reduce to a basic, irreducible 'nature' which is the reconstructed, Ideal 'nature'
of artistic creation, Carver in order to strip down phenomenal oppositions in
order to reveal the structural oppositions at the heart of any attempt at
reconstruction which subsumes the metonymic, the oppositional, into the
metaphoric, into resolution.
Alfred Kazin has written: 'Hemingway's was the perfect reduction, the
ultimate logic, of this modernist faith: what was unmistakeable would be
indestructible', and that this reduction to an inviolate essence of textual authority
consists in 'the right ordering of words.'15 Methodologically this clearly has much
in common with the essentials of Carver's own aesthetic:
It's possible, in a poem or a short story, to write about
commonplace things and objects using commonplace but precise
language, and to endow those things...with immense, even startling
power...
...That's all we have, finally, the words, and they had better be
the right ones, with the punctuation in the right places so that they
can best say what they are meant to say.16
But what prevents Carver's texts becoming, like Hemingway's, essentially
Modernistic texts, is not method. What subverts the textual authority, the textual
and epistemic indestructibility of 'the right ordering of words' in Carver's fiction
can perhaps best be summed up by adapting Charles Caramello's comments
quoted earlier regarding the 'ghostliness' of the postmodern text. Just as 'the
physical book remains as the ghost of a concept that has been destroyed',17 a
formal ghost, so Carver's texts are methodological ghosts of a Modernist
aesthetic, the ironic, performing shadows of an earlier narrative authority and
inviolability.
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Kazin points out that the 'strict Modernist aesthetic' of Hemingway,
Fitzgerald and Cummings entailed 'the excision of whatever was "vague",
"religious", "shadowy", like Kafka.'18 For Carver a strict methodology of
metonymic progression remains, but very much as an exoskeleton rather than an
indestructible, immortal soul; inside the exoskeleton is the 'shadowy', the
Kafkaesque, the green trout, exorcised by Edmund Wilson's and Hemingway's
textual self-sufficiency, but after Saussure open to possession again by what is
truly 'ghostly' in the text - not immanent essence but Derrida's absent presence;
not Hemingway's silent knowledge, but aphasia.
The framework of the hunt, the all but sacramental ritual, is intact in both
'Big Two-Hearted River' and 'Nobody Said Anything', but Hemingway's
framework is the narrative soul itself; Carver's framework, the exoskeleton, the
prose cage, is constantly being shaken and buckled from within by the
incommunicable, the 'shadowy' absences, the postmodern ghosts of narrative
authority. The boy's parents are speechless when the torn fish is presented to
them, when they are confronted by a 'semiological' crystallizing of the principles
of fragmentation by which they have come to live, and significantly it is precisely
this speechlessness, this semiological absence (even the phrase itself doesn't
appear in the text) which is chosen as the title of the narrative.
Hemingway wrestled a narrative authority out of indeterminacy, out of the
'shadowy', by making the tight, ritually self-enclosed 'concreteness' of the
metonymic text its own metaphoric legitimization. Carver ostensibly continues
the same struggle using the same fictional correlatives, but in fact only to
acknowledge the desublimated, bastardized nature of metonymic ritual itself in
the postmodern context. Carver's 'haunted' fictions are the methodological,
structural culmination of the epistemic process charted by Kazin when he writes:
Hemingway's faith in the 'unmistakeable', the linear, was to
become an heirloom that could not be passed on...Perhaps the
greatest challenge to Hemingway was to come from Faulkner,
whose unselfconscious originality of technique...showed narrative
not as a triumph over experience, but as the struggle of language to
find support for the mind in its everlasting struggle with the past...
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...Faulkner was another name for a world - for history - that
could not be reduced to a style.19
So far it has been shown that both thematically and stylistically striking
parallels generated by similar methodologies have been less strikingly but more
significantly undermined epistemologically. It remains however to take the
structural analysis of these methodologies of omission, of structural silences,
further and examine Carver's absences not simply as epistemic foils to
Hemingway's silences but as epistemic and aesthetic significances in themselves.
Lodge's critical methodology of typological binary oppositions has already
been used to provide a loose context within which to interpret and qualify some
of the complex relationships between the Modern and the postmodern that have
been posited in this study. Clearly however such an approach would be
meaningless unless the principle of binary opposition at a typological level
significantly informed the fictions of both writers in a discrete textual as well as
comparative sense. As noted above, the epistemological heterogeneity is only
clearly apprehended when the 'rock' of method is split, revealing in Hemingway's
case an Idealist internalization and aesthetic reconstuction of objective reality
and in Carver's a 'ghostly' absence in the place of stable referentiality and
epistemic authority. Thus The Third Thing That Killed My Father Off has a
deaf mute as its undeciphering, indecipherable cipher, and 'Nobody Said
Anything' ends with a loss of stable denotation, the halved fish becoming
referentially reduced to the denotation 'what was there': 'What was there looked
silver under the porch light. What was there filled the creel'(p.54).
To understand fully the significances of Carver's method then these
epistemic significations need to be seen in a closer analytical light than that of
comparison, and it is certainly possible to focus the structural analysis directly
onto Carver's discrete texts. The oppositions between knowledge and aphasia,
the Modern and the postmodern, Idealism and scepticism, metaphor and
metonymy are not just typological categories which can be applied to a
comparative analysis of Carver's work; they are integral to it. Though
Hemingway represents a Modernist foil to Carver as a postmodern, the
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relationship is, not at all straightforward. To refer back to McCaffery's
metaphor, Carver has neither simply reacted against nor simply returned to the
ontology of the narrative bequeathed to American vernacular realism by Stein's,
Anderson's and, most influentially, the 'Dead Father' Hemingway's, Modernism;
rather he has 'ritually eaten and digested it'. Not surprizingly then, a structural
analysis of Carver's work in relation to the epistemologically turbulent American
realism of the Twentieth Century cannot reasonably stop at a generalized
polarization between two epistemic tendencies. In fact the tensions generated by
those unstable polarities penetrate the character both of Carver's individual texts
and his body of work as a dynamic whole, not simply the nature of his aesthetic
relationship as postmodern to Hemingway's Modernism, necessarily the main
focus of attention so far.
Comparisons with the Modernist epistemological 're-builder' Hemingway
show, of course, what is lost to Carver as a postmodern, but if Handke's claim
that 'every step, every glance, every gesture...should be aware of itself as a
possible threshold and thus recreate what has been lost' is to be seriously
associated with Carver's own textual dynamics, then a critical preoccupation with
the deprivations of the 'postmodern turn' is in itself not enough. If what is to be
'recreated' is the possibility of the 'shock of connection', scepticism alone cannot
be isolated as the epistemic initiator of Carver's absences, only a feature of the
epistemic/aesthetic terrain in which they find themselves; the silences between
meaning and absurdity, coherence and aphasia, are rarely, if ever, capitulations
in the face of overwhelming, 'ultimate' epistemic odds. They are themselves
explorations, however tenuous, uncertain and even unrecognized, moving beyond
the 'well-lighted places' of the Ideal. Just as Hemingway's omissions are the
structural 'nerve-centres' of his fictions, so Carver's absences are at the heart of
this elusive, aphasic, even delinquent exploratory approach to a tentative re-
adequation.
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In the story 'Viewfinder', for example, we see aphasic absence - the loss of a
cohering, 'metaphoric' validation of identity and being (figured as the narrator's
loss of his family) - providing the space, as it were, for an intensely metonymic,
'delinquent' attempt at re-connection which may not be adequate ("'Show me," I
said. "Show me how much. Take more pictures of me and my house."/"It won't
work," the man said. "They're not coming back."'(pp. 193-4)) but is certainly
adequatz've in its impulse. The narrator begins to take an interest in having
photographs of himself and his house taken after seeing himself in one of the
photographer's earlier snaps of the property:
There was a little rectangle of lawn, the driveway, the carport,
front steps, bay window, and the window I'd been watching from in
the kitchen.
So why would I want a photograph of this tragedy?
I looked a little closer and saw my head, my head, in there
inside the kitchen window.
It made me think, seeing myself like that. I can tell you, it
makes a man think.(p.l92)
The effect that seeing himself in the photograph has on him is perhaps best
described as one of reflexive dis-location - it is a sudden indication that 'existence
doesn't take place inside the skin', or at least not only inside the skin. It takes
place within a semiological matrix, inside codes of being, (Bloom's 'language
structures surrounding them') as Carver hints at in abruptly and otherwise
arbitrarily connecting the narrator's dislocation from his familiar securities of
being (his family) and the spatial/temporal dis-location occasioned by the
photograph:
I picked up the picture.
'I was in the kitchen,' I said. 'Usually I'm in the back.'
'Happens all the time,' he said. 'So they just up and left you,
right?'(p. 193)
That the story is primarily concerned with questions of
epistemic/semiological dissociation is clear enough, then, but what liberates the
text from a simple scepticism, a simple exploitation of postmodern truisms, is the
way in which this dislocation is responded to:
I went inside and got a chair. I put it up under the carport.
But it didn't reach. So I got a crate and put the crate on top of the
chair.
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It was okay up there on the roof.
I stood up and looked around. I waved, and the man with no
hands waved back with his hooks.
It was then I saw them, the rocks. It was like a little rock nest
on the screen over the chimney hole. You know kids. You know
how they lob them up, thinking to sink one down your chimney.
'Ready?' I called, and I got a rock, and I waited until he had
me in his viewfinder.
'Okay!' he called.
I laid back my arm and I hollered, 'Now!' I threw that son of a
bitch as far as I could throw it.
'I don't know,' I heard him shout. 'I don't do motion shots.'
'Again!' I screamed, and took up another rock.(p,194)
There is more than bleak humour in this ending, though that is important:
the most significant dynamic is the 'exploding' of the signifier/signified,
sign/subject opposition which the photograph foregrounds. The narrator is now
performing (reflexively 'textualizing') his alienation and dissociation, his exile
from the security of being represented by the house - he is no longer snapped
unaware and in the house, he is now precariously on it, and no longer at the
mercy of the camera, the viewfinder, the limiting framer and 'freezer' of
existence, but now dictating to it, violating its containments: "'I don't know...I
don't do motion shots.'"
On a thematic/existential level there is then an affirmation of the eccentric
(even 'ex-centric') act as a desperate re-assertion of an imperilled identity, an
imperilled self. But more interestingly perhaps there is also a deeper,
typologically 'in excess' dimension to this dynamic. The viewfinder is not just a
figure for an existential 'freezing' of life, it is also a reflexively significant figure
for a metaphorical framing of the 'language of experience', to paraphrase
Barthelme: thus the 'little rectangle of lawn, the driveway, the carport, front
steps, bay window' become 'this tragedy', just as in more orthodox circumstances
such a photograph functions as an icon of security, of possession, of extended
identity. The narrator cannot in his dissociation fit into such a metaphorical
frame - he can only be dis-placed in(to) one; hence the 'aphasic', bizarrely
contingent, 'delinquent' nature of the narrative. He can however explode the
metaphor/metonymy opposition by deconstructing it on its own terms - in
breaking free of the viewfinder's containments he breaks free ('in excess') of the
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typologically grounded interpretive moment itself. Instead of psychological or
even figural placement we find an anarchic performance of ^placement (the
hurling of the rocks), a kinetic typological restlessness.
What such 'delinquency' explores, then, is not static codes of being in any
mythopoeic, valorizing or sacralizing sense. The silences beneath the
performance are not 'clean, well-lighted places' of the soul. For Carver the
aphasic is implicated always in struggle, in an interfacial rather than binary
engagement with the typological. The stakes are not Hemingway's private,
stoically valorized disciplines of being, but are simply the possibilities for a
mimesis of even the most minimally coherent, knowable 'reality'; a reality imaged
through the aphasic text struggling, working to communicate in and necessarily
through the limited, eccentric, even at times pathological idioms
methodologically traceable from Abish's post-Holocaust Germany to Carver's
post-social America.
This aphasic, epistemic minimalism permeates Carver's characters to the
core, particularly in the earlier stories. Thus in 'Bicycles, Muscles, Cigarets' we
find Evan Hamilton 'struck by the range of his son's personal life' just on walking
some two blocks from his own home(p.l44). For such characters the line
between the familiar and the unfamiliar, the secure and the dissociative, is a
perilously thin one, and the 'consequence' of crossing it often nothing less than a
radical and threatening dissolving of 'familiar' structures of control and an
abandonment to a damaging contingency. Evan Hamilton, introduced to us as a
man in the very process of exerting more control over his life (giving up
smoking), finds himself pitched almost helplessly into a violent losing of control,
being provoked into a short, brutal fight with the father of one of his son's friends
over a missing bicycle. Throughout the story there is a superbly crafted tension
rooted in the interwoven tropes of limitation, unfamiliarity, dis-location and
finally anarchically violent contingency. Moreover, through Hamilton's post-fight
memory of his own father in just such a situation Carver locates the significances
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of these tropes in a crisis of identity, in the limitations and contingencies (of
course cancer is one such contingency) of self-hood, of being:
He had once seen his father - a pale, slow-talking man with
slumped shoulders - in something like this. It was a bad one, and
both men had been hurt. It had happened in a cafe. The other
man was a farmhand. Hamilton had loved his father and could
recall many things about him. But now he recalled his father's one
fistfight as if it were all there was to the man.(p,149)
The almost absurd limitations depicted in this story (hardly knowing one's
own immediate neighbourhood, getting drawn into a pointless and humiliating
fistfight) culminating in this limiting of memory, the very index to being and
knowing, represent far more than just arbitrary dramatics, however contingent
they may be, then. Ultimately, they seem to delineate the disturbing lines of an
aphasic, dissociated condition of being, a condition of lack, of loss:
The boy rolled onto his side and watched his father walk to the
door and watched him put his hand to the switch. And then the
boy said, 'Dad? You'll think I'm pretty crazy, but I wish I'd known
you when you were little. I mean, about as old as I am right now. I
don't know how to say it, but I'm lonesome about it. It's like - it's
like I miss you already if I think about it now. That's pretty crazy,
isn't it? Anyway, please leave the door open.'
Hamilton left the door open, and then he thought better of it
and closed it halfway.(p.l51)
The semiological/epistemic roots of these typically 'Carverian' losses and
limitations are explored further of course in many of his other narratives. In the
fiction 'Signals' for instance Carver depicts a couple at the very edge of an
obviously acrimonious separation almost perversely celebrating the wife's
birthday at an exclusive (the unfamiliar again, and here, through the 'opacity' of
the French menu, perfectly placed for semiological resonances) restaurant. The
situation is used to create a multi-layered 'anti-dynamic' of disintegration, subtly
and powerfully linking semiological, social and psychological tensions and
disruptions.
The evening begins placidly enough, then the couple, Wayne and Caroline,
study the menu:
In a while, he said, 'Well, what are you going to have?'
'I don't know,' she said. 'I haven't decided. What are you
going to have?'
'I don't know,' he said. 'I haven't decided, either.'
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'What about one of these French dishes, Wayne? Or else this?
Over here on this side.' She placed her finger in instruction, and
then she narrowed her eyes at him as he located the language,
pursed his lips, frowned and shook his head.
'I don't know,' he said. 'I'd kind of like to know what I'm
getting. I just don't really know.'
The waiter returned with a card and a pencil and said
something Wayne couldn't quite catch.
'We haven't decided yet,' Wayne said. He shook his head as
the waiter continued to stand by the table. 'I'll signal you when
we're ready...
...'We could have had a better table,' Wayne said. 'Instead of
right here in the center where everyone can walk by and watch you
eat. We could have had a table against the wall. Or over there, by
the fountain.'
'I think I'll have the beef Tournedos,' Caroline said.
She kept looking at her menu. He tapped out a cigaret,
lighted it, and then glanced around at the other diners. Caroline
still stared at her menu.
'Well, for God's sake, if that's what you're going to have, close
your menu so he can take our order.' Wayne raised his arm for the
waiter, who lingered near the back talking with another waiter.
'Nothing else to do but gas around with the other waiters,'
Wayne said.(p.l60-l)
It is not difficult to locate the sources of the progressive deterioration in
Wayne's mood. The first of many negative gestures, or signals, occurs when he is
confronted with the French menu and has to 'locate' the language. This is
followed by his obvious discomfort at the waiter's first comment which 'he
couldn't quite catch'. It is these semiological disruptions or, staying with Carver's
own vocabulary regarding the menu, dis-locations, that trigger his dis-ease, his
dissociation and consequent aggressive insecurity ('We could have had a table
against the wall'). What follows this 'crossing of the line' to recall the earlier
reading of 'Bicycles, Muscles, Cigarets', is another contingently 'anarchical' spiral
into conflict, though this time subsumed into a form of semiological warfare
involving both the waiters and the couple themselves:
'And we'll have that right away. Before the salad or the relish
plate,' Wayne said.
'Oh, bring the relish tray, anyway,' Caroline said. 'Please.'
'Yes, madam,' the waiter said.
They're a slippery bunch,' Wayne said...
...'Let's talk about something pleasant,' Caroline said.
'All right, sure,' Wayne said...
...They clinked glasses.
'I like champagne,' Caroline said.
'I like champagne,' Wayne said.
'We could have had a bottle of Lancer's,' Caroline said.
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'Well, why didn't you say something, if that's what you wanted?'
Wayne said.
'I don't know,' Caroline said, 'I just didn't think about it. This
is fine, though.'
'I don't know too much about champagnes. I don't mind
admitting I'm not much of a...connoisseur. I don't mind admitting
I'm just a lowbrow.' He laughed and tried to catch her eye, but she
was busy selecting an olive from the relish dish. 'Not like the
group you've been keeping company with lately. But if you wanted
Lancer's,' he went on, 'you should have ordered Lancer's.'
'Oh, shut up!' she said. 'Can't you talk about something else?'
She looked up at him then and he had to look away.(pp.l61-2)
When Wayne says of the waiters They're a slippery bunch' Carver is at least
partially, and wittily, referring to the real culprits regarding his character's
dissociation - the opacity of words, signals, that confuse and divide at least as
readily as they reveal:
They looked steadily at each other as they drank. 'We ought
to do this more often,' he said.
She nodded.
'It's good to get out now and then. I'll make more of an effort,
if you want me to.'
She reached for the celery. That's up to you.'
That's not true! It's not me who's...who's...'
'Who's what?' she said.
'I don't care what you do,' he said, dropping his eyes.
'Is that true?'
'I don't know why I said that,' he said.(pp. 162-3)
This story then is far more than the contemporary American comedy of
manners it might at first seem: on close examination it seems much more a
broadly 'comic' exploration into postmodern problematics of communication and
signification itself.20 For Carver the postmodern aporia underlying all the
limitations, losses, dissociations and desperate aggression is, these three stories
(and many others) indicate, like language itself, irreducibly social. The 'site' of
language is in some senses always an unfamiliar restaurant (or neighbourhood,
or even home once 'invaded' by the radically unfamiliar as in 'Viewfinder') with
incomprehensible staff, untranslated menu and facile, unknowable maitre d'i\
certainly the site of language (Butor's 'fundamental narrative', Barthelme's
'language of experience') in crisis, language at the point of aphasic breakdown, of
the postmodern opacity the story closes with:
'Dear Lady,' Aldo said. 'I have something for you. One
moment, please.' He reached to a vase on a table near the door
and swung gracefully back with a long-stemmed rose.
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'For you, dear lady,' Aldo said. 'But caution, please. The
thorns. A very lovely lady,' he said to Wayne and smiled at him
and turned to welcome another couple.
Caroline stood there.
'Let's get out of here,' Wayne said.
'You can see how he could be friends with Lana Turner,'
Caroline said. She held the rose and turned it between her
fingers.
'Good night!' she called out to Aldo's back. But Aldo was
occupied selecting another rose.
'I don't think he ever knew her,' Wayne said.(p.!65)
The structural/epistemic silence left in the wake of such a dissociative
fracturing of communication has of course been comprehensively attended to by
contemporary criticism, but almost exclusively in the context of the irrealist
fracturing found in textual modes from science fiction to metafiction. Lance
Olson for instance typically applies a Derridean reading of fracturing, 'in excess'
absence to texts of 'fantastic discourse', claiming that:
To write is to produce gaps that must be supplemented...[writing]
becomes an absence which must be filled...texts of fantastic
discourse not only believe in absent centre; they revel in its
possibilities.21
But the potentialities of Olsen's 'revelling in the possibilities of the absent
centre', are, as has already been noted, not the exclusive preserve of meta- or
fantastic fiction. Again, a distinction can be drawn between the metaphorically
realized potencies released by an embracing of the liberating/threatening absent
centre and the less exuberant but no less resonant 'symbolic energy' realized in
the metonymic reflex to the textual fracture, or fissure. Indeed, Roland Barthes
has described the potencies of the postmodern, scriptible text which 'practices
the infinite deferment of the signified' using a clearly metonymic (though not of
course referential) rhetoric:
[T]he generation of the perpetual signifier...in the field of the
text...is realized not according to an organic progress of maturation
or a hermeneutic course of deepening investigation, but, rather,
according to a serial movement of disconnections, overlappings,
variations. The logic regulating the Text is not comprehensive
(define 'what the work means') but metonymic; the activity of
associations, contiguities, carryings-over coincides with a liberation
of symbolic energy.22
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The resonances of Carver's fictions seem almost perfectly described as 'the
activity of associations, contiguities, carryings-over' consonant with 'a liberation
of symbolic energy', a liberation echoed more laconically by Carver's 'hitting all
the right notes'.23 It is almost invariably through 'a serial movement of
disconnections, overlappings, variations', that Carver's metonymic texts achieve
an adequative potential, how the limited, always signifying rather than 'meaning'
postmodern texts achieve 'symbolic energy', and these 'serial movements and
variations' are equally evidently generated by 'the infinite deferment of the
signified', by the frisson of potentiality which haunts the textual absence. This
formulation of Barthes' then provides a highly suggestive rhetoric with which to
move on from the irrealist bias of so many critical readings of absence and
towards the metonymic tensions and elisions characterizing Carver's 'realistic'
textual problematics of postmodern adequation.
'Are You A Doctor?' is, for instance, a narrative masterfully structured
around 'a serial movement of disconnections, overlappings, variations' and
'infinite deferment of the signified'. With typical irony however, Carver, as with
'The Student's Wife', opens the narrative on a deceptive note of certainty: 'In
slippers, pajamas, and robe, he hurried out of the study when the telephone
began to ring. Since it was past ten, the call would be his wife' (p.33). As so
often in Carver's stories, such security is simply a hinge for the jaws of
dissociation:
'Hello, dear,' he said. 'Hello,' he said again.
'Who is this?' a woman asked.
'Well, who is this?' he said. 'What number do you want?'
'Just a minute,' the woman said. 'It's 273-8063.'
That's my number,' he said. 'How did you get it?'
'I don't know. It was written down on a piece of paper when I
got in from work,' the woman said.
'Who wrote it down?'
'I don't know,' the woman said. The sitter, I guess. It must be
her.'
'Well, I don't know how she got it,' he said, 'but it's my
telephone number, and it's unlisted. I'd appreciate it if you'd just
toss it away. Hello? Did you hear me?'(p.33)
At once, then, we find ourselves plunged, along with the protagonist, into
dislocation. And the dislocation is dependent on one basic trope, namely
87
deferment: deferment of identity (regarding both characters), of information (the
origin of the note) and immeasurably strengthening the trope the conversation
itself is structured around pregnant pauses, an almost comic reluctance on the
part of both speakers to divulge information, an insistent patterning of questions
undercut by a near refrain of 'I don't know'.
These initial deferments and evasions are eventually overcome, though not
without a struggle:
'And your second name, Arnold? What's your second name?'
'I really must hang up,' he said.
'Arnold, for goodness sake, I'm Clara Holt. Now your name is
Mr. Arnold what?'
'Arnold Breit,' he said and then quickly added, 'Clara Holt.
That's nice. But I really think I should hang up now, Miss Holt.
I'm expecting a call.'(p.34)
These initial, almost preparatory, deferments give way only to usher in a far
more complex 'serial movement of disconnections, overlappings, variations'
however. The voice on the end of Arnold's line does not lose its mystery in
revealing the name Clara Holt; instead this initial uncovering reveals a
deepening of ambiguity, a more radical deferment which suddenly moves
('carries over') Arnold Breit from the safe limitations of a telephone call to the
unsettling brink of unknowable and hence all but limitless potentialities:
'Could we meet somewhere, Arnold? You see, I haven't told
you everything. There's something else,' the woman said.
'What do you mean?' he said. 'What is this exactly? Hello?'
She had hung up.
When he was preparing for bed, his wife called, somewhat
intoxicated, he could tell, and they chatted for a while, but he said
nothing about the other call. Later, as he was turning the covers
down, the telephone rang again.
He picked up the receiver. 'Hello. Arnold Breit speaking.'
'Arnold, I'm sorry we got cut off. As I was saying, I think it's
important we meet.'(p.35)
From here on Carver ingeniously inverts the use of deferment in the story:
what now becomes dislocating and disruptive, 'in excess' of both Arnold's (and
the narrative's metonymic, typologically partial) 'securities' is the sudden near-
intimacy initiated by Clara Holt:
The next afternoon as he put the key into the lock, he could hear
the telephone ringing. He dropped his briefcase and, still in hat,
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coat and gloves, hurried over to the table and picked up the
receiver.
'Arnold, I'm sorry to bother you again,' the woman said. 'But
you must come to my house tonight around nine or nine-thirty.
Can you do that for me, Arnold?'
His heart moved when he heard her use his name.(p.35)
When they finally meet it becomes clear that this confusion or elision of
deferment and intimacy is the structural epicentre of the story. Arnold's kissing
her is a scene shot through with a disturbing detachment, and nothing is resolved
in their subsequent awkward and once more evasive conversation. There seems
little significance, then, to this briefest of encounters, but with the closing
sentence however Carver throws this understated account of suburban dis-ease
open into implications which abruptly shift the text's resonances onto a level of
epistemic, even ontological dynamics and problematics:
'Strange,' he said as he started down the stairs. He took a long
breath when he reached the sidewalk and paused a moment to
look back at the building. But he was unable to determine which
balcony was hers...
...When he reached home, the telephone was ringing. He
stood very quietly in the middle of the room, holding the key
between his fingers until the ringing stopped. Then, tenderly, he
put a hand against his chest and felt, through the layers of clothes,
his beating heart. After a time he made his way into the bedroom.
Almost immediately the telephone came alive again, and this
time he answered it. 'Arnold. Arnold Breit speaking,' he said.
'Arnold? My, aren't we formal tonight!' his wife said, her voice
strong, teasing. 'I've been calling since nine. Out living it up,
Arnold?'
He remained silent and considered her voice.
'Are you there, Arnold?' she said. 'You don't sound like
yourself.'(p.39)
The structural means of releasing the story's 'symbolic energy' then certainly
seems to correlate to Barthes' delineation of the potentially adequative
postmodern text. In the first place the pervasive deferment is, as in Barthes'
'model', metonymic: the lives of Arnold and Clara Holt overlap as a result of a
fluke phone call, there is no synthetic dynamic of signification in this, only a
contingent connection which forms the basis of a wider 'serial movement of
^connections, overlappings, variations'; as for Barthes' scriptible text, then, the
'logic regulating' the certainly scriptible text of their relationship (it is certainly
impossible to definitively say 'what it means', as would at least be invited by an
orthodox realism) 'is not comprehensive...but metonymic'. And a correlate of
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this as regards the 'parent' text of the narrative proper is that its silences, its
absences, are authentically aphasic, their resonances generated by a constantly
witheld communicative 'consummation', both within the communicative matrix of
the narrative and within the reader-text relationship, the 'symbolic energy' thus
being an energy of frustrated, delinquent expectation. In epistemologically paring
the text down to deferment rather than structuring it towards resolution he
leaves the metonymic frame empty of stable, secure epistemic signifieds but by
the same token wholly open to a resonant, highly charged 'threshold' awareness
and even expectation of, new competing potentialities. This 'symbolic energy' is
not to be characterized as metaphysical however. The delinquent, anarchic
potentiality for adequation is horizontal and typological, never vertical, never
appealing to a transcending of textuality itself.
Marc Chenetier, in his essay on Carver 'Living On/Off the Reserve', though
he relies on the phenomenalist Wolfgang Iser's The Act of Reading rather than
Derridean strategies for the basis of his critical analysis of Carver's absences, sets
out several lines of argument that 'translate' very usefully into a 'horizontal'
vocabulary. Writing of the uses of absence in Carver's texts he comes to the
following formulation:
The innumerable unanswered questions of his stories do not so
much embody an interrogation of the future as they reveal the
mysteries of an implicit past...
...Going unanswered, such questions linger in the mind during
and after the reading of the texts, inciting one to look among the
blanks and negations for answers feeding on transcended literary
meaning.24
Chenetier's vertical 'metaphysic' of these 'blanks and negations' is defined,
following Iser, as 'negativity':
Eerily echoing Carver's definition of fiction, Wolfgang Iser
writes: 'Fiction may be defined as a form of communication since it
brings into the world something which is not already there'. And
he adds: That which literature brings into the world can only
reveal itself as negativity'. It is within the context of negativity that
Carver's fictions may perhaps be assessed in the most satisfactory
manner.(p,180)
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What makes Iser's formulation, despite its phenomenalistic 'metaphysic',
valuable for a reading of Carver is his more precise delineating of this negativity,
this 'hollow that undermines from within all that is said', as 'twofold':
Meaning thus emerges as the reverse side of what the text has
depicted. The world of the text appears in a state of alienation,
and this alienation effect indicates that meaning is potentially
there, awaiting redemption from its potentiality. In consequence
of this, the unwritten text is constituted by a dialectic mutation of
the written...Meaning coincides with the emergence of the reverse
side of the represented world...We see the twofold structure of
negativity - as the cause of the deformation it is also the potential
remedy, and is thus the structural basis for communication.25
For Barthes, the 'meaning' immanent or chimerically unattainable
(according to the epistemic point of view) in the the text's absences remains
always an aesthetic potentiality. For Iser and for Carver (bearing in mind the
vertical/horizontal 'split') however, meaning, though it is likewise 'potentially
there', is not stable as potentiality, the dialectical dynamics of the text as coherer,
as Leserappell, (in new realist practice as typologically choreographed
performance), or as 'threshold', are such that it is constantly under a structural
pressure to metamorphose into adequation, into the kinetics of connection. For
Carver the epistemic potential of the absent heart of the text is, as Iser says,
always 'awaiting redemption from its potentiality'. In Barthes' model of the text
the 'symbolic energy' is generated by a 'teasing', a playful but nevertheless
complacent, stable witholding. In Iser's model the 'symbolic energy' is generated
by epistemic pressure ('dialectic mutation', 'deformation') because for him (and
more particularly for Carver) the witholding is less a game, more a crisis to be
endured: thus the nervy, ambiguous 'affirmation' concluding 'Fat', Ann Weiss's
desperate expectancy in 'The Bath' and more crudely but still effectively the
unnamed mother's repressed terror at the close of 'Why, Honey?'
In Carver's fiction this enduring, this 'awaiting', can be identified not only at
the level of the discrete text, but in the context of his work as a whole since it
forms a subtly evolving (though far from systematic) pattern which can be
usefully traced along the lines of the title stories of his first three major
collections. In the first such story, 'Will You Please Be Quiet, Please' the
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dynamic of the narrative is the outworking of a situation where an
uncommunicated though 'haunting' fact (a wife's adultery) finally surfaces. The
story is thus generated by an 'absent presence' (the initially unstated fact of the
adultery) and is then played out on a razor's edge of Iserian potentiality where
the husband, Ralph, after the confession, wanders through an urban maze of
suddenly emptied signifyers, emptied texts, 'awaiting redemption from this
potentiality', this suspension of his life between sudden meaninglessness and the
need for a new means of re-connection, of adequation:
[A] dark cutout of a man leaned over the jukebox in the corner, his
hands splayed on each side of the glass. That man is going to play
something, Ralph thought, as if making a momentous discovery...
...He kept swallowing, looked up as a car of yelling teenagers
went by and gave him a long blast on their musical horn. Yes,
there was a great evil pushing at the world, he thought, and it only
needed a little slipway, a little opening...
...A bell over the door tinkled. Ralph almost wept from the
sound of it.(pp.174-5)
This collage of empty, dissociated and dissociating signs is steadily built up
through the narrative, each set of signs either explicitly or implicitly evoking a
desperate 'redemption of potentiality' from Ralph as every sign touched by his
dislocated emotions is charged with half comic tormented ('mutation',
'deformation') significances. The story ends with Ralph returning home, still
unwilling to face his wife who has obviously now for Ralph become the ultimate
signifier of dissociation (long before the adultery she appears to Ralph as
awaiting a threatening 'redemption from potentiality': while on honeymoon he
watches her on the balcony of their hotel and is struck by her sensuality, 'the
whole incident [putting] Ralph in mind of something from a film, an intensely
dramatic moment into which Marian could be fitted and he could not'(p.l67)).
As a result he is unable to cross the threshold from his self-deluding position
before the confession when he 'felt, without really thinking about it, that he and
Marian understood each other perfectly - as well at least as any two people
might'(p,167), to a less innocent but finally unavoidable position where the
'redemption of possibilities' is free to occur, whatever the upheaval the
recognition of the essentially indeterminate nature of such a life (again,
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'fundamental narrative') may bring. This threshold can be crossed only when
Ralph sees the 'twofold structure of negativity' which is 'the structural basis for
communication'. Only when, that is, Ralph submits to the ambiguities and
indeterminacies of silence (absence), the 'negation' of verbal, securely encoded
understanding; it is this 'letting go' that figures the narrative's potential re-
connection and hence dynamic of adequation, the 'structural basis for
communication' it tentatively establishes:
He tensed at her fingers, and then he let go a little. It was
easier to let go a little. Her hand moved over his hip and over his
stomach and she was pressing her body over his now and moving
over him and back and forth over him. He held himself, he later
considered, as long as he could. And then he turned to her. He
turned and turned in what might have been a stupendous sleep,
and he was still turning, marveling at the impossible changes he
felt moving over him.(p,182)
Though not many of Carver's stories can be read quite so easily in terms of
Iser's vocabulary, many illustrate certain of the basic insights underlying it. In
one sense the real distinction of 'Will You Please Be Quiet, Please' amongst the
collection's other stories is its carrying through of the Iserian dialectic to its
actual hope of re-connection, over the 'threshold' to the actual beginnings of 'a
structural basis for communication'. Certainly many of Carver's fictions follow
the broad lines of the Iserian dialectic without crossing the threshold, in fact all
the stories so far discussed (though 'Bicycles, Muscles, Cigarets' ends with the
suggestive /za//-closure of the threshold of Hamilton's son's bedroom door, of
course).
This is also true of the second title story, 'What We Talk About When We
Talk About Love', though there is a significant deepening of implication and
significance in the failure. Here again a host of 'absent presences' can be seen to
underlie the discursive matrix regarding 'love' that forms the structure of the
story; every one of the four characters has gone through previous marriages, and
unstated 'potentialities' constantly threaten the semiological 'surface tension' of
their drunken amiability:
Mel fastened his eyes on Laura. He said, 'Laura, if I didn't
have Terri and if I didn't love her so much, and if Nick wasn't my
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best friend, I'd fall in love with you. I'd carry you off, honey,' he
said.(p.278-9)
The primary 'absent presence' however is of course 'love' itself. As an
indefinable, multivalent state this necessary absence subsumes all the other
fragmentary, contingent absences discursively represented by the four characters.
Mel, the main speaker in the story, uses the story of an old couple injured
together in a car crash in an attempt to finally 'fix' the concept of love, and this
attempt is the rhetorical, reflexive 'heart' of the story, the point where the
'doubleness' of the negativity that is the true 'subject' of the narrative is first
exposed:
Mel said, 'I was going to tell you about something. I mean, I was
going to prove a point. You see, this happened a few months ago,
but it's still going on right now, and it ought to make us feel
ashamed when we talk like we know what we're talking about
when we talk about love.'(p.275)
Much is made of the fact that the old couple cannot communicate, cannot
even make eye contact, an ironic counterpoint to the highly verbal, freely
discursive but by the same token self-deconstructive, 'infinitely defering' series of
semiological 'disconnections, overlappings, variations' characterizing the
conversation around the table. The non-verbal, discourse-deprived situation
therefore becomes a 'structural basis for communication' in that the 'absent
presence' of love is communicated through that very condition of deprivation,
that negativity. The main narrative however closes with a return to the reverse
side of this sub-narrative's 'structural basis'; the final scene is of a completely
'fluid' deprivation, offering figures not of any structural dynamic, only of spillage,
waste, and finally a stasis where the talk, the discourse, the 'human noise' of the
'symposium' has been pared away to the most minimal of all human noises, the
heartbeat:
Mel turned his glass over. He spilled it out on the table.
'Gin's gone,' Mel said.
Terri said, 'Now what?'
I could hear my heart beating. I could hear everyone's heart. I
could hear the human noise we sat there making, not one of us
moving, not even when the room went dark.(p.280-l)
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In a sense then 'Will You Please Be Quiet, Please' might seem something of
an anomaly in the context of Carver's early work, simply because the threshold is
not only approached as Ralph stumbles through the desacralized signs
surrounding him (a semiological correlate to Mel's discursive stumbling through
the desacralized signifiers of love) but is actually crossed. Ralph holds himself in
the stasis that closes the latter story for as long as he is able, but at last turns and
finds himself 'marveling at the impossible changes he felt moving over him'.
Certainly, as William Stull comments, To set this passage against the closing
paragraph of the later title story...is to juxtapose heaven and hell'.26 In the
context of Carver's work as a whole however, this 'redemption' can be seen less
as an anomaly and more a preview of the development of Carver's art.
This thesis began by identifying the need for and the attempts made at
establishing a new, postmodern mimesis in American fiction. So far a rhetoric
for delineating the broad structural principles that seem to lie behind the new
realist engagement with postmodern adequation has been at least partially
proposed, but the actual nature of this attempted adequation itself as it is
manifested in Carver's fiction has yet to be explored. In fact, though the
disjunctions which reverberate through the texts can be identified with
phenomenalistic disjunctions between text and reader (and indeed this
dimension is not wholly separable), the semiological and epistemic dislocations
typical of Carver's postmodern terrain should, finally, be traced within the
typological dynamics of the textual matrix itself. Carver's fictions are interfaces
within themselves, their own typological and rhetorical dynamics are the
postmodern discourse they reflexively address, and, arguably, adequatively
transform.
When adequation is felt for in his texts then, it is hardly surprizing that
Carver's engagements with 'negativity' are characteristically figured 'socially',
since the textuality of 'disconnections, overlappings, variations' is inescapably
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social in its contiguity, its metonymy, and moreover this is why its aphasia is
wounding, not simply an indulgence.
When types of existential/semiological stasis occur in fact, they are
invariably precipitated by a figuring of a breakdown in the meticulously charted
semiology or 'serial movement' of 5oc/a//domestic life. The characters have not
wandered in from Waiting for Godot, as Chenetier indicates at the end of his
(otherwise very valuable) essay.27 Stasis for Carver is a social, structural
consequence, not an existential condition or 'spiritual', essentialist presumption.
'The cause of the deformation...is also the potential remedy', and, in the third
title story 'Cathedral', 'deformation' in the form of blindness becomes the
'structural basis for communication' through a reciprocal, social figuring of
release, of adequation:
He found my hand, the hand with the pen. He closed his hand
over my hand. 'Go ahead, bub, draw,' he said. 'Draw. You'll see.
I'll follow along with you. It'll be okay. Just begin now like I'm
telling you. You'll see. Draw,'the blind man said.
So I began. First I drew a box that looked like a house. It
could have been the house I lived in. Then I put a roof on it. At
either end of the roof I drew spires. Crazy.
'Swell,' he said. 'Terrific. You're doing fine,' he said. 'Never
thought anything like this could happen in your lifetime, did you,
bub? Well, it's a strange life, we all know that. Go on now. Keep
it up...'
...'It's all right...Close your eyes now,' the blind man said to me.
I did it. I closed them just like he said...
...'Keep them that way,' he said. He said, 'Don't stop now.
Draw.'
So we kept on with it. His fingers rode my fingers as my hand
went over the paper. It was like nothing else in my life up to now.
Then he said, 'I think that's it. I think you got it,' he said.
Take a look. What do you think?'
But I had my eyes closed. I thought I'd keep them that way for
a little longer. I thought it was something I ought to do.
'Well?' he said. 'Are you looking?'
My eyes were still closed. I was in my house. I knew that. But
I didn't feel like I was inside anything.
'It's really something,' I said.(pp.446-7)
This 'structural basis' is, then, an adequative principle, unsustainable
linguistically in a the fictions of a semiologically fissured reality, or 'fundamental
narrative', but sustainable structurally in the (reflexive) figure of the social or
reciprocal 'threshold' itself as the 'activity of associations, contiguities, carryings-
over (which) coincides with a liberation of symbolic energy'.
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Carver's postmodern mimesis is, finally, a 'social' mimesis, one which has
located a possibility for a new adequation not through a 'sacralized' relationship
between iconic sign and thing, but through an exploration of structural bases for
communication in the delinquent metonymy of his texts' 'disconnections,
overlappings, variations': the performative processes themselves as they occur in
the text-as-threshold between the typological poles of epistemic potentiality. It is
in working from this 'social' contextualization that Carver's fiction can perhaps
best be seen as capable of attaining a valid postmodern mimesis and adequation
reaching well beyond the epistemic reductions of both 'classical' naivities and
irrealist ultimacy.
2
If the reader-response methodologies of Iser's 'negativity' and, earlier,
Isernhagen's Leserappell, have provided what has largely been a useful paradigm
for identifying the epistemic possibilities latent in the postmodern fissures of
Carver's texts, the very real problem remains of approaching those possibilities
on their own epistemic terms.
So far it has been possible to articulate the question of adequation in
Carver's texts in terms which, however qualified by a horizontal/vertical
distinction, belong ultimately within a phenomenalistic frame of reference.
Examining the relationship between postmodern scepticism and realist
representationalism in Carver's work in the light of the anti-representational
prejudices of earlier self-conscious postmodern fiction and criticism has
inevitably thrown this 'affective' bias into relief. Much of the criticism
engendered by metafiction has centred on broadly phenomenalistic issues and in
putting Carver into a postmodern context the debate is bound to 'carry over'
(Marc Chenetier's essay is perhaps the first significant contribution to it). But
obviously every bias, however necessary, is guilty of sins of omission, and in this
case the bias has deflected attention from the very foundation on which it has
been built.
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It has already been claimed that any phenomenalistic 'metaphysics' of textual
validation is simply paradigmatic to the 'physics' of Carver's texts; what is
required then is a method which takes us out of paradigm, beyond considerations
of the affective dimension of mimetic adequation which have necessarily
'muddied the waters', and towards a discourse which can allow us to apply to
Carver's method not the question 'how do the texts mean for the reader?' but
simply 'how do the texts mean?' That is, the inquiry must reach further than any
Iserian validation of fiction which, though 'eerily echoing Carver's own definition
of fiction' as Chenetier puts it, can only really show us that the concerns of
reader-response criticism (the felt need for a fresh legitimization of epistemic
possibilities in the wake of linguistic scepticism) are parallelled in the dynamics
of Carver's texts. These dynamics for Carver are, however, always generated and
resolved (or not) within the text; the affective threshold is not in fact echoed by
his stories, rather the affective validation echoes out of the structural and
linguistic chasms charted and sometimes crossed by his fictions. As Alain Arias-
Misson has commented on Carver's moments of adequation:
In Carver's stories the operative element is literary in the specific
sense, a solution of language, not in it; all the more notable as it
wrenches us out of a quasi-naturalistic environment.28
In fact, if we are to locate the new realism accurately and usefully with
reference to the postmodern terrain it is arguably more helpful to orientate
ourselves not so much in relation to the 'slippery ice'of Derridean ultimacies (or
rather to the successive exploitations of the ultimacies he has heralded) but far
more to the 'rough ground' of the later Wittgenstein, an orientation interestingly
explored by Charles Altieri who suggests:
[T]he grand testament of [Wittgenstein's] work is that so long as
one is alive to what constitutes the conditions of his existence and
avoids the enchantments of deep structures, origins, and essences,
he need never find a home because he has never lost it. Yet at the
same time he must find a way to lose it if he is to recognize that it
has never been lost. This is the key to his philosophical style and
to one continuous project in modern literature.29
Certainly, if possibilities for a vernacular 'realist' fiction can exist within the
aegis of postmodern awareness/scepticism, and, moreover can function outside
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the parameters of that necessarily debilitating scepticism without recourse to
phenomenalist 'jumps'into the metatextual, those possibilities are clearly rooted
in a different theoretical soil to John Barth's exhausted possibilities, and are just
as clearly of central importance to a tracing through the 1980s and beyond of the
postmodern dynamic in fiction.
The ontological and epistemic unease permeating postmodern fiction is its
hallmark; from metafiction through Peter Handke to the new American realism
the question of language, of adequation in the face of an intensely felt epistemic
breakdown has been central. Abrams' complacent conclusion in his critique of
Derridean criticism The Deconstructive Angel' that 'insofar as we set ourselves,
in the old fashioned way, to make out what the other means by what he says, I
am confident that we shall come to a better mutual understanding',30 may
comfort liberal critics but is extra-terrestrial in the worlds of Joseph Bloch, Mel
McGinnis and Bill and Arlene Miller; in the worlds that is of apparently
'representationalist' postmodern fiction. To penetrate the postmodern,
deconstructive dilemma to any depth then is to go beyond simple either/or
linguistic dichotomies. Derrida's assault on the classical myths of knowing and
telling is grounded not in arbitrariness and perversity but in a necessary
dissolving of the rhetoric (necessary because, as Wittgenstein has written, 'A
picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our
language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably'31) of the 'initial and
decisive' classical myth of essential, a priori Being, from which every other myth
of epistemic inviolability derives.
f
If there is to be a genuinely new adequation born out c^the postmodern turn
its dynamic will not derive from a species of an Abrams-like pragmaticism;
rather it will have to be definable in terms of nothing less than an ontological
exploration into postmodern possibilities of being, and only then into the
postmodern possibilities of knowing and telling. Henry Staten in his book
Wittgenstein and Derrida (partly an extension of and reaction to Altieri's earlier
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article) points a possible way out of essentialist, reductive aesthetic ultimacy inn
his distinction between a 'metaphysical' and 'deconstructive grammar'.
Commenting on remarks 193 and 194 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical
Investigations Staten writes:
Whereas 'metaphysical grammar' [a 'classical' grammar which
functions by generating binary oppositions on the assumption of
essential being, which then become heirarchical and allow a
subordination of 'accident' to 'essence'; Staten gives the examples
of 'ideal or logical and empirical, a priori and contingent...meaning
and sign, soul and body and so on'] subordinates accident to
essence, the empirical to the logicaL.'deconstructive grammar'
does not. Rather it attempts to let accidental being operate upon
deconstructive writing, deforming it and preventing it from
achieving transcendental form.(p,18 Italics mine)32
In Carver's fictions we can of course find many examples of such
'deconstructive' writing. 'Are You A Doctoi?, for example, as has been noted
earlier, uses deferment of identity (of 'essential' being) in order to finally
destabilize the security of identity, the ontological 'transcendental' (as opposed to
'accidental') 'form' of the protagonist: the questions 'are you a doctor?' and 'Are
you there Arnold...You don't sound like yourself resonate as interrogations of
identity, highlighting an all-pervasive root contingency of being. The story is
more than anything else a story of choices, though choices made without
knowledge, in the face of an intractable deferment of knowledge. There is no
subordination of 'accident to essence' then, thematically or structurally: the
'being' or ontology of both the narrative text and its protagonist is an 'accidental
being', not a 'transcendental form' since at every point the ongoing construction
of both is contingent, indeterminate, non-hfclrarchical (there is no knowledge
given by the text which is witheld from its protagonist). The inessential,
desacralized ontological status of the protagonist therefore is inextricably bound
up with the ontological status of the 'authority matrix' of the text, a status
perfectly consonant with Staten's 'Wittgensteinian' formulation of 'accidental
being'. Both text and character are constituted by one 'deconstructive grammar'.
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Again, in the brief early sketch The Father' this 'kinship' can be seen in the
dynamics of the aesthetic effect. Here the 'ideal' of secure, essential identity is
powerfully and disturbingly challenged through the figure of the baby:
The three little sisters and the mother, who had just gotten out of
bed and was still not herself, and the grandmother all stood around
the baby, watching it stare and sometimes raise its fist to its mouth.
He did not smile or laugh, but now and then he blinked his eyes
and flicked his tongue back and forth through his lips when one of
the girls rubbed his chin.
The father was in the kitchen and could hear them playing
with the baby.(p.40 Italics mine.)
The grouping of no less than three generations around this baby is
significant, not only as regards questions of essence (it is a picture of
contextualized, already socialized, being of course) but also as regards the key
tension this contextualizing inexorably constructs. Basically the tension revolves
around a process of 'hunt-the-referent' to recall Gavin Edwards' phrase, the
tension arising from the fact that the referent in question, the baby's identity, is,
in typical postmodern fashion, nowhere to be found:
'But who does he look like, who does he look like?' Alice
cried, and they all moved up closer around the basket to see who
the baby looked like.
'He has pretty eyes,' Carol said.
'All babies have pretty eyes,' Phyllis said.
'He has his grandfather's lips,' the grandmother said. 'Look at
those lips.'
'I don't know...' the mother said. 'I wouldn't say.'
The nose! The nose!' Alice cried.
'What about his nose?' the mother asked.
'It looks like somebody's nose,' the girl answered.
'No, I don't know,' the mother said. 'I don't think so.'
Those lips...' the grandmother murmered. Those little
fingers...' she said, uncovering the baby's hand and spreading out its
fingers.
'Who does the baby look like?'
'He doesn't look like anybody,' Phyllis said. And they moved
even closer.(p.40)
Up to this point the deconstructive dynamic in the text is fairly
straightforwardly Derridean: the rhetorical search for the 'transcendent signified'
is sucked haplessly into an absent centre, just as the circle around the baby is
drawn nearer by 'He doesn't look like anybody'. But Carver provides a further
key twist:
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7 know! / know!' Carol said. 'He looks like DaddyV Then they
looked closer at the baby.
'But who does Daddy look like?' Phyllis asked.
'Who does Daddy look like?' Alice repeated, and they all at
once looked through to the kitchen where the father was sitting at
the table with his back to them.
'Why, nobody!' Phyllis said, and began to cry a little.
'Hush,' the grandmother said and looked away and then back
at the baby.
'Daddy doesn't look like anybody!' Alice said.
'But he has to look like somebody,' Phyllis said, wiping her eyes
with one of the ribbons. And all of them except the grandmother
looked at the father, sitting at the table.
He had turned around in his chair and his face was white and
without expression.(p.41)
A makeshift 'transcendent signified' has in fact turned up, and turns out to be
none other than the unfortunate father. The point, however, is that the father
too 'doesn't look like anybody'. The father, like the baby, is deprived of identity
through being identifiable only in possessing an 'accidental' conglomeration of
physical features. Through being, that is, deprived of the social, contextual
essence which gives the women in the story their security, their grammar of being
as opposed to the father and son's 'accidental being'.
The distinction operates on the grounds of gender thematically, but
conceptually then on the grounds of an alienation from, in Staten's phrase,
'transcendental form', here figured as a generational continuum, an ontological
'grammar' which confers essence on otherwise 'accidental', contingent being. In
'Are You A Doctor?' the deprivation of any 'transcendental form' such as a
known profession (this particular lack being the point of the title of course)
leaves us with another face presumably 'white and without expression' at the
close of the story. In both narrative cases, then, the significances of the very
different 'existential' crises resonate with all but identical semiological
implications - implications concerning, ultimately, an ontology of the text, since
the loss of identity, of security of being, is a 'rhetorical' (in the fullest sense of the
word) loss. A loss, that is, of the tropes and constructs of lived experience
(identifications such as profession or simple resemblance) that endow 'accidental
being' with that elusive, in the end as illusory as it is necessary, 'essence' of
identity, of the (at once textualized) I.
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Though the re-assertion of the ontological basis of deconstruction is
essential to a study of the postmodern turn, it is, as these two stories indicate, the
pursuit after the implications of an intuitive, aesthetic apprehension of 'accidental
being' that traces the line delineating the nature and extent of the new realism's
exploration of the postmodern terrain. Arguably, whereas the main body of
postmodern fictional exploration has followed (consciously or not) the largely
circular spoor of Derrida's 'monstrosity', Carver's realism has regained the no less
sceptical (or 'uncanny' as Abrams terms it) but far more richly suggestive
response of Wittgenstein:
If I were sometime to see quite new surroundings from my
window instead of the long familiar ones, if things, humans and
animals were to behave as they never did before, then I should say
something like 'I have gone mad'; but that would merely be an
expression of giving up the attempt to know my way about.-33
Wittgenstein, and arguably with him, (though aesthetically rather than
philosophically of course) Carver, move on from a dissolution of the metaphysics
of presence towards a method not of inversion and persistent reductionism,'the
glimpse beyond and the parody of parody', but of a relative, transitive
epistemology. Staten, summarizing Derrida's reductionism comments:
Derrida's move here is in the style of the classical moralists,
and has the same motivation. He is looking for the flaw, the
element of impurity, the memento mori, no matter how barely
visible, that keeps anything from closing the final gap separating it
from the perfection of the ideal...We could...consider such modern
examples as the slight bruise that kills Ivan Illyich and the
birthmark of Hawthorne's story by that name.(pp.ll9-20)
The comparison with the 'classical moralists' is telling: almost certainly one
reason for the popularity of 'Derridean' as opposed to 'Wittgensteinian'
deconstructive strategies amongst the early metafictionists especially is its
'moral', or even ascetic, temper, its 'ultimist' scorn for compromise parallelled by
metafiction's scorn for the necessary 'straw man' of realist mimesis which has
been discussed earlier in this thesis. But what, then, does Wittgenstein's method,
(and arguably its literary correlative, the new realism) offer in its place?
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In this context both Altieri and Staten draw attention to a key principle in
Wittgenstein's explorations beyond the basic deconstructive axis of polluted or
inherently compromized essence: the principle of what Staten terms 'transitive
essences' (derived primarily from Wittgenstein's extended metaphors of family
resemblances and facial expressions as pictures of the relativity of 'states of
being' in sections 122 and 161 of the Investigations). In many ways this notion can
be seen as Wittgenstein's version of Derrida's doctrine of the 'trace'. In both
cases the deconstructive undercutting of ideal meaning is replaced by a
relativistic theory of signification privileging the classically ignored attributes of
each sign or signal - its semantic pluralism, its ideological/lexical heritage. But
whereas the 'trace' is given a 'vertical' dynamic by Derrida, a dynamic which
relentlessly destabilizes classical pretensions by boring down into the sign's
always and 'essentially' compromized semantic past, thereby discrediting its
presumption to 'mean', Wittgenstein's 'transitive essences' operate horizontally,
producing an indefinite overlap of significations, not destructively undermining
identity, but moving on from an already discredited ontology of ideal identity,
putting in its place a 'social' ontology. In Staten's words:
To think a continuous series of transitional cases is to think
the cases not as unitary and self-identical but as assemblages of
characters that may be variously reassembled. In a way every
character is essential, as part of the physiognomy of the case, and
in a way none is essential because each is only an essence
gradation. What I am calling the transitive essence is thus an
identity that is a term in an identity continuum and has no distinct
or unique essence boundary to separate it from the immediately
surrounding terms. Because a transitive essence contains, as part
of its own identity, characters that are spread across terms farther
along the continuum as part of their identity, it is transitive - is
already, within itself, part of the way along toward the essence or
physiognomy of something distinct from it.(p.97)
It is not difficult to move from such a set of propositions to the 'essence
gradations' of Carver's narratives - narratives which open and close at seemingly
arbitrary points on an unknowable but implicit continuum; themes, such as the
slow dissolving of relationships, the helpless descent into alcoholism, the losing
of the fixed securities of work or marriage, all of which see the 'deconstructive
angel' arriving not as an anarchistic demon but as a 'natural' condition (or 'form')
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of life, a mundane though destructive, dissociative, sometimes terrifying presence
to be endured. One thinks of a recurring Carverian 'horror', the child, whether
of The Father', 'Feathers' or even of Carver's autobiographical essay 'Fires'. In
such texts the deconstructive 'monstrosity' is quite literally 'mute, infant and
terrifying', though again the deconstructive, 'monstrous' process becomes for
Carver as for Staten, a 'moment' in a 'rhetorical' continuum, not its own negative,
'grammatically' fixed essence. The 'Derridean' infant of The Father' is
superseded by the 'Wittgensteinian' infant of 'Feathers', still 'monstrous', but now
figured with a comic/grotesque irony and without the formal pretensions of the
fixed, 'essentialist' tableau of the earlier fiction:
It was an ugly baby. But, for all I know, I guess it didn't matter
that much to Bud and Olla. Or if it did, maybe they simply
thought, So okay if it's ugly. It's our baby. And this is just a stage.
Pretty soon there'll be another stage. There is this stage and then
there is the next stage. Things will be okay in the long run, once
all the stages have been gone through. They might have thought
something like that.(p.306)
Roland Barthes' image of the textual tapestry, the product of 'a serial
movement of overlappings, disconnections, variations', echoing as suggestively as
it does both the comic evading of essence of 'this stage and...then the next stage'
and the Wittgensteinian notion of 'transitive essences' can be taken two ways.
On the one hand we can follow Barthes himself and press the implications of
such a text's (such an episteme's) lack of centre or given boundary, its lack of
essentialist or 'theological' depth and hence its vulnerability, or openness to
'exploitation'; on the other hand, whilst these attributes are in no way denied, the
emphasis can fall on the fact that though its essential plurality denies any of the
'loose threads' of discourse becoming priviliged, the implication need not be an
endless, speculative epistemology of unravellment, or 'striptease', but an
epistemology (and ontology) of the 'society' of the fabric of textual (and all
signifying) codes.
The signifying process in the new realist text is neither classical nor
metafictional, nor metatextual; it is the concept of a 'social (because transitive)
105
ontology' which finally locates being and telling in Carver's stories and arguably
in the fiction of the new realism as a whole. This 'ontology' is 'in excess of the
real' not through any irrealist, 'vertical' ultimacy, but through the 'horizontal'
excess of: 'Doesn't the analogy between language and games throw light here?...is
there not...the case where we play and - make up the rules as we go along? And
there is even one where we alter them - as we go along' or of 'I can look at the
clock to determine what time it is: but I can also look at the dial of a clock in
order to guess what time it is; or for the same purpose move the hand of a clock
till its position strikes me as right. So the look of a clock may serve to determine
the time in more than one way'.34
As Staten writes of such 'disruptive', 'in excess' dislocations in Philosophical
Investigations:
Because Wittgenstein sees no transcendental form in orderly
activities, he can argue that it would always be possible to deviate
from the 'normal' sequence and yet for the deviation to be
'following a rule'...On Wittgenstein's account it is as though an
activity were inhabited by a multiplicity of souls, and any one of
them could at some stage take over and guide the sequence in its
own direction.(p,103)
In other words, Wittgenstein posits a 'multiplicity' (or society) of transitive
essences, of trace significances which inhabit the linguistic 'activity' of
constructing meaning. The skeletal, graphocentric model of the text is not
redeemed by a metatextual infusion therefore, because the model is not truly
empty, it is simply not 'policed', not 'ordered' into any unified or metaphysical
meaning.35 It is in fact already vibrant with the 'society' of the conflicting 'souls'
of potential significance; with the souls, that is, of rhetorical possibilities, and
these possibilities become meaningful only in this context of multiplicity, of a
'meta-society' of contextual, sequential, or transitive significations.
Though this academic, rarefied vocabulary may seem very alien to the world
of Carver's meticulously concretized prose, it in fact bears much more than a
passing resemblance to the spirit of both the essay 'Fires' where we read 'My
world was one which seemed to change gears and directions, along with its rules,
every day'36 and fictions such as 'The Third Thing That Killed My Father Off. In
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this story, and in many others of Carver's, we can quite clearly identify a
'dramaturgy of meaning' as it were unfolding in the text; a dramaturgy which
seems in many ways almost a direct aesthetic correlate to the semiological
dynamics posited above. Thus Carver works hard in the opening paragraphs to
'prime' the narrative with a series of self-deconstructing 'essences', charging a
semiological 'orderly activity', the narrator's attempt to make sense of his father's
life, with the anarchic pressures of 'a multiplicity of (narrative) souls':
I'll tell you what did my father in. The third thing was Dummy,
that Dummy died. The first thing was Pearl Harbor. And the
second thing was moving to my grandfather's farm near
Wenatchee. That's where my father finished out his days, except
they were probably finished before that.(p.241)
The 'innocent' use of 'essences', of signal reductions or distillations of
experience in order to fix 'meaning' onto the actual flux of existence is, of course,
classic realism's most ubiquitous trope, but in deconstructing it Carver does not
simply make an epistemic/aesthetic point; rather he 'splits' the deceptively
coherent, self-contained, atom-like essences in order to release, not just qualify,
narrative potencies. Thus the narrator's reducing of his father's decline to three
things, three 'essences', is far from innocently employed as a fictional device (as
Adam Mars-Jones mistakenly assumed). 'I'll tell you what did my father in', we
are confidently told, but then two of the causes are left wholly unexplained and
the third and presumably most important, Dummy, explodes in a welter of
discursive unknowns, of conflicting, 'jostling' narratives, a 'series of
disconnections, overlappings, variations':
My father blamed Dummy's death on Dummy's wife. Then he
blamed it on the fish. And finally he blamed himself - because he
was the one that showed Dummy the ad in the back of Field and
Stream for live black bass shipped anywhere in the U.S.
It was after he got the fish that he Dummy started acting
peculiar. The fish changed Dummy's whole personality. That's
what my father said.
I never knew Dummy's real name. If anyone did, I never heard
it...I don't think he was really deaf. At least not as deaf as he made
out. But he sure couldn't talk. That was for certain.(p.241)
Significantly, the one thing 'certain' in this account is that Dummy cannot
speak - Carver thus sets him up as an ironic 'type' of essence: 'innocent' of
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rhetoric, of discourse. But this innocence, this 'essential', iconic self-containment
is of course illusory. Dummy, as the opening of the story shows, is at the centre
of almost limitless signifying (rhetorical, discursive) interpretive confusions,
constructions and lacunae; of, in other words, almost limitless signifying
(narrative) potential.
We see then, very clearly, that the 'activity' of creating a 'grammar', an
orderly 'transcendental form' for the lives of the narrator's father and Dummy, is
deconstructed from within, not through any metafictional intrusion, but through
the releasing of that grammar's silenced 'multiplicity of souls'. The liberation is
fundamentally dissociative of course, but now the dissociative effect is simply one
of an infinite number of rhetorical potentialities, not Derrida's inevitable
'monstrosity'. Thus in 'What We Talk About When We Talk About Love', the
narrative prising apart of the 'transcendent signified' love releases rhetorical
possibilities which are predominantly but not exclusively, or necessarily,
dissociative. Though one rhetorical or discursive fragment from the shattering is
the blackly comic/grotesque account of Terri's love affair with Ed:
'When I left he drank rat poison,' Terri said...They saved his life.
But his gums went crazy from it. I mean they pulled away from his
teeth. After that, his teeth stood out like fangs. My God,' Terri
said. She waited a minute, then let go of her arm and picked up
her glass...
...'It gets worse,' Terri said. 'He shot himself in the mouth. But
he bungled that too, poor Ed,' she said. Terri shook her
head.(p.271)
another fragment, another gradation on the 'identity continuum' of the 'transitive
essence' of love is Mel's attempt (touched on previously) to articulate a more
rhetorically orthodox, but no less powerful (and no less elusive and evasive: "'Can
you imagine?"; "Do you see what I'm saying," he said,') encoding of love:
'Casts and bandages, head to foot, the both of them. You know,
you've seen it in the movies. That's just the way they looked...Well,
the husband was very depressed for the longest while. Even after
he found out that his wife was going to pull through, he was still
very depressed. Not about the accident, though...I'd get up to his
mouth-hole, you know, and he'd say no, it wasn't the accident
exactly but it was because he couldn't see her through his eye¬
holes...Can you imagine? I'm telling you, the man's heart was
breaking because he couldn't turn his goddamn head and see his
goddamn wife...'
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...We all looked at Mel.
'Do you see what I'm saying?' he said.(p.279)
We are reminded perhaps of de Man's 'deconstruction' in 'Semiology and
Rhetoric' of a comic exchange between Archie Bunker and his wife:
It is not that there are simply two meanings, one literal and the
other figural, and that we have to decide which one of these
meanings is the right one in this particular situation...the very
anger he displays is indicative of more than impatience; it reveals
his despair when confronted with a structure of linguistic meaning
that he cannot control and that holds the discouraging prospect of
an infinity of similar future confusions, all of them potentially
catastrophic in their consequences.37
Such a rhetorical unmasking of aporia is simply the beginning for many of
Carver's explorations of course. Returning briefly to 'Will You Please Be Quiet,
Please', we can see that Ralph Wyman's 'turning, marveling at the impossible
changes he felt moving over him' is his final, 'redemptive' response to 'seeing
quite new surroundings' in Wittgenstein's phrase, is the beginning of his casting
off of the 'classical' securities of the stable, essentialist self-knowledge he begins
with ('the prudent measure of himself that he made') and the taking on of a
deconstructive acceptance of transition and the contingent release of
potentiality. It is also the opening of the text itself to a 'deconstructive grammar'
which is not the negatively essentialist, parameter-conscious epistemic grammar
of metafiction, but the potentially parameter-challenging and transcending
grammar of 'forms of life' grounded in 'social' or transitive essence, an interfacial
ontology sited at the threshold of discourse, 'alive to what constitutes the
conditions of...existence', continuous with, not seeking to represent 'that
fundamental narrative in which our whole life is steeped'. 'Carver has not given a
voice to his characters; he has given his characters to a voice'38, as Alain Arias-
Misson writes, and as if echoing this, 'The deconstructive critique of language',
Staten observes,
could even be phrased as a denial that there is language. Not, of
course, a denial that we speak and write, that we have dictionaries
and Berlitz schools and so on, but a denial that there is any
boundary of essence between what we call language and what we
think of as nonlanguage.(pp.20-l)
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Again, in Frederick Barthelme's words: Then you remembered that
experience itself was a language, even if it was a language mostly unknowable, in
the sense irreducible'. The classical link therefore between grammar and logic, or
grammar and Ideal meaning, is discounted and in its place is put an interweaving
of, or society of, signifying 'souls' which inhabit, as 'forms of life', both speech acts
and gestures, all the codes of human meaning, in fact, and which are governed
not by 'the nature of things', not by an essentialist metaphysic, but only by a form
of 'social contract', a contract open to both dislocation (the 'potential
catastrophe'of de Man's 'Semiology and Rhetoric') and liberation (Ralph's
inarticulate, inarticulable, since there is no "boundary of essence
between...language and...nonlanguage', embrace of being-in-the-world as an
always non-essential, tenuous, contingent, rhetorical existence). The lives of both
Ralph and his wife are violated or compromized by differance in the semiology of
their lives' 'grammars', by traces (his past 'identity' as Jackson, a student
drunkard, 'the "reference" within the Now, to a past Now',39 and her brief affair
at a party), and only in accepting that the basis of life is not an essential self-
knowledge but an ongoing semiological continuum of identity and gesture in
time (something Ralph's wife intuitively understands but which Ralph resists)
can Ralph find release in gesture, in a new understanding of the 'sequential',
contingent nature of their life together, naively denied by their vow to ''preserve
forever the excitement and the mystery of marriage'(p.l67) but ironically fulfilled
by a revised, 'darker' reading of the promise of 'mystery and excitement'. As de
Man comments on Archie Bunker's confusion, The deconstruction is not
something we have added to the text but it constituted the text in the first
place'.40
The use of a terminology taken from linguistic philosophy is not
paradigmatic to the concerns of the stories - the question of 'social' adequation,
of interactive being and knowing, is the question of grammatical possibilities in a
textual world governed by aphasia, aporia and the loss of communion. In the
brief story 'I Could See the Smallest Things' Carver uses the simplest image of
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division and separation, the fences between neighbours, not just as a metaphor of
social breakdown in its usual sense, but as an index of an aporia fissuring the
'society' of the world of the text itself. What is at stake is not simply the social
relationship between neighbours, but the relationship between dissociation and
association, fragmentation and connection, delinquency and potentiality.
The story begins by structuring the narrator's defamiliarization along the
dichotomous lines of a 'metaphorical' illumination (the moon) and the
'metonymic' tableau illuminated:
I got up and went to the window. A big moon was laid over the
mountains that went around the city. It was a white moon and
covered with scars. Any damn fool could imagine a face there.
There was light enough so that I could see everything in the
yard - lawn chairs, the willow tree, the clothesline strung between
the poles, the petunias, the fences, the gate standing wide open.
But nobody was moving around. There were no scary
shadows. Everything lay in moonlight and I could see the smallest
things. The clothespins on the line, for instance.(p.204)
The sense of a rift is widened still further in the next sentence: 'I put my
hands on the glass to block out the moon. I looked some more. I listened. Then
I went back to bed'. Clearly the essence of her defamiliarization is more than
simply the result of insomnia. She has, quite literally, woken 'to see quite new
surroundings from [her] window instead of the long familiar ones', the unearthly
moonlight transforming the metonymic mundanity of a list of common objects,
'lawn chairs, the willow tree, the clothesline...' into a near litany of wonder.
Significantly, then, the effects of this dissociation are presented by Carver
not simply in terms of an existential disjunction, but as an index to a dissociation
which is epistemic, which is not an 'epiphanic' interlude in normal life but
actually the generally unnoticed, or unacknowledged, mundane ground of that
life. The fissure between a 'rhetoric' of perception (the moon as a face,
illuminating the all-encompassing 'arms' of the hills around the city) and a strictly
metonymic 'grammar' of limitation ('any damn fool could see a face there',) is not
heralded by the story; rather the story is structured on this aporiatic principle.
The text itself, then, is 'dissociated', is hung between a validation of the
transformative light of metaphorical potentiality and a suspicion and retreat
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from it into the metonymic particularities of a desublimated, desacralized
linguistic/epistemic actuality. And this dissociation is the 'absent' heart of the
text itself, is 'of language, not in it', in Arias-Misson's words.
In another of Carver's stories, 'Neighbours', we see a textualizing of very
similar dynamics, though here much more fully worked out. David Boxer and
Cassandra Phillips have already provided an in-depth study of this text in their
article on voyeurism and dissociation in Carver's fiction,41 but though the themes
of voyeurism and dissociation are indeed central to the story, as Boxer and
Phillips demonstrate, the concerns they highlight are of more than thematic
significance. That is, the themes (or, as Carver would prefer it, obsessions) are
not ends in themselves, nor simply indices to a powerful but essentially
traditional, or classical mimesis, and Boxer's and Phillips' conclusion that:
His accuracy hits home; we put ourselves in the shoes of his
characters, and we find, often, that the fit is alarmingly close.
Reading Raymond Carver's stories is like peering into the windows
of life through very powerful binoculars.42^
does not exhaust their significance by any means.
But what, in that case, are these recurring 'obsessions' of voyeurism and
dissociation indices of? Perhaps the most accurate answer to this is that they are
indices of transition: indices of a re-shaping of the epistemic "building blocks' of
knowing and hence belonging in the social/textual world, a re-moulding of those
always textual (though not always linguistic) "blocks' into new and alien
dimensions. Bill and Arlene cling together at the close of the story because their
social and 'spiritual' contours have been re-cast, and, like altered pieces of a
psychic and social jigsaw, they are excluded from the old, formally
contextualizing niches they once fitted, just as they are, finally and tellingly,
excluded from the Stones' apartment.
The process begins with a straightforward enough social 'game' of
dissociation - Totemically, the Millers', as Boxer and Phillips put it, 'are shedding
their own dull skins for the bright feathers of their neighbours'43 - but from this
starting point a spiralling down into a far more fundamentally transformative
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'game' ('game' in the Wittgensteinian sense of the word where the concept of
rules, or of a delimiting 'grammar of action,' becomes transitive or desacralized
as ultimacy and becomes recognized as a tactical, or inessential and thus
.'playfully' discursive epistemic ground) can be traced. This 'ur-game' is not
simply a matter of 'dressing up', of temporarily slipping out of one social identikit
and into another, but of casting off a whole network of social and personal
structures, a whole 'classical grammar' of social and personal heirarchies, a whole
('form of) life, and the replacing of it with the 'deconstructive grammar' of
dislocation and transition, a 'new world' where 'things, humans and
animals...behave as they never did before'.
After the first visit to the Stones' apartment Bill finds himself disturbed by
'the feeling he had left something', and of course he has: the reserve, the strict
'grammar' which has characterized his life up to that point, distilled by Carver
into the one phrase 'bookkeeping duties'. After the second visit Arlene begins to
notice the creeping transformation:
'Let's go to bed,' he said.
'Now?' she laughed. 'What's gotten into you?'
'Nothing. Take your dress off.' He grabbed for her
awkwardly, and she said, 'Good God, Bill.'(p. 18)
The next day Bill goes a step further and stays away from work to have more
time for exploring the Stones' apartment. From an initial sense of dislocation,
then, Bill has rapidly spiralled to a position where not only the semiological
structures of his internal life, his 'bookkeeping duties' are de-privileged, but also
the semiological structures of external domestic and social routines (of course
Carver's characters are often defined in relation to their work, or more typically
their lack or loss of it, and the Miller's are no exception), and now a truly
'deconstructive grammar' is beginning to replace the old certainties, a new
inessentialist grammar resonant with new and transformative possibilities: 'He
tried to remember when the Stones were due back, and then he wondered if they
would ever return. He could not remember their faces or the way they talked
and dressed'(p.20). And later, when Arlene echoes these thoughts, Bill confirms
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'It could happen. Anything could happen'(p.21). The old world, an old identity
of stability and heirarchic, settled significances and meanings is dissolving along
with the Stones' faces and mannerisms. Social and domestic identity, sexual
identity and even physical identity is seen to become abruptly inessential,
negotiable, transitive, as Bill Miller dresses before the mirror in both Jim and
Harriet Stones' clothes and wonders at the face he sees staring back at him.
Arlene too has undergone this same process of 'ontological dissolution', losing
(loosing) the rigid structures, the epistemic 'rules', of knowing and being:
And then she said, 'Maybe they won't come back,' and was at
once astonished at her words.
'It could happen,' he said. 'Anything could happen.'
'Or maybe they'll come back and...' but she did not finish.(p.21)
Boxer and Phillips describe this process in the story very well as
'disengagement from one's own identity and life, a state of standing apart from
whatever defines the self, or of being unselfed',44 and as far as it goes this notion
of 'being unselfed' is fully accurate. However, Boxer and Phillips see the
denouement of such a process only in existential terms:
As his dissociated characters tentatively reach out toward
otherness, Carver ambushes them, giving them sudden, hideously
clear visions of the emptyness of their lives; even the most familiar
takes on the sharp definition of the strangely unfamiliar. They
become voyeurs, then, of their own experience.45
In fact the process does not simply end with a cathartic realization of
dissociation; the dissociation is an index of transition, not of ambush, and the
closing sense is not one of 'hideous emptyness' but of a, perhaps more terrifying,
potentiality. Boxer and Phillips regard the breakdown of the fabric of the
Millers' orthodoxy as, essentially, only a totemic series of role-reversals, and at
the root of this reading is the familiar spectre of a 'classical' fantasy/reality,
'rhetoric'/'grammar' binary dichotomy: there is no transition involved, only a
fantastic aberration, soon to be chastised by the return, if not of the Stones, then
of the real limitations of 'real' life, in this case the prosaically locked apartment
door. But outside that door Arlene's 'lips were parted, and her breathing was
hard, expectant', and it is on this note of expectancy, of a new, unassured but
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from this point on only contingently limited future of rejuvenated possibilities,
and not of 'chastisement' or ambush, that the story ends. Furthermore, this new
future begins not with the existential dissociations of Bill and Arlene, but after
this transitional 'stage'. The 'deconstructive turn' begins with the ontological,
with the dissolution of essential being, but culminates, if it is to culminate rather
than to drift in an endless 'free-play', in a new, inessentialist, 'deconstructive
grammar', a new epistemic framework for, and engine of, relation and
adequation: Bill and Arlene cling together, bracing themselves, not conceding
madness - Boxer and Phillips' 'fantastic aberration' - because to do so would
'merely be an expression of giving up the attempt to know [their] way about'.
Again: 'the operative element is literary in the specific sense, a solution of
language, rot in it'.
The fact, then, that the dissociation and aporia afflicting Carver's world is
typically the 'result' of a social/domestic disintegration, though initially used to
rebut a 'metaphysical' reading of the stories can now be more constructively used
as a basis for understanding just how the 'social ontology' functions as the
potential 'structural basis of communication' in the texts; in other words, how the
deconstructive negation of 'transcendental form in orderly activities' can open
out into a 'rhetoric of life' which generates meaning not as an essence behind
signification, whether 'present' or 'absent', but as the interactive, interlocking
transitive process of signification and adequation itself. Carver plunges us into
apparently de-contextualized beginnings and hauls us out at 'pre-seismic' endings
not because behind what is told is a Hemingwayesque 'absent presence' of
unwritten knowledge, but because such a method implicitly embraces both the
deconstructive tenet that there can be 'no transcendental form in orderly
activities' and simultaneously the re-adequative possibility, brought to fruition in
stories such as 'Will You Please Be Quiet Please', 'Cathedral' and 'A Small, Good
Thing', that the 'grammar' of life's signs and codes, deprived of the falsely
transcendental, is thereby inseperable (as de Man demonstrates in 'Semiology
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and Rhetoric') from the 'rhetoric', the endless potentiality or signifying potency
of the 'social' fabric of signs and codes.
Much of the typical criticism levelled at Carver's work (and the work of
contemporary American realism as a whole) stems from a misunderstanding of
this central dynamic. Thus in his reading of 'Preservation', a text he sees as 'the
archetypal Carver story', Michael Gorra quotes the last paragraph of the
narrative and then goes on to ask:
Yet why should it end there? It is in no way an ending in their
lives; dinner still has to be eaten, the floor mopped, the auction
attended. Their lives will presumably continue in precisely the
same way. What makes this extremely thin slice any better than
one further down the loaf, what makes Carver's choice of an
ending anything more than arbitrary? What makes the sight of her
husband's foot next to a puddle 'the most interesting thing' Sandy
will ever see? What makes this moment count?...One needs the
details of...personal history...one needs the social detail, the
context, that Carver's deliberately undersuggestive prose won't
provide, and the story collapses under the weight of its own crust.46
This criticism is significant, though arguably only in that it can stand as a
representative type of the preconceptions brought to critical readings of the new
realism (preconceptions fostered perhaps by its exploitation of a 'low mimetic'
method) based firmly and erronously on existential, 'slice of life' expectations of
the texts. Erronously because the 'solution' isn't in 'the social detail, the context',
but is 'of language'. Gorra wonders 'what makes the sight of her husband's foot
next to a puddle "the most interesting thing" Sandy will ever see', and if the
reader is prepared only to look for the epiphanic then the question carries some
weight; but the text just doesn't turn on that essentially classical or even
Modernistic axis. In fact Sandy's 'epiphany' is deeply ironic rather than simply
bathetic; it doesn't mark, and doesn't attempt to mark, a moment of 'meaning';
the trope is not metaphoric and unifying but metonymic and fragmentary.
Carver is drawing the traces which litter the text (the image of the preserved
iron-age man, Sandy's memories of her parents and so on) not into a unifying
pattern but outwards, teasing the threads apart, or, to take a metaphor from the
story itself, allowing the settled past and the securities of the stagnant present to
'thaw', to melt down, to trickle away. The story ends with Sandy's husband's feet
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moving away from her, across the linoleum, like the meltwater. This 'dynamic'
reduces not to an existential enlightenment but to a semiological crisis: Sandy,
watching her husband's feet next to the water on the linoleum is not being
awkwardly pushed by Carver into an unachieved epiphanic insight as Gorra
supposes, but is confronted by an impasse in perception, in comprehension. The
metonymically 'non-sensical' traces have suddenly slipped free of the rigid forms
which keep them contingent and separate (the 'grammar' of everyday life) and,
'melted' by dissociation have 'pooled' into a 'rhetorical' ambiguity where even
pork chops become charged with an almost sinister unfamiliarity:
She used her spatula to raise one of the pork chops. Then she
lifted it onto a plate. The meat didn't look like meat. It looked
like part of an old shoulder blade, or a digging instrument. But she
knew it was a pork chop, and she took the other one out of the pan
and put that on a plate, too.(p.320)
The literary process at work in this story is not the construction of an
existential meaningfulness, but the opening up of an epistemic slippage, or fault,
between a metonymic continuity (and preservation) and a 'metaphoric' chaos of
signification, a flood of associations, of signifying potentiality. It is this that
'makes this moment count', as it counts not simply for Sandy but more
importantly for the text itself, and it is at this point that a 'Modernist' reading
must give way to a postmodern awareness of the depth of the semiological waters
hidden beneath the puddles on the kitchen linoleum.
Adequation in Carver's texts is possible precisely because meaning or
epiphanic illumination is absent in Gorra's 'classical' mimetic sense. Rather it is
founded on the synecdochal, is sequential, and hence 'social': it is, finally, a
threshold, not primarily between reader and text, but between, as for Handke's
Loser of Across, potentialities for being, knowing and telling, always held in a
necessary tension against the equal potentialities for dissociation, aphasic
confusion and aporiatic silence. It is the 'twofold structure' of this 'negativity',
this aporiatic fissuring of the characters' and their textual worlds' epistemic
ground and security (the sudden flux into which the Millers are plunged, Sandy's
bafflement, staring at her husband's feet) which draws out the text, opens it up to
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create a threshold, rarely crossed but always glimpsed, even wrenching, from an
apparently closed, limited and limiting vignette of phatic despair, the wordless,
'ungrammatical' wonder which Ralph is finally engulfed by, 'marveling at the
impossible changes he felt moving over him'.
3
'Meaning', and so adequation, then, is not essentially locatable as such in
Carver's texts. Rather it occurs through its witholding as settled significance, its
deferment as epiphanic or metaphoric 'penetration'. It is finally only 'present' as
a dynamic (whether of di/ssociation or adequation) and never as a stable site for
archeologies of intention, revelation or summation. It is the product and
producer of social significations; social in the sense that Wittgenstein's figures of
language-as-game-rule and essence as family resemblance47 are posited on a
'social' episteme, even ontology; and in Barthes' sense of aesthetic adequation as
a matrix of 'disconnections, overlappings, variations'.
So far such a reading has been supported by a fairly representative selection
of texts from Carver's first three major collections of short stories. But there is a
further, highly significant dimension to this view of Carver's art. This dimension
involves a study of an aspect of Carver's methodology so far passed over but
fundamentally linked to the above observations on the adequative movement in
his fiction: the practice of revision.
A study of Carver's use of revision not only provides a coherent overview of
an aesthetic and epistemic radicalism so far only traced in the discrete dynamics
of individual narratives, but also a means of properly appreciating a point in
Carver's work which can be seen as very much a key development in his work:
the revising of the representatively minimalistic, dissociative story 'The Bath',
found in his second and certainly bleakest collection, and the re-casting of it as
the adequative 'A Small, Good Thing' of Cathedral.
There are at least three levels on which we can conduct a study of Carver's
practice of revision, though they of course interconnect. The first and most basic
118
is the level of of a general habit of revision: 'For me', Carver says in an interview
of 1987, referring to his practice of re-writing stories even after their initial
publication, 'it was like conceiving a story and seeing it as unfinished business';48
and again in the essay 'Fires' we read:
In one regard I was in no hurry to finish the story or the poem I
was working on, for finishing something meant I'd have to find the
time, and the belief, to begin something else. So I had great
patience with a piece of work after I'd done the initial writing. I'd
keep something around the house for what seemed a very long
time, fooling with it, changing this, adding that, cutting out
something else.49
This habit, or principle, of revision would seem to apply to virtually all of
Carver's fictions included in the first three major collections, and whilst for this
reason it doesn't offer any real insight into a study of particular texts in isolation,
it does hold several implications borne out in more precise studies of
comparative cases of revision.
In the first place there is certainly implied in the above comments a strong
sense of contingency as regards the structural and figural 'mechanics of meaning'
within any of his texts: rather than working towards an amplification or clarifying,
Carver 'tinkers' on 'unfinished business'. The notion of 'unfinished business'
suggest a coherent purpose to the revisions, not simply the gratuitous 'toying'
with the text that the notion of 'tinkering' might at first suggest, but if this
revisionist principle is not directed towards a 'revelatory' honing of 'meaning'
(and quite apart from the discursive indeterminacy suggested by Carver's
'tinkering' the most cursory reading of Carver's fiction confirms this contention)
and strengthening of the text's teleological determinacy (the classical goal of
revision), what is it directed towards? Carver himself goes much of the way to
answering this question through reference to a particular example; again in the
essay 'Fires' he writes:
Not so long ago...I was in the middle of writing a short story when
my telephone rang...On the other end of the line was the voice of a
man who was obviously a black man, someone asking for a party
named Nelson. It was a wrong number and I said so and hung up.
I went back to my short story. But pretty soon I found myself
writing a black character into my story, a somewhat sinister
character whose name was Nelson. At that moment the story took
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a different turn. But happily it was, I see now, and somehow knew
at the time, the right turn for the story. When I began to write that
story I could not have prepared for or predicted the necessity for
the presence of Nelson in the story. But now...I see it is right and
appropriate and, I believe, aesthetically correct, that Nelson be
there, and be there with his sinister aspect. Also right for me is
that this character found his way into my story with a coincidental
Tightness I had the good sense to trust.50
Though Carver is referring here to an influence on the act of composition
rather than on the act of revision in the usual sense of the word, we can safely
assume that the inclusion of 'Nelson' in the story ('Vitamins') was a revision of an
initial 'telos', though a telos only partially commited to paper. As such this
deceptively anecdotal recollection, like so many in the essay, sheds a great deal
of light on the aesthetic which in governing Carver's method can also be seen as
governing his progressive re-defining of previous limits to postmodern
adequation. Very simply, we can arguably see in this account of
composition/revision a means of creating textual significance which is founded
on a fundamental contingency, not merely the almost universal aesthetic
contingency of 'inspiration', but a 'violating', transitional contingency that
radically, even disruptively and subversively, cuts across ('deforms') as well as
initiates the putative telos. Significantly, Staten again furnishes an almost
uncannily consonant theoretical vocabulary for this aesthetic praxis or 'grammar'
of signification: '"deconstructive grammar"...attempts to let accidental being
operate upon deconstructive writing, deforming it and preventing it from
reaching transcendental form'. In this way Carver co-opts the anarchic
postmodern significance, the wholly dislocated, 'floating' signifyer (the
incorporation of the random phone call) but neither valorizes its arbitrarily
metaphorical status as would, say, the metafictionist Raymond Federman ('my
role, once I have set up the metaphor, is to decipher the meaning of that
metaphor and write its symbolic meaning') nor neuters it by depriving it of its
semiological relativity. Rather he 'socializes' it, charging the sign through both
its fundamental randomness and its newly contiguous, metonymic relations
within the text with a 'multiplicity of (competing-to-signify) souls'.
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Carver's general principle of revision, then, can be seen as mirroring on the
most basic of levels the structural dynamics of signification already traced as a
purely 'internal' textual mechanism. Just as significance and even adequation is
in many of his stories based on 'a serial movement of disconnections,
overlappings, variations', on 'transitive essences', so, perhaps not surprizingly, the
creative principle behind those significances is likewise based on a methodology,
a 'grammar', of 'inessential meaning', Staten's 'accidental being' which 'operate(s)
upon deconstructive writing, deforming it and preventing it from reaching
transcendental form', (Carver's 'coincidental rightness' where Tightness is not a
fixed essence, not a determinate 'centripetal', 'hard grammar' of 'meaning', but a
'centrifugal', 'deconstructive grammar' of discursive, rhetorical potentiality).
Carver's claim that, 'when I began to write that story, I could not have predicted
or prepared for the presence of Nelson in the story' seem in this context almost a
working aesthetic application of Staten's description of 'Wittgensteinian' meaning
quoted earlier on page 100.
The significance of this primary methodology of 'coincidental Tightness' is
more than just that of furnishing a confirmation in practice of the dynamics
already identified within the typological dynamics of the text, however. Revision,
for Carver the honing of this 'accidental being' as opposed to any stable,
metatextual teleology, can be further seen as fundamentally affecting, even
dictating, over and above the narrative teleology, the adequative potential of the
text's semiological 'energizing' (in the sense of Barthes' 'liberation of symbolic
energy', a liberation as likely to be dissociative as adequative, of course).
This 'second level' at which revision operates can be identified through a
comparison of two versions of a story bearing essentially the same narrative
teleology (classically, and even in many Modernist fictions, the adequative or
dissociative principle): the story titled 'Distance' in Furious Seasons (1977, and
again in the later Fires) and titled 'Everything stuck to him' in What We Talk
About When We Talk About Love (1982). Not only does this comparison
highlight the postmodern, semiologically-orientated perspective essential for any
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technical reading of Carver's work, but also, within the highly problematic aegis
of postmodernism, the radical shifting by this new realism of mimetic potentiality
away from the metaphorical pole of Federman's 'delinquent' symbolism (for all
its desire to 'face up to reality and now what passes for reality' still locked in
Idealist diegesis) and into the metonymic potencies of 'transitive essences',
'accidental being', 'coincidental Tightness'; of, that is, the resonances of
contingent significances and contiguous relations as tropic indices to being and
meaning in the text. Thus we find that every significant change Carver makes in
the 1977 text 'Distance' for the 'Everything Stuck to Him' of 1982 involves the
texts vocabulary of relations, its grammar of association.
In general the changes Carver makes to the earlier 'Distance' are
overwhelmingly dissociative - just as the ambiguous but finally unmistakeable
affirmations of 'Will You Please Be Quiet, Please' were almost programmatically
crushed by the stasis and silence that closed its sister title story 'What We Talk
About When We Talk About Love', so we see here from the same period a
conscious widening and deepening of the semiological chasm Carver's texts had
sometimes earlier been allowed to at least briefly straddle, if not as boldly as in
'Will You Please Be Quiet, Please' then at least through a persistent tension
between an associative grammar and an alienating teleology, as we find in
'Distance'.
The first such tension occurs in the very first paragraph of 'Distance'.
Consisting of just two short sentences this introduction to the main narrative
firstly sets up a typically stark raison d'etre for the father's story (the daughter's
request for information) but then, significantly, adds both a dissociative edge and
associative poignancy in the second sentence: 'She's in Milan for Christmas and
wants to know what it was like when she was a kid. Always that on the rare
occasions when he sees her'.51
The knowledge that this daughter sees her father only on rare occasions sets
up a pervasive sense of alienation (of 'distance') between them of course which
the father's narrative invests with many complex figural resonances (love/death,
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union/separation, loyalty/constriction and so on) their imagery drawn from
hunting and marriage. This is the dissociative edge which characterizes the
teleology, then. But this knowledge of familial alienation given to us in this
second, amplifying sentence, also works to create if not a value-judgement as
such, then an implicit sense of relational expectations, relational norms which
are being transgressed. The poignancy of this, again something reinforced in the
narrative which follows, is fundamentally affirmative: the daughter's desire to
know about her childhood is transformed from the starkly interrogative to the
implicitly hurt, confused, alienated need to somehow 'relate' to a 'distanced'
parent.
The full significances of the tensions seen in this first paragraph emerge even
more clearly when the revision, 'Everything Stuck to Him', is held against it.
Carver's revisions here consist mainly of excisions, and the first thing to be
excised is indeed the second sentence just discussed, it being a primary hallmark
of the associative/dissociative tension which previousely hallmarked the story.
Suddenly a relational tension becomes a relational pathology of sorts, the father
semiologically assaulted by a faintly menacing stranger, 'a cool, slim, attractive
girl, a survivor from top to bottom', who also happens to be his daughter. In
'Distance' the description of her is ironic, even poignant, suggesting a brittleness
which only masks her emotional need; in 'Everything Stuck to Him' the
description is far more two-dimensional, though identically phrased, this 'new'
daughter's description operating almost as a tormenting 'foil' to the father's
'failure' in love and life. The reason for this lies not only in the deletion of the
second sentence of course, but in a relentless emotional 'freezing' of the
narrative's grammar and vocabulary, in fact of the more 'supple' linguistic
tensions and ambiguities of 'Distance'. We find this, then, from 'Distance':
They were kids themselves, but they were crazy in love, this
eighteen-year-old boy and his seventeen-year-old girlfriend when
they married. Not all that long afterwards they had a daughter...
...The boy and girl, husband and wife now, father and mother,
lived in a three-room apartment under a dentist's office. Each
night they cleaned the upstairs office in exchange for their rent and
utilities. In the summer they were expected to maintain the lawn
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and the flowers, and in winter the boy shovelled snow from the
walks and spread rock salt on the pavement. The two kids, I'm
telling you, were very much in love.(pp.l31-2)
subtly transformed into this, from 'Everything Stuck to Him':
They were kids themselves, but they were crazy in love, this
eighteen-year-old boy and this seventeen-year-old girl when they
married. Not all that long afterwards they had a daughter...
...The boy and girl, husband and wife, father and mother, they
lived in a little apartment under a dentist's office. Each night they
cleaned the dentist's place upstairs in exchange for rent and
utilities. In summer they were expected to maintain the lawn and
the flowers. In winter the boy shovelled snow and spread rock salt
on the walks. Are you still with me? Are you getting the picture?52
Throughout the revised passage we can find evidence of a systematic
'freezing' in full keeping with the implications deduced from the excision of the
second sentence. To begin with the possessive 'his' of 'his seventeen-year-old
girlfriend' becomes the dismissive 'this' in the second version. And a similar
technique is used when Carver adds a mannered 'they' to the phrase 'they lived in
a little apartment'. Carver does the opposite in deleting the 'their' from the
original 'their rent and utilities', but to a similar end. The tiny revision, along
with the increased emphasis on the dentist's ownership of the property contained
in the added 'the dentist's place upstairs' just does enough to unsettle the sense of
security, of 'belonging' which runs so much more strongly through the passage
from 'Distance'. Finally we find a rare expansion, though its purpose is not to
elucidate, rather to amplify the antagonistic intensity of the underlying conflict
which, as becomes ever clearer, is the sub-text of the revised story: 'Are you still
with me? Are you getting the picture?' the father narrator interrogates
needlessly and, in this phatic context, aggressively.
All these minor but very telling revisions point to one thing - a freezing or
'brutalizing' of the narrative in the interests of a wide ranging dissociation
embracing both fictional characters, the ur-narrator, or authorial voice and the
reader (even the fairly revealing title 'Distance' becomes the far more opaque
'Everything Stuck to Him'). A covert semiological hostility, then, pervades the
new narrative; the new title, the narrative's focal sign, is hostile to the reader; the
narrator's vocabulary (linguistic and gestural) is hostile to the daughter (the
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vocabulary used to describe the boy's dealing with her as a crying baby is altered
in several places and always to dissociating effect); the grammar of the text itself
becomes hostile to its referents - mannered, minimalistic, its clipped, reluctant
concreteness relentlessly deferring.
What is clear then is that these two texts, despite sharing the same narrative
teleology, are epistemologically all but polarized through the process of revision.
The 'knowledge' embodied by 'Everything Stuck to Him' is not simply
hermeneutically different to the 'knowledge' embodied in 'Distance'. Rather a
wholly different form of knowledge, of telling, is manifested in the revision, one
which resists its own embodiment in language, which in fact resides more in the
interstices of frustration between signifier and signified, teller and told, text and
world. Many such texts have already been studied in this thesis of course, but the
point now is not so much the nature of just such a semiologically brutalized text,
but the fact that such a fundamental epistemic disruption characteristically
consists for Carver not in a fixed telos or narratological 'essence', but in
exploiting a transitive, inessentialist restlessness within the text's grammar and
vocabulary of relations. 'Everything Stuck to Him', when held in contrast to
'Distance', is perhaps the clearest example of how this process of creating
epistemic 'delinquency', brought to perhaps its purest expression in 'What We
Talk About When We Talk About Love', operates; a process which for Carver
grounds revision in 'a serial movement of disconnections, overlappings,
variations'.
As mentioned above, however, there is a further, third level to Carver's
method of revision, beyond both the basic principle of revision in the creation of
the text and beyond the use of revision as a dissociative, epistemologically
aggressive, diminishing tactic. On this level revision functions in a similar way to
that seen in Carver's re-working of 'Distance', but to an opposite end: that of
creating in the text an associative dynamic, that of earning adequation 'not
through psychological detail, but through the poetic authority that springs from
an honest grappling with nearly unbearable tensions'53 as Josh Rubins remarks
125
of 'Fever'. In examining the relationship between The Bath' and 'A Small, Good
thing' we arguably see precisely this adequative dynamic in motion, as it were.
Not surprizingly, 'A Small, Good Thing' has become a representative text for
almost every critic concerned with the development in Carver's art marked by
the collection Cathedral. Opinion as to its merits obviously varies, but the nature
of and reasons for these variations are, it would seem, far less important than the
often identical presuppositions brought to bear in the majority of readings of the
story. One major reason for this is that the text is, of course, the product of an
extensive revision. As a result of this fact almost every analysis tends to situate
the story in direct opposition to The Bath', seeing it as almost a 'repentance' of
sorts, a belated embrace of humanistic values through the loosening of an
obsessively mannered, minimalist prose and the apparent investing of a
previously fragmented, cryptic telos with a figurally rich, redemptively conclusive
narrative dynamic. Thus we find that W.L. Stull's grounds for seeing the fiction
as a 'minor masterpiece of humanist realism' are that 'where "The Bath" was the
inconclusive, fragmentary tale of an existential disaster, "A Small, Good Thing" is
a fully developed tragedy'.54 In fact for Stull, the central significance of A Small,
Good Thing' is its implicit rejection of what he, following Linda Chase, terms
'existential realism' with its 'angst and anomie' in favour of what he takes to be an
all but Christian realism, complete with symbolic sub-text: A subtle but
pervasive pattern of religious symbols in "A Small, Good Thing" suggests the
presence of a third kind of love in Carver's work since What We Talk About,
Christian love.(p.ll)
Though few critics are as straightforwardly hermeneutic in their readings of
the story, the basic presumption is commonplace - A Small, Good Thing' is
adequative, even figurally redemptive in intent and execution because its realism
has become humanistically expressive, become a vessel of 'presence', that
'presence' consisting in, if not quite Stull's 'account of spiritual rebirth'(p.ll) then
perhaps 'hope springs eternal', at least.
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There is, however, a very different way of approaching the undoubted
challenges to the existential 'angst and anomie' so relentlessly evoked in The
Bath' that this revision manifests. Few critics, in their hurry to ease Carver out of
the un-American clutches of a minimalistic scepticism have bothered to do
anything more than identify the contrasts between 'A Small, Good Thing' and
The Bath', but arguably the relationship between the two is far more complex
than simple, oppositional readings suppose. It can certainly be contested that
rather than pushing aside the semiological explorations into textual meaning and
being which hallmark Carver's 'pessimism', this later text pushes those same
postmodern explorations further forward still - beyond a simple 'pessimism' or
'angst and anomie' as is so often remarked, but also beyond the simple, vacuum-
abhoring 'optimism' too easily put into its place.
In fact, 'A Small, Good Thing' is remarkable in the context of Carver's
earlier fiction not because it signals a re-orientation towards a 'humanist (far less
Christian) realism' and a corresponding abandonement of semiological
'engagement', but because it signals a willingness to move the realist text
radically on into epistemic tensions and confusions, risking more than just a
peering down into the aporiatic mise en abyme, risking now something like a
typological high-wire performance over it, so to speak. It is in this risk, in the
situating of the text amongst previously unacknowledged tensions and
contradictions that the adequative potency of 'A Small, Good Thing' is to be
found - and it is always a potency, not an achieved, humanistic, symbolically
figured point of rest, of conclusive affirmation.
To properly appreciate the radicalism of this story then we need not }tel
abandon the broadly postmodern conceptual matrix in favour of a search for
'presence' or 'essence'; rather to extend it in accordance with the new
complexities this narrative creates. Certainly as regards the narrative teleology
the revisions of 'The Bath' seem to be directed at little more than providing a
more 'human' drama, complete with tragic denoument and redemptive ending,
and this is the level at which the text is almost invariably addressed. Arguably
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however, the re-written prose, far from defusing the scepticism and menace of
The Bath' actually works against its new, deceptively stabilized telos, thereby
internalizing tensions and contradictions previously only affectively present, the
text itself thereby becoming resonant not through the existential dis-ease
produced in the reader by the previously 'brutalized' narrative, but through a
deeper, more complex semiological dis-ease inherent in the text's subverting and
subverted 'society' of codes and constructs.
For instance, one of the most striking series of revisions in 'A Small, Good
Thing' is that concerning the characterization of Ann Weiss. On the basis of
even the briefest comparison she seems to emerge in the second text as a far
more 'human', 'essentially' constituted realistic character. We are now given her
full name in just the second paragraph, and given it by the now omniscient
narrator - 'she gave the baker her name, Ann Weiss, and her telephone
number'(p.331) this narrator tells us. In The Bath' of course there is not only a
characteristic deferal of 'the mother's' identity, but a menacing use of the name
by the ambiguous, again unnamed, voice on the phone at the close of the story.
Previous to this we find only Ann herself giving her name as part of her attempt
to share her suffering with another family at the hospital; the giving of the power
of naming in precisely opposite circumstances to this sinister, anonymous voice is
a major source of the story's dissociative power. The 'icon' of the name, the
classic denotation of 'presence' in the realist text ceases to function as a safe,
stable sign of essential identity, the primary tool of representation, and becomes
a 'discursive', violating tool of manipulation. In 'The Bath', then, the witholding
of Ann Weiss's name is not simply a device to generate tension, it is an act of
epistemic disruption, a radical (though for Carver typical) assault on the
complacencies of the realist text.
The revision therefore can easily be seen as a direct repudiation of these
subversive, disruptive strategies, and not surprizingly W.J. Stull takes this to be
the case:
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In 'A Small, Good Thing', the minimally developed characters
of The Bath' take on flesh, blood and consciousness...Carver early
introduces Ann Weiss by name and sets forth her essence - her
preconceptions, her need for community...Even the secondary
characters - Dr. Francis, Dr. Parsons, the black family Ann passes
in the waiting room - are given essential identities.
Moreover, instead of highlighting, as in The Bath' the
existential isolation that suffering imposes, Carver here works in
the manner of George Eliot, enlarging rather than contracting
human sympathies.(pp.8-9)
Certainly such a reading can be supported by a great deal of superficial
evidence: apart from Ann Weiss's actual naming we also find Carver devoting far
more space in the revised text to what Stull terms her 'essence', her thoughts and
feelings. According to this reading not only does Ann Weiss become more
revealed, but the epistemic radicalism of the earlier narrative voice consequently
disappears. However, a close analysis of Mrs Weiss's 'essence' reveals a much
more ambiguous situation than that identified by Stull. The 'essence' that Carver
now endows the character of Ann Weiss with is hardly the stuff of great
psychological realism, the tradition Stull believes Carver to be embracing:
She gave the baker her name, Ann Weiss, and her telephone
number...The baker was not jolly. There were no pleasantries
between them, just the minimum exchange of words, the necessary
information. He made her feel uncomfortable, and she didn't like
that. While he was bent over the counter with the pencil in his
hand, she studied his coarse features and wondered if he'd ever
done anything else with his life besides be a baker. She was a
mother and thirty-three years old and it seemed to her that
everyone, especially someone the baker's age - a man old enough
to be her father - must have children who'd gone through this
special time of cakes and birthday parties. There must be that
between them, she thought. But he was abrupt with her - not rude,
just abrupt. She gave up trying to make friends with him. She
looked into the back of the bakery and could see a long, heavy
wooden table with aluminium pie pans stacked at one end; and
beside the table a metal container filled with empty racks. There
was an enormous oven.(p.331)
But if this isn't an authentic attempt at great, essence-revealing psychological
realism, and it surely isn't, what is it? One answer is clumsiness, but this would
only be the case if it could be reasonably established that Carver is indeed trying
to write a traditional, humanistic, essentialist portrait, and this simply doesn't
seem to be the case. Far from 'setting forth her essence' Carver is rather
highlighting the banality and contingent randomness of what is valorized in
classic realism as 'essence' - the constructs that are the stuff of assurance and
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security of being (precisely what is assaulted in the vast majority of his fictions):
Ann Weiss, confronted by the taciturn 'otherness' of the baker retreats into the
reassurance of a manifestly tenuous, brittle code. The signs that make up this
code, the figures of fatherhood, cakes, birthday parties are significantly laid out
in direct counterpoint to the signs of otherness, the physical objects (pie pans,
empty racks, the enormous oven) which for Ann construct the unreadable,
opaque code embodied in the baker. The true significance of this passage lies
not in the commonplace, brittle, complacent expectations of a typical American
mother, but in the placing of these 'innocent' expectations between the
oppositional codes signalled by cakes and parties on the one hand and the
physical intractability of pans, racks and ovens on the other. It is no accident in
this masterfully structured story that Ann Weiss surveys these objects
immediately on giving up trying to communicate with the baker, and the simple,
irreducible physicality of the objects is quite clearly a counterpoint also to the
psychological discursiveness which precedes their description.
i
It is a familiar Carverian opposi^bn after all, then, between the two codes, or
texts (familiar/unfamiliar, known/unknown) that generates both the tension and
the peculiar horror of this story - the crux of the narrative is the crushing of the
Weiss family between 'familiar' expectancy and the callous otherness of the
'unfamiliar' (a clash figured at its bluntest in the nature of the boy's accident, an
anonymous hit-and-run which occurs on his birthday), a crux common of course
to many earlier stories, such as 'Bicycles, Muscles, Cigarets', as well as to the
earlier version of the narrative The Bath'. What Carver has done in 'A Small,
Good Thing' therefore is not eliminate this essentially semiological, postmodern
subversion of humanistic, essentialist realism, but extend its earlier tensions into
far more subtle and multivalent complexities which characterize the text's
powerful clashing of irony and pathos, detachment and melodrama, 'essence' and
contingency, banality and insight.
This complex subversion, as opposed to Stub's far simpler essentialism, can,
if carefully traced, be followed throughout the re-written narrative. Obviously
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however, the reading stands or falls on its ability to account for the most
significant revision of all - the completely new ending of 'A Small, Good Thing'.
Once again, at first reading, as with Carver's re-writing of Ann Weiss, there is a
temptation to follow Stull:
In breaking bread together, the characters reenact the central rite
of Christianity, the Lord's Supper...With a palpable sense of
'newness of life', the characters talk on into the dawn. The story
ends with a sunrise - a classic symbol of the resurrection...What
Carver first published as an existential tale of crass cruelty he thus
offers anew as a story of spiritual rebirth, a minor masterpiece of
humanist realism.(p,12)
All these 'symbolic' figures, the bread, the night, the dawn, are
unquestionably designed to evoke precisely the classic sacramental resonances
listed above, an admission that might seem to undercut the semiological
orientation of this counter-essentialist reading. It doesn't simply because this is
not all they evoke, or rather, they do not evoke these significances simply and
unproblematically, as Stull assumes. The text itself in fact echoes back
problematics and distortions to the initial affirmation. It is this 'doubleness' and
resonant multivalence which elevates 'A Small, Good Thing' above almost all
Carver's earlier fiction in both ambition and attainment and which provides for
an adequative potency far more complex than the simple, even crass, symbolic
affirmations of Stull's 'face value' reading of this text's conclusion.
There are two main events which demand close attention in this ending:
Scotty's death (in The Bath' of course his fate is left in the balance) and the final
confrontation with the baker. Both can be taken (and are taken by Stull) to be
figurally redemptive, but by the same token both can be taken as occasions not
for 'redemptive' significances but rather for opening up 'echo chambers' of sorts,
ambivalent epistemic spaces between oppositional codes, oppositional
hermeneutics, oppositional texts-within-the-text which serve to clash, distort and
thereby desacralize the initially clear-seeming resonances of the 'redemptive'
tropes.
For example, the account of Scotty's death is, as Stull is quick to point out,
potentially loaded with almost Dickensian religious traces. The very nature of
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Scotty's condition is, on this hermeneutic level, figural - the physical coma
mirroring the baker's spiritual 'death-in-life'. Similarly, in the account of his
actual death we can find echoes of the crucifixion:
The boy looked at them, but without any sign of recognition.
Then his mouth opened, his eyes scrunched closed, and he howled
until he had no more air in his lungs. His face seemed to relax and
soften then. His lips parted as his last breath was puffed through
his throat and exhaled gently through the clenched teeth.(p.345)
The cry before death, the focus on the final exhalation, all carry strong
biblical undertones: 'And Jesus cried out with a loud voice, and breathed his
last'55 as Mark's Gospel tells us, immediately following on with an account of the
conversion of the centurion under the cross and the tearing of the Temple Veil
in two, both figures of renewed access to God, Truth, adequation. And it is not
difficult to identify this last significance with the way in which the Weiss's are
brought more fully together and into human understanding through Scotty's (in
this sense redemptive) suffering. Thus Ann Weiss is now allowed to find some
form of communion with the Negro family who have also lost a son, whilst in
'The Bath' this family appeared only to highlight the existential intensity and
isolating dissociation of suffering - "'Nelson'" is all this mother from the earlier
story can bring herself to say in response to Ann's own compulsion to explain her
plight.
But again this 'redemptive' reading of the revisions seems more than a little
problematic on closer inspection; indeed an alternative interpretive complexity
'haunts' the more obvious figural affirmations. The coma, for instance, works as
a trope not merely in the humanistic context of the baker's 'flawed essence', but
also, and more directly perhaps, in relation to the oppositional structuring of the
text's semiological significances: Scotty is, like his mother and finally like the
narrative itself, held in tension between oppositions, between contradictions.
For his mother this entrapment takes the form of a conflict between the familiar,
the 'textually' secure and the unfamiliar, the unpredictable, 'unreadable', the
other which is the baker as both character and voice and the wholly 'other',
inhuman indifference of circumstance itself. For Scotty the entrapment occurs
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first within the opposition between the hit and run incident and traditional
birthday significances (birthdays are, after all, signals and affirmations of the
continuation of life), and secondly within the entrapment of the coma, the
crystallizing of all those entrapments into the ultimate opposition of life and
death. The coma is, then, primarily a crucial figure of a tension between
oppositions; Scotty's coma figures perfectly the 'hidden agenda' of semiological
conflict which underlies the superficially 'humanistic', straightforwardly
affirmative text.
In a similar way Scotty's actual death strongly resists a simple, single figural
explication: the death is perversely random, from the initial road accident to the
'one in a million circumstance' of the 'hidden occlusion'. Hardly an
unproblematic parallel with the redemptive determinism of the crucifixion.
Likewise it seems almost gratuitously painful - Carver makes a point of avoiding
the simplest and most obvious means of moving from coma to death, a quiet
passing away, in favour of the disturbing violence of the chosen scene. For all
the possible religious significances adhering to the account, it unarguably exists
primarily as a purposefully harrowing depiction of random, irreducibly
meaningless death. The apparently redemptive adequative consequences of it
are almost mocked by the 'absurdity' of it, and certainly at the very least made
highly contingent by it. It is interesting to compare Christ's recognition of Mary
before death and Carver's The boy looked at them, but without any sign of
recognition'(p.345).
What we arguably find then is not simply a religious sub-text, but a series of
signal oppositions, even contradictions, again in keeping with the patterns of
semiological disruption already discussed. The death scene can perhaps be best
described as a locus, a site of semiological friction, and it is this friction, not any
one semiological index (of, say, religious typologies) that, in its 'liberation of
symbolic energy' produces the adequative 'heat and light' of 'A Small, Good
Thing', as can be even more clearly seen in an analyzing of the final and most
»
drastic revision - the Weiss's actual confrontation with the baker.
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Once more it is possible to construct a wholly 'optimistic' reading around this
episode. Apart from the sacramental imagery of the bread, we are seemingly
faced here with the clearest indication yet of of an abandonement of the
dissociative semiological tensions of The Bath'. This earlier story ends of course
with Ann Weiss's frantic interrogation of the anonymous voice, firmly locating
the dramatic suspense of the narrative in the deeper epistemic 'suspense' of
semiological deferment and disruption. Once this particular dramatic
denouement is discarded the way then seems open for a discarding of the
postmodern semiological/epistemic drama it represented. However, it can be
shown that though this initial dissociative strategy of suspense has been
superseded in 'A Small, Good Thing', the thematic strategy put in its place (the
Weiss's eventual cofrontation and reconciliation with the baker) is just as, and
maybe more, deeply semiologically engaged. Though we do indeed see
adequative dynamics in this closing scene, their final significance is arguably
semiological, not theological; they remain dynamics, relational and so inessential
- adequative potencies not settled claims to adequation.
All this can be seen simply through looking more closely at the two main
figural presences in this part of the text, the 'sacramental' bread and the
'resurrection' light.
The most striking thing to be noticed in any careful analysis of the figural
significances of the light in the bakery, for instance, is that within just the two last
short sentences of the story we are presented with no less than three images of it:
They swallowed the dark bread. It was like daylight under the
fluorescent trays of light. They talked on into the early morning,
the high, pale cast of light in the windows, and they did not think of
leaving.(p.352)
Furthermore, this plurality of reference (illusion of daylight, fluorescent
light, actual dawn light) is figurally ambiguous, even problematic as far as any
neat 'redemptive' hermeneutics is concerned. A faintly disturbing reversal has
been set up, the artificial light of the bakery is 'like daylight', the simile producing
a positive, resonant equivalence when set against the darkness of the bread, but
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then this equivalence, this figural linkage, is disrupted, is broken down. The
cause of the disruption is the intrusion of the 'real' - the figure of the weak, but
authentic, light of dawn works in at least three ways as a dissociative trope: its
placement disrupts the figural equivalence of the light/dark oppositon, its
presence reminds of the falseness, the artificiality of the baker's 'trays of light'
and its own qualities, its remoteness and paleness, serve both to strengthen the
opposition between it and the 'false' light and also to create figural resonances of
its own, far removed from the neat 'redemptive' equivalences (structured around
the fluorescent light) which precede it. One has only to recall the 'snowy light'
from the T.V. that closes 'Where Is Everyone?' (another revised story), the
'terrible' sunrise of The Student's Wife' and the 'sky turning grey' and the 'birds
starting up' in 'Menudo' to realize that dawn in Carver's world generally figures
desperation, even despair, not any intimation of 'spiritual rebirth'. Rather what
we see is something much more interesting, namely the deconstruction of the
classical tropes mentioned on precisely their own terms. Light deconstructs light.
The real dynamic here is to be semiologically, not hermeneutically defined. The
dissociative threat is rooted in the plurality of the sign, the deprivation of
expected essence, the anarchy of the trace. The figure of light is another locus,
then, just as Scotty's coma and death are, of a semiological conflict, and in that
conflict of 'a liberation of symbolic energy'.
Again, in analyzing the figure of the bread, we can see perhaps even more
clearly how the dynamics of this semiological conflict push the text into
adequative resonances more authentic, complex and wide-ranging than any of
the hermeneutically derived essentialist affirmations that are typically brought to
bear on it. Though the contradictions inherent in Carver's use of this figure are
less complex than those 'inhabiting' the motif of light, because of this greater
directness it is this figure that finally emerges as the primary point of disturbance
and challenge in the text - it is after all the 'small, good thing' of the title.
Even more so than the figure of light in this part of the narrative, the bread
motif initially offers itself as an almost blatantly religious significance, and even
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more so than with the above reading of the 'light' motif, a more than superficial
hermeneutics must first of all contextualize this apparently straightforward use of
the trope before its fuller, though more elusive, significances can be approached.
As with the figure of 'light' we find that this semiological contextualization results
not in the strengthening of an 'iconic' significance, but in an 'internal' disruption,
a contained 'explosion' within the sign that both fractures and releases.
The key to this disruption is Carver's structuring of figural oppositions which
at first appear as inter-signal oppositions, but which can actually be seen as
forcing open the focal sign itself (the bread) and revealing intra-signal
oppositions and contradictions. The most obvious of these inter-signal, or
'external' oppositions has already been noted, namely the light/dark opposition
which can now be seen to initiate a reversal of sacramental as well as
resurrection motifs: whereas the Mass or Eucharist is traditionally performed in
a reverential near darkness with white wafers of bread, here we find a crude,
glaring fluorescent brightness and a 'heavy', 'rich', 'dark' bread.
Another 'external' opposition is again set up just before the breaking of the
loaf: 'He had a necessary trade. He was a baker. He was glad he wasn't a florist.
It was better to be feeding people. This was a better smell anytime than
flowers'(p.352). The figures in opposition are again religious - the bread, of
course, and the flowers which also function as 'sacraments' at weddings, funerals
and so on. More to the point, in both these sets of oppositions concerning the
bread we find an identical basis for figural conflict - the irreducible physicality of
the bread, its resistance to any easy figural usurpation of its presence. Carver
insists on a relentlessly concrete and richly sensuous apprehension,
foregrounding the smell of the bread, the 'taste of molasses and coarse grains',
the act of swallowing itself, as well as its heavyness, its richness and darkness.
The function of the flowers/bread opposition is clear enough in this context of
insistent physicality; flowers are all but purely signal in the sense referred to by
the baker, just like the almost purely symbolic, almost incorporeal wafers of the
Mass. On one level then the opposition is again semiological, concerned not so
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much with metaphysical significance but with the subversion of the semiological
terms and mechanisms of 'metaphysical' signification itself.
The 'internalizing' of this subversion is not difficult to trace from these
structural conflicts so subtly set in motion by Carver. Very simply, it can be
argued that the bread figures not even as a self-contained figure in opposition,
but, in its insistent physicality, primarily as a focus of a multiplicity of signal
contradictions: that is, it becomes a text. Resisting the settlement of its
'competing' codes and significances, it becomes a site for a 'multiplicity of souls',
a form of 'threshold' in Handke's sense; the nourishment it offers is in a
fundamental sense a narratological sustenance. Its intra-textual narratives,
derived from the surrounding ur-narrative of the teleology, create a locus of
semiological engagement, of struggle (where we live, after all) that both figures
and in itself embodies a textual physics of presence in the midst of a far more
familiar and orthodox, but ultimately subverted, metaphysics of presence:
Christian hope, identity ('"I'm just a baker. I don't claim to be anything else'"),
the hope of a future, figured as children: 'He told them what it was like to be
childless all these years. To repeat the days with the ovens endlessly full and
endlessly empty'(p.351).
In 'A Small, Good Thing' we can indeed see a movement beyond even 'Will
You Please Be Quiet, Please' and 'Cathedral' towards a 'redemption' of
postmodern 'delinquency', but not through the figural sacralizing of metaphysical
referents. Instead the movement is inwards, is deeper into the typological and
figural interstices and resonances of narrative. It is finally by virtue of this
increased semiological 'radicalism', not its abandonment for 'humanist' verities
and myths of presence, that the text engages in a rich and complex way with the
textuality, the 'fundamental narrative', of life itself, releasing the 'symbolic
energy' of a restless expectancy in which 'every step, every gesture [may be]
aware of itself as a potential threshold, and thus recreate what has been lost'.
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This reading of Carver's work need not simply stop at 'A Small, Good Thing',
of course, though this fiction is in many ways perhaps a culmination of strategies
and more importantly 'obsessions' which so characterized his first three major
collections.
With the publication of Elephant however, new narrative possibilities can be
seen to emerge in the fictions, as if the struggles of 'A Small, Good Thing' had
won a 'l^bensraum' of sorts for the prose, releasing it from the all-but constant
replaying of intransigent conflicts. The approach to this work is to be made in
this study not directly from 'A Small, Good Thing' however. The struggle for an
authentic adequative potency in the postmodern realist text has taken on several
different forms, though certain fundamental correlations can be more or less
consistently traced, allowing, for instance, the semiologically 'engaged'
problematics of In Country or Will You Please Be Quiet, Please to stand
comfortably, if distinctively, side by side with the far more explicitly reflexive
How German Is It.
In studying the work of Richard Ford in relation to the postmodern
framework already evolved for the fictions of Raymond Carver in this thesis, it is
arguably possible to begin to identify at least the most significant of those
fundamental connections and thereby undertake a speculative reading of more
than just a discrete body of fiction - namely a reading of perhaps the most
influential and transformative movement in American fiction since the
postmodern upheaval itself began to be felt.
Despite the fact that any of several other equally important and
representative writers (including Bobbie Ann Mason, Frederick Barthelme,
Tobias Wolff) could be examined in almost as telling a way, Richard Ford has
been chosen for the very basic but also very significant reason that, like Carver's,
(though in his own often radically divergent ways and for his own quite
distinctive ends) his methodology seems to reach back most directly and most
rewardingly to the all-important 'Dead Father' of this new American realism,
Hemingway.
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CHAPTER THREE
'BETWEEN THE IDEA AND THE ACT: IDEALITY, INDETERMINACY
AND IDENTITY IN THE FICTION OF RICHARD FORD
1
It can be argued that the 'luminous gestures' of Raymond Carver's fiction,
heralding and indeed making possible a 'redemption', a non-metaphysical but
vibrant re-sacralizing of delinquent postmodern signification, become in the
novels and stories of Richard Ford a textual phenomena more complex again
than those isolated 'epiphanic' potencies; that they form, in fact, a 'fabric' of
epistemic self-orientation which is for their characters the guarantee of more
than a brief, passing illumination and adequation. It is the constructing of this
fabric, through an unravelling and re-working of codes of experience, that is at
the heart of Ford's achievement.
This achievement is one which in many ways seems consonant with Carver's
own undercutting of both Modernistic and traditional mimetic strategies. Ford
too is arguably engaging in a by now familiar struggle to 'undo' both the 'mythic',
subjectively centred Ideal self and the equally mythic chimera of 'objective'
reality. Like Carver he works to re-locate and even re-validate the self within the
texts that form its world since in a postmodern world (and Ford's fictional worlds
are certainly that) this is where the 'realist' subject and voice as much as the
metafictional subject and voice must begin.
In Ford's novels we see this process worked at (not through until The
Sportswriter) in a variety of ways. It can be shown however that throughout all its
different manifestations in the texts a basically continuous (though developing in
terms of both structural and figural sophistication) process remains clearly to be
seen: that of evolving an 'ontology of entry', of 'finding one's way about' (to echo
Wittgenstein again) a deconstructed world (the perceived world - the world of
self after all) whose texts of meaning and hence of validation for the subject have
somehow lost their coherence and authority. This 'somehow' figures as many
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things in the texts, but throughout retains a basic signifying value. Thus in Ford's
first novel A Piece ofMy Heart it figures as both sexual obsession and a form of
psychological aphasia; in The Ultimate Good Luck as the trauma of Vietnam and
a State-and rebel-terrorized Oaxaca; in The Sportswriter the death of a son and
the subsequent break up of a marriage; in Wildlife the separation of parents in a
town threatened by forest fires. What all these things signify is epist.emic
breakdown, the 'undoing' or 'unravelling' referred to, an unravelling of the selfs
securities along the threads of its codes of meaning.
Of course this process in itself is not new to American fiction. Hemingway,
pre-eminently for Ford, has been here before both in the 'undoing' of a 'lost
generation' of his own and in the attempt to re-cohere the frayed realities of his
heroes; in this sense Nick Adams and Frederic Henry are always at the shoulders
of Ford's Quinn, Robard Hewes, Joe Brinson, even Frank Bascombe as
essentially isolate, emotionally cauterized figures involved primarily in
structuring rather than in simply empirically living their lives; the inevitable
tension between these two modes of existence generating much of the lostness
inevitably endured by his protagonists. In fact, like Carver's stories, Ford's novels
can be seen as signalling a postmodern assimilation of Hemingway's Modernist
transformation of classical realism. Just as earlier Hemingway's aesthetic
provided for a reading of Carver's own postmodern response to the realist
heritage, so now it can provide a Modernist 'foil' of sorts to Ford's explorations of
the epistemic/ontological problematics raised by a postmodern fissuring of self¬
hood.
For Hemingway, writing in the wake of Conrad's, James' and Anderson's
unreliable narrators the realist, metonymic text could no longer be taken for
granted as a coded index of self-hood, of epistemic security, of, ultimately, a
metaphysical, metatextual ontological presence. The realist voice, the given
narrative presence could however still function, though no longer securely as the
creator of rhetorical tropes, only as their creation. The voice could no longer
guarantee a meta-textual authority (if it ever did even before that authority was
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at last self-consciously and systematically challenged by the Moderns), but it
could itself construct, or concretize, an ontological integrity of (as opposed to
with) the text. The text functions for Hemingway not simply as a simple,
complacent index of authorial, 'theological' security, but as a complex
reconstruction, re-concretizing, of an insecure, subsiding reality. The textual
index becomes the reality.
But for Ford, writing almost a century on, the text itself must be seen as
shifting and friable. And if the text itself, because of the very nature of its
materials, can never have a settled ontology even in its willed constructedness,
what idea of self can survive on such unsupportive ground?
In his essay The Eccentric Self Peter Currie notes that:
American postmodernism may be seen to endorse a rhetorical
view of life which begins with the primacy of language. Richard
Lanham's work on literary rhetoric in the Renaissance indirectly
corroborates this distinguishing feature of Franco-American
critical theory and postmodernist practice, particularly with regard
to the question of character; for personality theory formed on the
analogy of rhetorical theory exemplifies a typical Renaissance
process, one which closely parallels Lacan on the relationship
between figures of speech and the mechanisms of the unconscious:
'The parts of speech and the parts of man can be discussed with the
same vocabulary'.1
What is particularly interesting about this claim with regard to the fiction of
Richard Ford is that 'a rhetorical view of life which begins with the primacy of
language' is not a 'distinguishing feature' of his postmodern practice at all, though
it is certainly a feature of it. It is not a distinguishing feature since it applies
equally well to certain modes of Modernist theory and practice, perhaps pre¬
eminently well to Hemingway.
This aesthetic has already been examined in the light of Carver's 'rhetorical
view of life' of course, but this earlier comparison was concerned not with
Modern/postmodern validations of self-hood as such, rather with the
possibilities for a Modern/postmodern epistemic adequation; that is, with the
self-as-other; other than the external world, its codes, its other selves. The
analysis was in other words geared towards the epistemological potencies of the
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two aesthetics. In studying Richard Ford's fiction the focus must be shifted from
the epistemological, from the textual phenomenology of self-hood, to the
ontological, to the textual phenomena of self-hood.
Returning to Peter Currie's observation, we can see that there are essentially
two strands to Ford's implicit 'rhetorical view of life': the first a distinctively
deconstructive process of, in Currie's words, 'effective negation and diffraction of
the self, a transgression of the identity principle"2; the second, not mentioned in
Currie's (predominently metafiction orientated) essay, a thread trailing directly
back to Hemingway, a thread of embattled self-construction. Both Nick Adams
and Jake Barnes are, for instance, like Quinn in The Ultimate Good Luck, 'post¬
war' characters, characters who have experienced an incoherent war (whether
the Great War or Vietnam) the aftermath of which has functioned as the engine
of 'affective negation and diffraction of the self. Furthermore, all three
characters seek a re-unification of self through 'right action', through Quinn's
'Good Conduct'3, through the highly wrought shaping in action of consequent
physical, emotional and moral experience. And so Nick Adams fishes, Jake
Barnes is drawn to the bullfights and Quinn isolates himself as a winter
gamekeeper in the Michigan forests.
The two 'strands' of Ford's working out of the dilemma of postmodern self¬
hood seem in one sense then hardly anything more than a simple continuation of
broadly Modernist strategies. Arguably however Ford's concern with
Modernistic ontological dialectics is as distinctively postmodern as Carver's
concern with the Modernistic epistemologies discussed earlier, and the root of
this distinction is to be located, as it was in the comparison of Hemingway and
Carver, not simply in differences of emphasis or interpretation, but in a
subversion of the parallels to be found.
For Hemingway, the impulse to forge a new, isolate validation may be seen
as arising out of the classic, essentially tragic, and above all Ideal dialectic
between a 'mythic' integrity of self and a 'political' deconstruction of that myth,
the deconstructive axis in classical tragedy being the hamartia; the axis in
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Hemingway being the post-war moral and cultural condition of a 'lost
generation'.4 For Ford this 'classic' dialectic holds good only within the context
of another, larger problematic which subsumes the former, though common to
Ford's first two novels in particular is a framework which corresponds to the
Modernistic frame erected by Hemingway, a framework which must first be
delineated before the undermining of it can be posited and appreciated.
Just as Nick Adams and Jake Barnes work out (though never fully resolve) a
mode of being caught between the centrifugal dynamic of the acted-upon self
(moulded, disfigured, castrated by war) and the centripetal dynamic of the self-
as-actor-upon (the figure of the hunter-fisherman, the meticulous, sacramental
coherer-through-right-action of the external, potentially chaotic physical world),
so in A Piece ofMy Heart Sam Newel realizes that: "'Everything I think I know is
ambiguous...I'm flying apart a mile a millisecond for that very reason'"5 and
Robard Hewes is unable to resist the 'centrifugal' force of his lust for Beuna, a
force which dissociates choice, the 'cement' of self, from act:
It seemed unaccountable, he thought, for life to transport you this
way, to where you'd never thought of going nor wanted to go nor
even knew to exist. It made him feel giddy and out of
control...there wasn't any planning it finally. He saw it all at once.
It was all right to plot it, but you had to be ready to glide in the
wake of fate sooner or later, and not be surprized when things
surprized you.(p.200)
A Piece of My Heart is essentially a chronicle of the futile attempts of both
men to understand and overcome this 'transgression of the identity principle', the
characteristic Hemingwayesque struggle, though Ford is less shy of allowing his
characters to articulate as well as live it.
Even in Ford's far mellower The Sportswriter the same dialectical pressures
can be identified quite easily, though now more understated and self-contained:
Frank Bascombe turns to sportswriting after a brief period as a 'serious' writer
because the certainties of the sportswriting code, its ethos of a stoic but
'homespun' 'right action' (as well as its regular pay) offers a more secure textual
validation of his life than the contrivances of fiction; after his son's death and his
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divorce it becomes the means of 'a separate peace', the willed haven from a
fragmenting world.
How then are these parallels with Modernistic dialectical strategies of
validation, seemingly mirrored so closely, subverted by Ford, and to what end?
To begin with, a crucial distinction must be made between the (broadly
speaking) Modernistic 'deconstructive turn' functioning as an 'essential', or
classically 'tragical' axis and the postmodern deconstructive principle, functioning
not tragically, but ironically, even 'comically'; that is, functioning as a structurally
inherent compromising of the codes of right action, rather than simply as the
critical aporia which prompts, even necessitates, the re-codifying of experience.6
Instead of the rhetorical re-shaping occuring as a stabilizing, potentially
totalizing strategy then as it is for the Moderns, the re-codifying in Ford's fiction
remains determinedly rhetorical and never 'hardens' into an 'essential' grammar,
into myth. Rather the encoded 'shelters' of ontological security constructed by
Ford's characters are always revealed as reactionary and as such inherently
baseless, deriving their authority not from any true integrity of being, but from a
transitory, embattled discipline of being. For Hemingway in such texts as 'Big
Two-Hearted River' an Ideal dialectic of ontological security can be cleanly
played out between the disruptive forces of the external world and the implicitly
a priori cohering potency of the mind in action, of the will as existential function;
for Ford, as will be shown presently, such dialectics are simply strategic and
transitive, a means of marshalling a 'multiplicity of souls' to return to Staten's
phraseology, a crisis strategy which cannot be sustained indefinitely against the
centrifugal pressure of an a priori 'multiplicity' which in its rhetorical lack of fixity
undermines from the beginning what must now be seen as the arbitrary, imposed
grammar of the 'code'. Again then, the tragical axis still available to the
Moderns disappears and in its place is an ontology with no room for even
problematic, traumatized 'essences' beneath the storm; instead,
The rhetorical view of life, in Lanham's definition, is satirical
because the rhetorical stylist can see no central self or irrreducible
identity to be true to: 'the concept of a central self, true or not, the
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idea of an unreduced residue rather than a candid
acknowledgement of the rhetorical aspects of life, flatters man
immensely'.7
The distinction can perhaps be seen then as an outworking of the dynamic
traced in the previous chapter away from an 'essentialist' view of being. For the
Moderns this essentialism is more or less taken for granted and allows for at
least the classic 'tragical' or mythical valorising of the self; in a postmodern
context it survives as the 'straw essence' necessary for the Derridean notion of
'polluted' or 'compromized' being where the subject is seen primarily as a wholly
vulnerable chimera, open to an endless 'unravelling' of integrity in much the
same way that the postmodern text is open to an endless unravelling of its codes
and structures of grammatical authority.
Ford moves even further away from it than this however, towards what may
be termed an exploration of 'transitive' being, no longer polluted by differance,
since the very notion of pollution presupposes an essentialist nostalgia, but
rather released into differance, into a rhetoric of life which is 'potentially
catastrophic' in de Man's words,8 but by the same token potentially
transformative. As Currie again puts it, a '"non-linear" conception of character
has so far emerged, constructed on a set of transformations rather than the
consistency of an "evolving" or "developing" personality'9(Italics mine). Arguably
Ford's characters play out just such a conceptual drama of character, of self¬
hood; again, not a tragic drama since the ontological flaw is not a fateful axis but
a mundane condition of being; rather an ironic/satiric 'comedy'. When Sam
Newel in A Piece of My Heart is describing his father's life (the 'adhesive for
everything' Newel finds incoherent in life) to his lover Beebe, this sense of the
bleak comedy of an existence undermined by the ever-present trivial (rather than
the one tragic) nexus (perhaps pointedly his father misses the Second World War
because of a heart murmur - "'I don't know what would have happened to him.
Nothing worse, I guess'") is never far from the surface. "'Does that seem at all
funny?"' Newel asks, explaining "'it began to seem funny again to me for a
second"'(p.81). His father's death too is, in Newel's words "'practically slapstick'":
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'He got killed in Bastrop, Louisiana, on his way to New
Orleans. He got behind a big flat-haul and I guess he was going to
pass, I don't know. He was a traveling salesman and never drove
over sixty, never got close behind cars. But he was behind this
truck for some reason, and all of a sudden a load of corrugated
steel pipe came loose and slid off down in the front seat with him.
Cut his head off. Left him sitting in the front seat. He could've
kept on driving if he'd had a head. It didn't even bump the
compass on the dash.'(p.77)
Of course this 'comic' probing and undermining of the Modernistic, isolate
constructed self is not systematically pursued in Ford's work, though in the first
two novels that subversion is the dominant feature of his engagement with the
problem of postmodern self-hood. By the third, The Sportswriter, the. constructed
self has all but collapsed before the novel begins and the tentative
reconstructions of 'transitive being' form the novel itself. A Piece of My Heart
and The Ultimate Good Luck can therefore perhaps be most usefully approached
as being themselves transitive in their explorations, working towards a re-
adequation, but characteristically through a pervasive deconstruction, neither
novel ever settling but keeping their characters and problematics always at one
remove from re-orientation and resolution, each textually mirroring, then, the
ontological restlessness that above all else concerns them.
Significantly, restlessness is the main structural principle of Ford's debut
novel A Piece ofMy Heart. In charting the journeys of Sam Newel and Robard
Hewes across America to a remote island on the Mississipi Ford interweaves two
accounts of chronic restlessness, constructing from them not a dialectic but an
oppositional structure itself animated by unease, by an antagonistic refusal to
fulfill its tropological dynamics of resolution. The novel opens with the death of
one of the two men, though we are left uncertain as to which of them it is, and
this fact wholly undercuts the superficially dialectical structure of the novel,
subverting structural expectations, creating a dis-ease that permeates any latent
sense of dynamic progression, forcing the structure out into diffusion rather than
in towards resolution. Indeed, as if to make the fact of this textual restlessness
more clear Ford takes the title for the novel (itself indicating fragmentation of
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the heart, the mythic centre of the self) not from any cohering significance in or
of the narrative, but from the writing on the side of a truck which passes through
the text without leaving any mark other than this signal of only transitional
illusions of meaningfulness and coherence, glimpsed 'through dust and
coagulated grease', hinting at but not finally delivering 'good sense'. Semantic
'restlessness' or instability is here also figuring alongside and underneath the
marked structural and thematic resistance to fixedness, then:
The first truck to pass the station hissed through the curves
and ground out into the road - a tandem hauling diesel smoke into
the desert. There was large writing on the sides through dust and
coagulated grease, WHACK MY OLD DOODLE, and below that,
TAKE ANOTHER LITTLE PIECE OF MY HEART, as though
one line followed on the other and made good sense. He looked at
the writing and scratched the back of his neck and wondered what
that meant.(p.30)
The overwhelming impression left by the two searches for re-orientation
undertaken by Robard Hewes and Newel is one of a fundamentally aimless,
transitional 'passing through' rather than any Modernistic 'odyssey' towards
however ironic a conclusion. As Hewes reflects as he begins his journey: 'nothing
in his life ever ended. Things only changed and grew up into something
else'(p.l2). Hewes and Newel are anything but Ulysses's; more ontological
travelling salesmen, as it were, never reaching a point of rest, always in transit,
undergoing a condition of life, not undertaking a journey to any fixed goal.
Certainly, to return to the account of Newel's father, the figure of the
travelling salesman is invested with a great deal of significance by Ford. '"My
father'", Newel admits,
'isn't finally important. He's just adhesive for everything. I puzzle
about him to have somebody to puzzle about. But I still end up
thinking about just parts all the time. There's something easy
about them I don't understand, and I can't hold them together well
enough to figure out what it is.'(p.80)
It is not Newel's father as such then, not the man that's important; rather the
legacy of the figure of the extended trope of his life as it presents itself to Newel's
memory. The significance is in the structural principle of that life (one of
transition and fragmentation) a principle that now structures (or rather de-
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structures) Newel's inner life and figures as a metaphor almost for his lack of
settled identity, of coherent being. Newel can only 'think in parts', parts which
cannot be made coherent because he has no stronger 'adhesive', no stronger
'identity principle' of his own to replace the identity of his father. Thus through
the novel we are presented with a series of vignettes, scenes from Newel's past,
scenes of life on the road with his father, none of which cohere or reveal but only
constitute a series of ironic non-epiphanies. What we see is a postmodern
process of metonymic, even aphasic identity construction, essentially arbitrary
and contingent for all its teasing towards synthetic meaningfulness. These
passages are italicized as if to emphasise their separateness from the rest of the
text, from anything consequential, leaving them irreducible and finally opaque.
In typical postmodern fashion they are, as far as Newel's identity is concerned,
mirrors not windows, and this is the root of his inability to make the fragments
produce meaning, and the root of his restlessness which is simply an expression
of his fear that in the end there are no windows on the soul, only a hall of mirrors
at the end of 'self-discovery':
'...what does it have to do with you?' 'It frightens the shit out of
me.' He tried to make out a look on her face but couldn't. 'I don't
want everything the same. Your past is supposed to give you some
way of judging things. So it has to do with me because I say it
does.'
There's no need answering you,' she said.
'Shouldn't I have something besides the assurance that
everything will eventually be the same?'(pp.82-3)
Newel's 'epiphanies', then, reflect an acted upon (because helpless, or
impotent in self-definition) identity rather than reveal the interstices of motive
and impulse. Just as the travels of the salesman-figure of his father are 'handed
down', are scheduled and not chosen, are separate from any personal motive for
travel, so Newel's loss of 'security of being' and consequent restlessness is a state
of being, figuring an ontological flux and not an existential journey of self-
discovery, though this is what he yearns to make it. 'It has to do with [him] only
because [he] say[s] it does'; the significances, the 'epiphanies' are arbitrary, or at
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best beyond comprehension. His adhesive is not the Hemingwayesque, Ideal
sacralizing power of the will, but mere wilfulness.
Robard Hewes also suffers this same disjunction between a propelling
restlessness and the lack of an 'adhesive' strong enough to bind that restlessness
into a coherent focus. Instead of the will his 'adhesive' is his obsession with his
cousin Beuna, and this is enough to pull him away from the weaker bond of his
marriage. Again then we see character delineated according to principles of
fragmentation as opposed to an '"evolving" or "developing" personality':
On the road back across the desert he began to tiy to settle
things. In general, he knew, things didn't end in your life because
by all sensible estimations they ought to. Or because people
involved did things or changed places that would ordinarily make
carrying on any longer a natural hardship. Because once a force
got a start in you, it grew and took on dimensions and shadings and
a life separate and sometimes as complete and good as your
own.(p.ll)
Of course behind such a dissociation of self from being in the existential
sense of initiating, choosing and acting out of an integrity of identity, an
authenticity, is a fundamental dissociation of identity itself. The dislocation from
the past and hence from understanding felt by Newel and the dislocation from
the acting present felt by Hewes signifies an ontological disruption, a disruption
seen not only in the self-explanations of the characters, but also, as the novel
takes on an almost archetypal landscape (the island) for its action, in an analysis
of the dramatic 'siting' of the physical/psychological outworking of the narrative.
In this analysis another important dimension of Ford's handling of the problem
of postmodern identity in the novel can, arguably, be seen: a dimension which
seeks to make an ironic, even parodic, archetype of the novel's dramatized
ontological concerns.
The notion of an island or even just isolated locus serving as the basis for
what could be called an ontological topography is of course an old one. Poe's
Valley of the Many-Coloured Grass, Coleridge's Xanadu, Lord Jim's Patusan and
Marlow's Congo, Nick Adams' camp on the Big Two-Hearted River and of
course Prospero's island all belong to some extent within this loose 'tradition'.
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Ford's island however, while clearly designed to echo and even promise just such
a depth of signification, both fulfills and simultaneously subverts it as a (carefully
manipulated in true postmodern spirit) tropic expectation.10
We first hear of the island through Newel's lover, Beebe, the granddaughter
of the island's owner, Mr Lamb, and it is unambiguously, if laconically, held out
to him from the start as a place of potential reorientation:
'...I don't know what you're talking about,' she said.
'It's complicated,' he said, feeling sad.
'Go to the island,' she said cheerfully, as if that had been an
acceptable option all along, and she were just rehearsing it for the
record.
'And do whatT he said irritably. 'Run through the woods
screaming while they shoot at me?'
'I don't know what,' she said. 'But there isn't anyplace left for
you to figure out whatever it is you seem jinxed into figuring out,
all that dismal mess you were shrieking about...It's a very good
place to go to compose yourself, or do whatever you'd like.
It's Mississippi in its most baronial and ridiculous. You can go
tonight if you want to; all I have to do is make a call to the boat
camp...
...I'll tell Popo you're coming but he shouldn't expect you until
he sees you. That'll be nice.'
'Nice for whom? Why don't you just say I'm presently in an
institution for the morally unsure and won't be released for some
time?'(pp.83-4)
Immediately however Ford undercuts this promise of 'composure', of
reconstruction, subverting the expectations of a secure 'haven' he has set up
through Beebe's account of the island:
'Did you know,' she said, looking abstracted, 'in 1911, some
poor people went to sleep in Arkansas and woke up in Mississippi.
The river changed course at 3 A.M. and everyone was forced to
make some adjustments. Popo's coloured man insists he was in the
river in a wood boat at the moment of the change, but I don't
believe it.'(pp.84-5)
Just as Ford can be seen as both adopting and undercutting the Modernist
valorizations of the male, isolate, ordering self in structuring the events in
Hewes' and Newel's worlds solidly around inner pathologies which, instead of re-
cohering, fragment and dissociate, so he can also be seen as both adopting and
undermining a much older technique for the fictional valorization of identity as a
cohesive, cohering and centring force, as an Idealistic 'gravity' for a world of
signs. The island is set up as a signal for resolution and healing, but then this
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sign is 'polluted', its significations compromized. Significantly, the first thing
Newel and Hewes discover on arrival is that the water supply has become soiled
by a fault in Lamb's sewerage system:
'Shit,' the old man said. There's shit in my well water, by God.
Mrs Lamb knows what she's talking about.'
The colored man shook his head ruefully and stood over the
hole, staring at it as if it were a grave.
'I bragged on it,' the old man said, still levered back on his
haunches.
'Yes suh,' the colored man said.
'It queers everything. I told Gaspareau a month ago what a
goddamn good well I had, been good since 1922, and the first thing
I know the privy goes and infects it. That was a jinx, and I'm to
cause.'(p.llO)
If the island itself carries a weight of albeit ironic figural significance, Lamb
himself certainly functions as an ironic/parodic cantankerous Prospero figure:
from his claim that 'that was a jinx and I'm to cause' to his engineering the
removal of his island from official maps, (thus in a representational sense making
the island his own, decontextualized, private creation) he emerges as the comic-
grotesque master of a wryly conceived, postmodern version of a Tempest-like
Idealist landscape. We learn that the animal life he has charge over on the
island becomes subject to whim rather than natural laws (hunting laws being
framed around the natural order of breeding seasons of course):
'I thought you said it was out of season for deer,' he said.
The old man looked at him malignantly. 'It's my land. It's
open season on anything I take a notion to shoot. Piss on deer
season and every other season. I'll shoot what I want to shoot. I
got a covey of pet quail right out between the house and my
airfield this very minute...I'll take Elinor and walk right out there
and shoot me two quails and eat them for dinner, if I want to. I
don't need nobody to tell me it ain't quail season, cause it is. Them
quails is always in season - my season.'(p.l30)
And equally Prospero-like within the parodic context of the comparison is
his attitude to Hewes and Newel, his psychological/ontological castaways: "'I
don't like people around here who aren't satisfied, except me, and I can be any
goddamned thing I please'"(p.ll5).
And again echoing (within Ford's 'realistic' parameters) Shakespeare's
island, the very physicality of Lamb's self-contained world is ambiguous:
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With one hand to guard his eyes, he poked into the grove, which
seemed to be beech saplings and plum bush, until in front of him
he could no longer see now the trail parted the brush, and he could
smell the sweet plums, and his next step was a long one down into
the water.(p.l84)
Again there are elliptical echoes and hints at a restoration for Hewes and
Newel, echoes and hints that draw on an almost archetypal textual strategy for
such a restoration. When Ford undermines these already tenuous significances
therefore he is doing more than arbitrarily depriving Newel, Hewes and the
reader of a satisfying, 'readerly' closure. In a sense he is subverting a whole
tropological tradition of the Idealist power of the will to re-mould in perception
(and hence creation) the past and acting present, inverting this classical and
Modernistic metaphoric ontology of the text and presenting us instead with a
metonymic ontology of lost origins and centres, of contingent fragments 'shored
up against the ruins'. And so we see Lamb progressively become an ever more
inverted, desacralized Prospero (we discover that his island is in fact leased, not
owned), and find the novel steadily charting his decline:
'I just don't know,' the old man said, jamming his little hands
together and starting one thumb into orbit around the other,
becoming momentarily engrossed as though it was no small task to
keep them both going at once. 'First my well goes queer, which it
had never been known to do in fifty years. Then the turkey season
fouls up, then the goddamn lease is coming up.' The old man
squinted at him as if he were considering including him as a fourth
calamity. 'There's something wrong, ain't it, Newel?'(p.l68)
Not surprizingly, then, Hewes and Newel, so overtly brought together by the
novel's contrapunctal structure, only once during their stay make any attempt to
understand each other's reasons for being there, and even then the attempt ends
not in resolution or enlightenment, but in a series of phatic exchanges laced with
a sardonic irony ('as if he really wanted to know the answer', 'as if he were
looking at everything philosophically') targeted at precisely those tropological,
'readerly', metaphoric expectations mentioned previously:
The jeep motor choked out and Robard watched the lake
stippling light up through the willows. 'I got something I want to
ask you, Newel,' he said...'What is it you're doing down here?'
Robard pushed his thumb knuckle in his eye socket and gave his
eye a good kneading.
'I'm forgetting all about that,' he said, and got up and stood
around to the front of the jeep, feeling ready to go back.
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'Life ain't that difficult.' Robard took a match from behind his
ear and scratched it off his zipper.
'I just have to adopt a plainer view of things,' he said.
'That's me.' Robard puffed luxuriously.
'I had all these ideas I couldn't make sense of.' He came and
slid over onto the back bench of the jeep and let his feet dangle.
'Peoples names, a lot of things at random.'
'But ain't that just your memory?' Robard said.
'Yeah, but it started giving me the creeps! I couldn't
remember anything else, except what had happened the day
before, and some little bits of law school. Didn't that ever happen
to you?'
'No,' Robard said, touching the ash with the nail of his little
finger. 'I ain't been to law school.'
He frowned at Robard, who was admiring his cigarette.
'Anyway, goddamn it, I got obsessed with what the hell I knew, and
all I knew was just those things - bits of time, pictures of people in
my mind, little places, my old man. You can't attach yourself to a
bunch of crap like that. I sat in my apartment a solid month trying
to stitch it together into some reasonable train of thought, and
none of it worked.'
'How come?' Robard said, turning around as if he really
wanted to know the answer.
'I don't know...'
...Robard sighed as if he were looking at everything
philosophically. 'All right,' he said...
'You come all the way down here and you're going back
without having done nothin?'
He tapped his heels, watching the dust settle on the grass. 'I
figured one thing out,' he said.
'And who's that - me?' Robard said.
'I don't give a shit anymore,' he said precisely, listening to the
air wash up through the willows.(pp.228-9)
An even more telling, though much briefer, encounter between the two men
has yet to occur however, and when it does it is placed significantly within the
context of what must be seen as the structural heart of the novel's subversion of
its tropic archetypalism - Newel and Lamb's fishing trip. If, as has been argued,
the island can be seen as an undermining, a postmodern desacralizing of
traditional ontological topographies, sites of Idealistic valorizations and
restorations of integrated self-hood, then the fishing trip can be seen as bringing
not only this tropic subversion to a head, but also as a consequence the failure of
its visitants to achieve the restoration the tropological dynamic in question
promises.
Parallels have already been drawn between Hemingway's Modernist
valorizing of the isolate self, personal 'codes' of right action and Ford's adoption
and undercutting of very similar figures of self-validation. In the episode of the
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fishing trip a more specific parallel is worked out between Hemingway's use of
the isolated, sacralized (through the will's rituals in hunting and fishing)
landscape as an ontological significance and Ford's 'debasing' of such
significances in the episode in question.11 In place of Nick Adams' artistry with
the fly-rod for instance we get:
'What about poles?' he said, looking wretchedly toward the
underside of the house, where the poles were strung...
...'Shit on poles,' the old man shouted, careening off toward the
outhouse, getting both hands on either side of the wheel and
seeming to lose control...
...'I like to telephone the fish,' the old man said craftily, and
motioned with his thumb to the back of the jeep at a little black
metal box with a smooth wood-handled crank and two long half-
stripped copper leads fastened to gold thumbscrews at either
end.(p.236)
Nowhere in the novel is it made more clear that the psychological 'lostness'
and separateness felt by Newel and Hewes is irredeemable not simply because
they 'don't give a shit anymore' but because such capitulations are ultimately
grounded in an ontological condition of subversion, a disruption which offers
parodies of significance rather than settling for affirmations of limited
significances and which thereby challenges rather than simply avoids the tenuous
securities accreting to Modernistic valorizations of the (however fluid) essential
self. It is this undermining, parodic quality that is both the main structural and
aesthetic determinant in the book, and that should arguably be taken as its final
word on the 'teasing' dialectical structural devices that simultaneously invest with
and divest of settled, valorizing significance the characters and their meeting in
such a tropologically de-stabilized fictional world. As Newel is driven past
Hewes on the way to the lake then, we are made to feel that this is a very
significant non-meeting, perhaps Newel and Hewes' last chance to fulfill the
expectations set up by their being brought together on the island, and yet we are
also told that Newel's sudden sense of urgent importance is nothing more than
an 'insignificant urge':
The jeep ducked below the rim of the bank, and he looked
back disconsolately at the house and saw Robard kneeling out in
the dooryard to the Gin Den...He had a feeling that when he got
back from wherever he was going, some inexplicable place where
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you caught fish by telephone, Robard would be long gone, and it
made him feel queer and almost angry. And he had the sudden
insignificant urge to signal him somehow, to wave his hand up, but
the jeep straggled down beneath the flat marly rim of the buff, and
he was gone, and there was no time even to get his hand off the
frame of the glass and into the air.(p.236)
This 'doubleness' in the signifying process continues as Newel and Lamb
drive to the lake, Ford's depiction of Lamb and his gestures alternating between
the mysteriously portentous and the pathetically impotent and (so far as the
Prospero parallel is concerned) debased:
All at once the old man hacked up a pocket of phlegm and
spat it and gave him a tricky look as it something were tempting
him to speak but he was intent on keeping it a secret until precisely
the right moment when he'd spring it and startle everybody,
Ford tells us, but just preceding this information is a description of Lamb which
paints him as not just 'debilitated', but by the end of the passage all but physically
absent, completely wasted away, prefiguring his actual and ultimate absence in
death which is soon to follow:
The jeep was producing a lot of smoke and terrible strangling
sounds that filled the bottom, and Mr Lamb had retreated into the
clamor and begun to look a little debilitated. In the mossy light his
skin was pale and the blood pounded the artery in his forehead,
percolating hotly back into his brain. His frame was bent over the
wheel and his suspenders had luffed forward away from his chest
as if nothing were inside them to hold on to.(p.237)
Ford goes on to further set up and then undermine several more intimations
of unspoken knowledge, of epistemic potency, for instance by 'loading' Lamb's
sighting of a woodpecker ('Mr Lamb watched the bird keenly, as if he were
making a mental note of it, then glanced at him again craftily as though there
had been some import to the bird's flying the way it had that shouldn't have been
missed') and then following it immediately with 'the story of the slaughterhouse
goat', a long, rambling, 'debased' parable with a leaden denouement which Ford
again parodically invests with a (this time overtly subverted) promise of
significance:
'Oh, yeah,' the old man said, the smile reviving. 'So what do
you think the morale of that story is about the goat named Newel?'
'I don't know,' he said gloomily, resenting the old man for the
whole story.
'The morale is,' Mr Lamb said, transforming his eyes into tiny
peepholes of unrivaled significance, 'a smart goat will always
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outrun a dead one.' The old man's eyes suddenly snapped wide
open, in imitation of the response he expected to see but didn't
get.(p.241)
A little further on we find Lamb sitting and watching the bank of the lake
(much as the reader is by now presumably sitting and watching the text) 'as if he
were waiting for something to identify itself and deliver up a potent sign'(p.242).
Once again however the anticipation of significance is harnessed, as indeed it is
throughout this whole passage, to the limiting, puncturing formula accompanying
it: 'as if/'as though'.
This pattern of valorization/subversion reaches far beyond this adjectival
oscillation of course. In an important sense the episode of the fishing trip
functions not so much as the static heart or centre of the book, but rather as a
dynamic nexus. It is the point at which the novel's doubleness finally asserts
itself, splitting on a thematic level the fates of Newel and Hewes, and on a figural
level the metonymic, fragmented postmodern ennui from its archetypal, quasi-
mythopoeic, Modernistic shadow.
Thus the lake, like the island, is an 'absent presence', deprived of a solid
signal reality, an ambiguous non-place within an ambiguous non-place:12
He tried to recall if he had seen evidence of a lake on the aerial
map, but could only remember the contour of the island, a large
blotchy teardrop imprint, bounded by the river, but nothing else. It
seemed possible that the picture had been taken when the lake was
dry and the ground mossed over, though it seemed equally feasible
that the old man had schemed and cajoled and managed to delete
the lake from the picture by design, the same way he had scourged
the entire island from the official map of the Corps of
Engineers.(p.243)
Now however there are no hints at, or echoes of, a sacralized topography or a
sacralizing wedding of the will to the world through physical ritual. There is only
a straightforwardly parodic debasing of that trope where, correspondingly, the
mechanized, skill-less 'ritual' enacted 'splits' the act of fishing from its tropic
resonances. Indeed, any way of taking fish other than by electrocution is
incomprehensible to Lamb:
'I'll tell you, though,' he said, smiling strangely, 'Landroo's a
comical old coon. When he comes out here, he won't go right to
where them jugs are at. He'll rig him up a cane pole and take a
bunch of whatever he likes that day, worms or roaches or
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whatever's he got in his "farm", and start down there in them dead
falls and nigger all the way up to here.' The old man grinned at him
in amazement as if Landrieu were a living mystery to match all
mysteries, never divining Landrieu might take some considerable
pleasure in the leisurely divertis^hent of fishing, before he got
down to the actual business of taking in the fish.(p.246)
The one and only 'event' that takes place on the island therefore, far from
fulfilling the tropic expectations discussed earlier, completely overturns them.
The fishing expedition effectively 'concludes' the novel (from here on there is
little 'structuring' of expectation, just a coda of disintegration) simply because it
is here that 'doubleness' becomes 'otherness'. The parodic ceases to function as a
corrective and becomes the dominant mode, amplifying both the 'restlessness'
and essential separate-ness which above all else the novel ultimately insists on.
Lamb's 'practically slapstick' death is inevitable on this fishing trip, its comic-
grotesque quality catapylulting Lamb's figural significance finally and
unequivocally from the ironic to the parodic, the one conclusive dynamic of the
novel as a whole:
All at once Mr Lamb stopped cranking, his ears grown scarlet,
and sweat thickening the collar of his flannel shirt. The old man
turned and gave him a defiant look, then grabbed for the wires in
his other hand...by some miscalculation he grabbed onto both spiky
ends at once and discharged the entire stored-up quotient of
telephonic electricity directly into his body.
'Oops,' the old man said in an obvious surprise, and threw up
both his hands, dropping the cords into the water and pitching
straight over backward into the middle of the boat, making a loud
whumping sound on the chinky curvature of his spine, his eyes
wide open as if he were about to instigate another imitation of
Landrieu but had somehow gotten sidetracked. He did not hit his
head. The rocker effect of his spinal curve mediated the blow so
that his head only lightly touched the slatted bottom of the boat
the way an acrobat's head passingly touches the mat at the start of
a somersault.(p.249)
Equally inevitable is the conclusion of Hewes's and Newel's attempts to
understand each other, and by extension the roots of their restlessness and
dissolution of identity, their 'spiritual', ontological brokenness, a dimension to
their suffering shaded in by Ford behind their nervous, dismissive talk of eyes,
the 'windows of the soul', and broken hearts:
He looked at Newel, then thought a moment. 'What was it you
said about my eyes? Something ignorant, I remember.'
'I forgot,' Newel said, looking away.
160
'No you didn't neither,' he said. He bit up a tiny piece of his
lip.
'You gettin worried?' Newel smiled at him.
'Screw yourself,' he said, and stalked inside the Gin Den and
let the door spring out in the wind. He sat on the edge of the bed
and watched Newel through the open door and wished he'd never
seen him.
Newel walked inside the doorway and leaned against the jamb
and looked out. 'I said there was something grieved about you.'
The wind had begun to keen in the joints, and the tin seemed to
expand as if it wanted to explode. 'Grieved might not be the right
word,' Newel said, wagging the back of his head against the chase.
'Heartbroken might be.'
'Nothin ain't broke my heart,' he said, staring at the points of
his boots, wishing Newel would disappear.
'I don't know,' Newel said. 'You know more about it than I do.'
He walked off from the doorway.
'I sure as hell do,' he said loudly, trying to decipher just what
there could be to break his heart.(p.262-3)
2
If the figural 'key' to the theme of self-hood inA Piece ofMy Heart is restlessness,
then the 'key' of The Ultimate Good Luck is, as its title suggests, luck, and the two
are in fact intricately related in almost all of Ford's later work. In this second
novel however there is little emphasis on restlessness as such: it is almost as if
these two early novels work out two separate figural strategies in preparation for
the mature work which, in bringing them intimately together, creates a richer,
more complex strategy for moving beyond the mapping out of the postmodern,
continually deconstructed selfs fragmentation and lostness.
Having said this, luck is of course a factor in the structuring ofA Piece ofMy
Heart, functioning both as an arbitrary 'deus ex machinal (the deaths in the novel
are all 'bad luck', from Lamb's accidental electrocution to Hewes' misfortune in
falling victim to the teenage psychopath employed by Gaspereau at the boat
camp) and as portent (experience for Hewes especially seems often patterned by
omen rather than rational, causal inference - seeing a rabbit in a cage 'a tiny vein
of panic' opens in him, and when he realizes he has inadvertently left Lamb's
revolver in his belt on entering the house he is again panicked by the seemingly
inconsequentially accidental, rushing out to the Gin Den and determining that
'you had to be ready to glide in the wake of fate sooner or later, and not be
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surprized when things surprized you'). The use of luck, whether as 'machinery' in
the plot or as portent is very undeveloped in comparison with Ford's later work
however, functioning as a backdrop to the psychological/ontological drama, not,
as in subsequent fictions, figuring within it.
In moving from the treatment of luck in this first novel to the far more
explicitly articulated, figurally 'loaded' use of luck in the second, it is useful to
first consider some of the ways in which Ford develops the signal 'weighting' of
the term in stories roughly contemporary with the first two novels. For instance,
in 'Going to the Dogs', the earliest story in Ford's collection Rock Springs, we see
an ostensibly very simple, but in fact quite complex, layering of significance
regarding the notion of luck. The narrative opens with two references to luck,
one explicit, one implicit:
My wife had just gone out West with a groom from the local dog
track, and I was waiting around the house for things to clear up,
thinking about catching the train to Florida to change my luck. I
already had my ticket in my pocket.13
Luck immediately figures as a twofold contextualization of the narrative
then, siting the 'drama' in a textual world where the traditional devices for
advancing such a narrative, for opening or closing the text, for a moral
'sacralizing' of the drama, are absent. These absent devices may be broadly
grouped under two categories, the use of choice and the use of fate as primary
structural determinants. Choice and an arbitrary fate exist in this story, but they
are not oppositional, and so nothing hinges on them; fate is not defied and choice
is not overwhelmed. Instead the determinant is luck - the interface of choice and
fate. In 'Going to the Dogs' (the title itself of course punningly conflates the
notions of gambling/luck with self-ruin) Ford begins to show that these
distinctions are not trivial hair-splitting, that the elements of a distinctive
aesthetic of textual self-hood rest on it.
To return to the opening paragraph - luck is both the background to the
narrative (the narrator loses his wife at the greyhound races and this loss is the
occasion for his narrative) and, figuring as the possibilities for a new life in
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Florida, the fulcrum around which the narrated drama turns; is therefore both
problem and projected solution. In other words we are presented from the start
with a foregrounding not of character, but of a context, just as at the opening of
A Piece ofMy Heart where we are presented with a dramatic context for the rest
of the book which subjugates the significances of character to the all-embracing
single significance of inevitable disaster. At a stroke Ford has dissociated the
narrating T from its own discourse; the discourse of the story is now primarily a
structural discourse - the T degenerates from subject to object, becomes passive,
concretized only in relation to structural circumstance. The narrator 'goes to the
dogs' in a double sense: under his story of his wife's desertion and his consequent
decline lies a more fundamental abandonment of character for context, self for
the interstices of a purely reactive code of understanding and perception. This
underlying sense is hinted at by Ford in his naming of the character:
'I don't even know your name,' Bonnie said, and stood up and
looked around the sad little room for the door to the back.
'Flenderson,' I lied. 'Lloyd Henderson is my name. I've lived
here six months.' I stood up.(p.ll5)
The name he gives, the identity, the self he adopts is an arbitrary response,
the self is 'created' through a reactive self-definition.
Structurally this dissociating of the 'I' as voice from the centring, centred self
of classical (and indeed in more formally varied ways much Modernist) realist
fiction becomes clearest at the very end of the story. The actual word 'luck'
occurs for only the second time in the very last sentence, despite the notion of
luck permeating the narrative (discussions of betting at the dogs given resonance
by the first paragraph), and the effect of this limited repetition, functioning
almost as a denouement, is to foreground radically both word and concept, again
at the expense of character-as-actor; the T is marginalized in its own discourse,
passive and impotent before the 'luck' which has crippled the one choice, the one
determination made available to it by Ford, the choice to leave:
But when I went to the dinette to have a look at my ticket in
my wallet, there was nothing but some change and some
matchbooks, and I realized it was only the beginning of bad
luck.(p.118)
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An ambiguous relationship has thus been set up; on the one hand the human
significances of the women who visit the narrator after hunting are centralized by
the narrative T, their visit is, after all, the 'subject' of the story; on the other hand
they can be seen to have functioned at the last as little more than deus ex
machina, Ford's agents of 'bad luck', their actions contained and defined by the
two poles of bad luck which stand at either side of their visit. The narrator of
'Going to the Dogs' is doing just that because he is lost, restless in the interstices
between the two worlds of his own narrative - the world of choice, action and
self-definition, and the world of reaction, portent and chance. The act of
falsifying (again making transitional, 'restless') his name is central: it figures both
as self-definition and as arbitrary reaction. In between these two polarities, held
in tension by the act itself, the self as anchored essence, the secure, integrated 'I'
somewhere disappears, goes to the dogs.
In 'Rock Springs', the next earliest and title story of the collection, a
strikingly similar character actually has this 'lack' pointed out to him, and indeed
through an examination of this more substantial story some idea of the way in
which Ford will later begin to work within this 'deficiency' (which bears, as will
be seen, more than a passing resemblance to Carver's epistemic 'delinquency')
towards a more positive textualizing of the postmodern self can be seen to
appear, in preparation as it were for the fuller explorations of the novels.
The accusation of 'deficiency' follows after a key point in the story, a point
where there is a deliberate mixing of texts, an infusion of confused, open-ended
'parable' which may or may not have any metaphorical significance for Edna, the
narrator's girlfriend, but which is anyway all but incomprehensible in its pathos
(or bathos) to the narrator, Earl. Edna has recalled briefly owning a monkey
(won in a bet with a Vietnam veteran) of which she developed an irrational fear,
inadvertently killing the animal as a result (through chaining it to the back of a
chair while she slept):
I looked over at Edna, smiling, but she was staring at me with eyes
that were fierce with anger. "VVTat's wrong?' I said.
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'Don't you care anything about that awful thing that happened
to me?...You want to know what I did with that monkey?' Edna
said.
'Sure I do,' I said.
'I put her in a green garbage bag, put it in the trunk of my car,
drove to the dump, and threw her in the trash.' She was staring at
me darkly as if the stoiy meant something to her that was real
important but that only she could see and that the rest of the world
was a fool for.
'Well that's horrible,' I said. 'But I don't see what else you
could do. You didn't mean to kill it. You'd have done it
differently if you had. And then you had to get rid of it, and I don't
know what else you could have done. Throwing it away might
seem unsympathetic to somebody, probably, but not to me.
Sometimes that's all you can do, and you can't worry about what
somebody else thinks...What else can I say?' I said.
'Nothing,' she said, and stared back at the dark highway. 'I
should've known that's what you'd think. You've got a character
that leaves something out, Earl. I've known that a long time.'14
Perhaps most noticeable in this exchange is that there is in fact little
difference between Earl and Edna's reactions to the moral dilemma posed by the
story. The dominant tone for both is one of passivity: 'Don't you care about that
awful thing that happened to me' Edna says, and 'Sometimes that's all you can
do...What else can I say?' Earl tells her. The 'something left out' in Earl's
character is not simply his moral passivity as such, then. The passivity (seen also
of course in their drifting, only tenuously committed lifestyle) is a hallmark of a
crucial disjunction between, it could be said, fact and significance. Whereas
Edna, in her pity and guilt, can appreciate if not articulate the 'loss' which her
passivity entails and can therefore finally leave Earl for the hope of a new
beginning, Earl can only relate fact to necessity, not to responsibility: 'But I don't
see what else you could do'. This is in some ways a re-casting of a disjunction
discussed in relation to Carver's work - the 'delinquent' disjunction between
metaphor and metonymy. Just as the sense of loss in the story 'I Could See the
Smallest Things' is structured along a dissociating and fissuring of the narrator's
perceptions, so in Ford's story a hinted at ontological lack is pictured through the
characters' inability to make connections between the transitive and Ideal, sign
and meaning, incident and 'essence', 'my plan and what happened...the idea and
the act' as Earl puts it.15 Instead the epistemic vacuum lying between is filled
with arbitrary and reactive significations and valorizations (portents, such as the
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dashboard light which signals a warning Earl can't interpret) paralleling the
existential dislocation and vacuum of passivity before events that lies behind the
'fugitive* lifestyle of so many of Ford's characters. As Edna says to Earl "'You
don't think right, did you know that, Earl?"'(p.21).
Restlessness then can be seen in this story as bearing primarily on loss, or
lack, which is in being, not simply circumstance. The lack of a centre to the
characters' lives is seen in their circumstantial restlessness - their small-time
fugitive life on the road - and this is figurally significant; but more important is
the lack of centring or cohering potential in their inner selves, their inability to
escape the fluid lostness of decontextualized lives, lives lived passively under
'luck', because they are lived between the deconstructions of physical
(circumstantial) transition (lawlessness, homelessness, joblessness) and the
compensating constructions of self that seem almost heroic for Hemingway's 'lost
generation', for the dissociated Nick Adams on the 'Ideal' banks of the Big Two-
Hearted River, but are absurd self-deceptions for Ford's postmodern, 'unselfed'
Earl on the seat of a stolen Mercedes:
I thought, then, how I never planned things well enough. There
was always a gap between my plan and what happened, and I only
responded to things as they came along and hoped I wouldn't get in
trouble. I was an offender in the law's eyes. But I always thought
differently, as if I weren't an offender and had no intention of
being one, which was the truth. But as I read on a napkin once,
between the idea and the act a whole kingdom lies. And I had a
hard time with my acts, which were oftentimes offender's acts, and
my ideas, which were as good as the gold they mined there where
the bright lights were blazing.(p.27)
It was claimed at the beginning of this study of Ford's early work that the
first two novels reveal a progressively complex reaction against the classic
Modernistic response (a broadly Idealistic mythopoeic valorizing) to the
problems of selfhood that Ford is addressing. 'Rock Springs' takes us a step
further in that progression. In this short narrative many clear overlappings and
amplifications of the dilemmas fundamental to A Piece of My Heart have been
identified, though it is equally clear that these overlappings owe more to 'a serial
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movement of disconnections, overlappings, variations' than to a straight
duplication of strategic intent. The 'failure' of Earl in 'Rock Springs' is only
identifiable with the failure of, say, Sam Newel up to a certain point. The voice
that closes the story, Earl's voice, poses questions that Newel or Hewes could
never pose:
And I wondered, because it seemed funny, what would you think a
man was doing if you saw him in the middle of the night looking in
the windows of cars in the parking lot of the Ramada Inn? Would
you think he was trying to get his head cleared? Would you think
he was trying to get ready for a day when trouble would come
down on him? Would you think his girlfriend was leaving him?
Would you think he had a daughter? Would you think he was
anybody like you?(p.37)
This is a voice which doesn't even carry echoes from the world of Lamb's
Mississippi island, but which resonates through all of Ford's later work, from The
Ultimate Good Luck to The Sportswriter and Wildlife, and it is with just such a
voice, questioning, vulnerable, that Ford, beginning tentatively in the first of
these three novels, moves towards an exploration of what may be termed, again
echoing this study's earlier readings of Carver, an exploration of the potentialities
rather than simply the lost or debased securities of the 'fundamental narrative'
that is postmodern existence.
Earl's questioning at the close of 'Rock Springs' shifts Ford's tropological
handling of his characteristic concern with postmodern being in several ways and
on several levels. Perhaps most strikingly it creates an almost shockingly (in the
hard-boiled, cryptically structured and lavishly textured context ofA Piece ofMy
Heart) direct rapport between narrator and reader: the interrogation is simple,
'personal' to the point of intimacy, and makes an implicit plea for sympathy.
Consonant with this phenomenalistic disruption is a releasing of the
tropologically confined textualizing of being seen in A Piece ofMy Heart (Newel
and Flewes trapped in the parodic frame of reference provided by the island) and
'Going to the Dogs', this story's narrator oscillating impotently between the two
'lucks' of his figurally 'closed' narrative. For perhaps the first time in Ford's
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fiction we see in 'Rock Springs' a disjunction between the codes of the textual self
and the codes of its particular circumstances. Previously, character has been, to
adapt Hardy's phrase, luck. Earl's questioning disrupts this formula, pulling it
apart under the force of the 'socializing' of his predicament. The persistently
repeated 'would you' forges a link between both character and reader and also
between character (Earl) and an 'absent presence' within the text figured by the
unseen occupant of the only other lit room in the Ramada Inn besides Earl's, an
'absent presence' which, like Carver's absences, provokes a dis-ease that
insinuates itself into the interstices between the codes of familiarity, decaying the
semiological bonds between the familiar and the secure:
There were maps and paperback books and sunglasses and the
little plastic holders for cans that hang on the window wells. And
in the back there were kids' toys and some pillows and a cat box
with a cat sitting in it staring up at me like I was the face of the
moon. It all looked familiar to me, the very same things I would
have in my car if I had a car. Nothing seemed surprizing, nothing
different. Though I had a funny sensation at that moment and
turned and looked up at the windows along the back of the motel.
All were dark except two. Mine and another one. And I
wondered, because it seemed funny, what would you think a man
was doing if you saw him in the middle of the night looking in the
windows of cars in the parking lot of the Ramada Inn?(pp.36-7)
The rhetorical linking of the 'released' 'I' (released from the passive
rhetorical fatalism of Earl's reflection that: 'when you get to the point of arguing,
you're past the point of changing anybody's mind, even though it's supposed to be
the other way, and maybe for some classes of people it is, just never mine'(pp.34-
5)) to an implicit other, can be seen as signifying a definite shift in Ford's
textualizing of postmodern being. This shift is not in itself a solution to the
problematics of the earlier work, but it does mark a vital break with the
exploration of forms of isolate validation (Ford's postmodern wariness of such
strategies being of course always evident in the 'habitually' parodic tropic context
they seemed to occur in). The result of this break is the beginning not of any of
the more usual postmodern lampoonings of textual being16 but a 'lateral'
ontological figuring, consonant with Carver's 'Wittgensteinian' lateral epistemic
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figuring, avoiding the metaphysics of essence not through an 'ultimist' reflexive
parody (Lawson's 'the glimpse beyond') but a re-writing of 'essence'.
'Rock Springs' is, then, in many ways a pivotal fiction, marking the point
where a parodic 'textual view of life' gives way to a 'textual view of life' within
which we can still find the rhetorical destabilizing of 'grammatical' securities of
being but also the complex attempts at adequation brilliantly worked through in
Ford's finest novel to date The Sportswriter. It is easy to see that in very
important ways Ford works towards Frank Bascombe from even Hewes and
Newel, but Bascombe, and The Sportswriter as a whole, are not properly
comprehensible in the context of this study without an examination of the novel
which lies between Earl's questions at the close of 'Rock Springs' and Bascombe's
tentative attempts at answers. In fact, The Ultimate Good Luck is if nothing else
a novel which turns thematically on precisely the ontological implications of
'Rock Springs': the freeing of the textual self from tropic impotence to rhetorical
potency in the socializing, or making 'transitive' and inessential, of the validating
impulse.
Ironically, the very first sentence of The Ultimate Good Luck calls to mind
the opening sentence of 'Going to the Dogs', the story which perhaps best
exemplifies what Ford, in this novel, is leaving behind. There is very little to
distinguish between the substance of 'My wife had just gone out West with a
groom from the local dog track, and I was waiting around the house for things to
clear up, thinking about catching the train to Florida to change my luck'(p,109)
and the more condensed 'Quinn knew he needed to get lucky'(p.l). Irony aside,
this 'doubling' is not just vaguely suggestive, it is highly significant since the
similarity in question isn't an isolated curiosity but arguably part of a pattern of
correspondences which link the two texts.
Without repeating the earlier analysis of this story, it is perhaps sufficient to
note that whereas the narrative strategies of 'Rock Springs' offer an implicit
transcending of the earlier story's ontological paralysis, The Ultimate Good Luck
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provides an explicit thematic reworking of the stasis which is the hallmark of
'Going to the Dogs'. The novel both adopts the story's rhetoric of confinement
(the 'leitmotifs' of luck and a rootless vulnerability to and passivity before
circumstance) and yet moves beyond even 'Rock Springs' in its new breaking
down of that tropological/ontological paralysis. Whilst the opening sentences of
'Going to the Dogs' and The Ultimate Good Luck seem almost identical in
substance then, in fact the tropic context of each text moulds the notion of a
'change of luck' into two very distinct things, and the discrepancy between the
two is perhaps the true measure of how far and how successfully the implications
of the pivotal 'Rock Springs' are worked out in this deceptively generic, though in
fact restlessly exploratory, second novel.
The most telling disjunction between the two texts occurs immediately after
the terse opening sentence of the novel. Just three lines on we read: 'Luck,
Quinn thought, was always infatuated with efficiency'. In this simple aphoristic
formula are, arguably, the roots of every ontological significance in the text; its
implications encompass not just a critical departure from the tropic fatalism of
the earlier fiction, but also a deconstruction of its own terms as the novel
progresses. Using this aphorism as a touchstone, it can be seen that this novel is
more than a means of generically re-siting the ontological problematics raised in
A Piece of My Heart - it is above all a restless, probing and unsettling textual
exploration which prefigures even the seemingly so alien subtleties and
complexities of The Sportswriter at least as much as it is itself prefigured by the
sardonic nihilism of A Piece of My Heart. In understanding the various and
sometimes conflicting pressures towards securities and potentiality of being in
this fiction, several tropological currents of significance are perhaps best
followed; firstly the figural 'loading' not only of landscape but of almost all
empirical reality, not just because this offers a convenient parallel with the Ford's
use of landscape in A Piece ofMy Heart, but because nearly every other figural
significance keys into it as a tropic strategy.
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The valorizing ofA Piece ofMy Heart's, physical landscape depended heavily
on a static, almost mythic tropic figure - that of the island, the isolated, separate
locus where dislocations of familiar reality are almost inevitably accompanied by
figurally suggestive disjunctions in signal familiarity and hence the
epistemological 'realities' or norms expected within the ostensibly 'realistic' text.
In contrast, though the narrative of The Ultimate Good Luck is also built on a
similarly textured half-hologrammatic, half-concretized empirical ambivalence,
its figural resonances result not from the parodic clashing of 'mythic' archetype
and a subverting 'realistic' idiom, but from a semiological clash of codes
grounded in an idiom of cultural and historical as opposed to classically or
Modernistically 'mythic' self-hood. Lamb's island provides for the deconstruction
of a figural archetype of reconciliation and self-definition, the
classical/Modernistic figure of the ontological haven, and as such there is no
room in the novel for any ontological rhetoric other than that of postmodern
subversion and parody. In dismantling a 'mythic' security Ford is left with an
equally 'mythic' insecurity - the isolate self remains as a sort of ontological
morpheme, the irreducible unit of existential sense-making even when one loses
faith in the notion that any coherent 'sense' can finally be made.
In The Ultimate Good Luck however we see a rhetoric which is not finally
'trapped' by its oppositional tropes since its terms are now unbounded by
archetypal valorizations/subversions. Instead of parody we see inquiry: the
isolate self is subjected to the 'violations' of both violence and love - dissociation
and dislocation become socialized, as does therefore any hope of re-orientation.
The world of this second novel is not then rhetorically self-defining as was
Lamb's debased, parodically Idealistic Mississippi island; rather it pushes
restlessly towards a questioning of both the securities of essential being and the
securities of irredeemable alienation.
The oppositions which constitute this restlessness are complex and affect the
whole of the novel's fictional 'reality'. They can be identified as a
cultural/political reality for instance in an almost dialectical opposition between
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the almost hallucinogenically luminous immediacy of Oaxaca and the all-
pervasive, debased semiological totems and shadows of North America. More
fundamentally they occur in even the depiction of physical reality.
The entire empirical/signal 'ground' of the novel is held in a constant state of
ambivalent tension, then: Oaxaca is invested with an oppressive physical
immediacy in the text (The day had begun to hot up. Second-class buses
wallowed in through the streets, windows full of mute Indian faces. Diesel had
begun to overpower the sweet cinnamon smell filtering out of the mercado. All
the fountains were on'(p.ll4)) but at the same time this immediacy, or empirical
'solidity', is never allowed to become empirical security. Drugs feature
recurrently as almost a motif of 'Oaxacan' reality. Sonny, along with many other
Americans is imprisoned there for drug smuggling and there are constant
references to anything from Quaaludes, Peyote buttons and marijuana to the
Lomotil Quinn takes for his dysentry, the drug motif permeating the disturbingly
intense, 'pressured' narrative with a persistent threat of perceptual 'slippage'.
More directly and more threateningly empirical solidity and its illusory
security can be literally as well as perceptually exploded, stripped bare to a latent
'reality' underlying the previously 'dominant' signal one. Thus the description of
the town square given above is almost immediately followed by:
The Americans stopped below a chiropractor's neon sign made to
look like a spine, all the vertebrae curved and articulated, and
bracketed to the chiropractor's windowsill...They stood beside the
Baskin-Robbins, and the girl was staring up while her father
pointed out the sign, sweeping his big arm up and down to explain
the shape...at that moment the Baskin-Robbins exploded...
../ITiere was one great bulb of orange flame roaring outward
and bursting apart in the air, and then a huge hot noise, and then
the air suddenly was emptied of sound and filled with a baked
greenish dust...A bright green taxi that had been in front of the
Baskin-Robbins was blown away from the curb and into the
street...The Baskin-Robbins, Quinn could glimpse through the
panes of rising dust, looked like a garbage can emptied and kicked
on its side. Whatever was inside was blown outside now or gone
altogether. The chiropractor's sign was missing. There were rag
figures strewn on the sidewalk and in the street, but nothing was
moving or flailing...
...Quinn was on his feet going towards the Americans or
toward where they had been a moment before, but weren't now.
Outside the park shade the sun was suddenly much hotter and
brighter, and he could smell rank-burned metal and cordite. It was
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familiar and became almost pleasant when the air
overheated.(pp.114-5)
Importantly, the explosion is described not simply as destructive, but as
horrifically transformative (just like the chiropractor's peculiarly 'Mexican'
skeletal sign, it fulfills the 'semiological' function of making 'Whatever was
inside...outside now'). The violence of the explosion and the cultural/historical
opposition it signals is textualized, then, or becomes consonant with a
semiological conflict. Arbitrariness collides with the codes of security and
dominance, of familiarity. It is familiar to Quinn because, paradoxically, it is
precisely this violent deconstruction of the culturally familiar that has fashioned
his life during and after Vietnam.
In contrast to the 'ontological topography' ofA Piece of My Heart, then, we
can identify a far more complex matrix of valorizations/subversions in this novel.
'Myth' appears now (almost suggesting a darker version of Barthes' Mythologies)
as a cultural/epistemic security (American slogans and 'icons' from Try God' T-
shirts to Pepsi-Cola and the nuclear family) not simply to be challenged,
subverted and finally deconstructed by the anarchic, random violence of Oaxaca,
but rather as a 'dialectical' necessity which thereby allows for an ontological
dynamic in place of a parodic stasis. The episode of the explosion for instance is
not simply an opportunity to sardonically expose the fragility of the mythic
'securities of being' accreting to the American nuclear family (its 'atom' split by
the blast in no uncertain terms) - this is established by the tone of Ford's
descriptions of the family's behaviour, but then undercut by the grisly pathos of
their deaths as Quinn wanders the square, finding fragments of them scattered
along the street. The simpler dynamic of subversion which dominated A Piece of
My Heart gives way to something both more subtle and more problematic which
is to be found not in the basic fact of desacralization, but in the attempt to see
beyond that, beyond the simple, emblematic, mythic and hence static 'fight
posture' of binary opposition:
People were yelling in Spanish now very fast and loud,
something he couldn't understand, that sounded like 'I own her.'
He walked back into an area of sidewalk that was suddenly
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deserted, and he felt all at once that he was conspicuous and
shouldn't be here and shouldn't let himself be separable at all.
There was a theory for that too...He posed an unreasonable risk
now. On the front of the chiropractor's building was the long red
and black boxing poster he had seen all week and that had not
been touched. It showed two giant black boxers with their fists
clenched in fight postures above the words 'Sin Empate, Sin
Indulto.' No Holds Barred.(p.ll7)
Other examples of this figural 'pattern' or dynamic of 'cultural' violation and
slippage are not difficult to find. Almost whenever America is mentioned it is
placed in relation to an Oaxaca or Mexico which turns its myths, its texts of
security and privilege, into a stream of incoherent, often menacing signs:
All the stories in the American news were published in the
wrong syntax...There was a story about a grandmother in South
Dakota stabbing a lion to death with a button hook inside her
travel camper. The story didn't say how the lion had come inside
the camper or why there was a lion around at all. Mexicans would
understand it. Americans lived in an ocean-to-ocean freak show,
and there was a good reason to be here where things were simple
instead of up there where things were bent wrong.(pp.48-9)
'Americans thrive on protecting privileges nobody else would ever
want'(p.lO), Quinn recalls his Mexican lawyer Bernhardt saying, and then we are
given a description of Oaxaca which juxtaposes the American emblems (Pepsi
sign, the American Highway) of security and material familiarity with, again, a
random, arbitrary menace violating the 'privileges' signified by an emblem such
as the American Highway:
[Quinn] counted landmarks every night. The pink rotator on the
airport tower...the hollow lights that shone all night on the
cathedral opposite the zocalo, and the red Pepsi script shimmering
far out in the Mixtec barrios beyond the river...The American
Highway curled down the mountains, split, circled the city two
ways, then reunited, and the only detectable movement there was
the lights of an overland truck gearing down before flatting out
into the valley. Americans were off the road hours ago. The
trucks and the Dinas would blink their lights, then run you off the
cliffsides.(p.lO)
Quinn's response to this landscape is significantly loaded with many of the
key figures of ontological significance (luck, isolation, existential immediacy) that
are to be developed as the novel progresses:
Quinn thought when you hung out in the present, which he
did, you slipped free of the past, though not the future, and all the
anxieties came in at higher calibers. It was why he liked fucking
phony Italian girls from the Portal, and why he'd let Rae leave
when she got ready. Too much future, too much anxiousness. In
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the present, he knew precisely how it would feel every time: the
contact, then the being alone, then somebody else coming in to fill
up the space. That was manageable, and you felt lucky and not
anxious, and when it wasn't done right, like this time, it didn't
matter.(p.lO)
Furthermore, both the 'emblems' used in this episode to denote American
'securities' are used again for much the same purpose in what can be seen as
almost elaborations on this early scene. On the way out to Zago's mansion the
Highway is first made explicitly emblematic of the familiar, the 'quintessentially'
American, and then is drained of this familiarity and filled instead with a
menacing, invasive textualizing ('Everybody'd heard the stories') of its former,
illusory 'essence':
Bernhardt took the highway north, the direction of no lights.
Quinn let the air flood in, cool and without odor, no sage or the
smell of corn being burned. It couldVe been anywhere, Michigan
or Louisiana or California—There were phantom cars on the road,
coming high speed, Americans scared of stalling on the highway.
Men with machetes wandering out of the agave fields to lie by the
road. Everybody'd heard the stories.(p.l36)
These stories are given an ambiguous narrative fulfillment which is
subversive in a double sense - the real threat on the highway turns out not to be
machete-wielding peasants, but the police and army. Earlier in the novel Quinn
passes a group of American college girls held up by soldiers:
Back in the line a red Dodge van was waiting for
inspection-Inside were three rows of American college girls all
talking at once and looking out the dusty windows at the front of
the line...Quinn watched the girls go by. He wondered which ones
would have to pull down their jeans for the soldiers and what they
would tell whoever was paying for the trip. It was going to be an
adventure, (p.20)
And later, on the way back from the prison Quinn passes the van again:
They were approaching the army spec station from the
opposite direction. More buses sat queued on the dusty shoulder
wheezing smoke...The red travel van that had been in the queue
before was parked beside the station hut with all its windows
broken and its seats pulled out. None of the girls was around
anymore. They were Americans, but there was nothing he could
do for them, and it gave him a cold bone feeling to wonder where
they were and what they were getting to look at next.(p.34)
As well as the highway motif, the Pepsi 'icon' too is elaborated on as a 'site'
for the violation of quintessential securities, and in fact the highway provides the
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context again for this; even the College van is mentioned, tying the significances
of each incident and each motif still more closely together:
Ahead of him a Pepsi truck had driven off the airport road and
blundered onto its side. All the Pepsi bottles had spilled on the
ground and two Mexicans without shirts were standing in the field
drinking Pepsis, other bottles already stuck in their pockets and
down their pants...though the truck was on fire and there was a
chance it might explode...He made a wide turnout to avoid the
truck, a brand new cab-over Mercedes with PEPSI stencilled
backward in red script across the blunt nose. When he got beyond
the cab he could see in the mirror the driver inside, his face
sprouting blood and jammed up into the windshield...Rae didn't
need to see that. It would make her think the wrong thing, like the
American girls gone out of the van in the morning. Everything got
harder.(p.70)
A certain patterning behind such initially random- seeming episodes of
violence and violation is clear to see, then. In every case something far more
complex than a hard-boiled chronicling of the case is in progress - namely a
subtly manipulated foregrounding of culturally defined epistemic securities
which are then overturned (literally in the case of the truck) in order to show the
vulnerability of such a signal familiarity and hence 'security'.
It is hardly surprizing then that the empirical landscape of Quinn's Oaxaca is
easily dislocated into psychological and even ontological landscapes: the
subverting of cultural securities is never allowed to rest on a 'political' level.
Ford makes a point of tying the semiological deconstructions inextricably to the
actual 'deconstruction' of selves: the family of tourists, literally de-constructed,
the truck driver, the presumably violated college girls). Thus texts of being are
fundamentally bound up in the text with the fragile neon or stencilled texts of
cultural identity. The clear implication is that the 'codifying' of being is as
vulnerable a textual security as the so easily destroyed or violated Pepsi ads,
Baskin and Robbins' or the American Highway, an implication confirmed at
several points in the text besides those given above. For instance, when Quinn is
being driven by Bernhardt out on the periferico, the road to the peripheral, slum
and guerrilla zone of the city, we find a very interesting opposition set up
between the Centro (security, however vulnerable) and the periphery (the
unfamiliar) and more particularly a loose, though suggestive, correlation of the
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latter landscape with the dissolution of being in Quinn's question 'Does it matter
if you hit somebody?', in Bernhardt's talk of suicide and later in their visit to the
dead boy's hut, the cryptically signifying object of their journey to the periphery,
to the margin, to the 'ex-centric':
'Does it matter if you hit somebody?' Quinn said.
Bernhardt shook his head. He watched the road attentively as
it narrowed into the dense palms. The law makes more trouble
than the good you do to stop...when the law takes you, it wants to
determine why things. Why you do this? Why you do that? And if
you don't mean to, there's no why, and they never let you go. But
the man is still dead'...
'Where's this going?' He thought about Rae in the Centro. It
was making him edgy to be away.
'It will take only a few minutes.' Bernhardt flicked up the
brights and Quinn could see up the long corridor of palm trunks
diminishing quickly into a hole of darkness. It felt like a picture
from a dream in which events never completely conclude.
'Do you fear becoming old?' Bernhardt asked expansively,
keeping his eyes on the road.
'I fear not becoming old a lot more,' Quinn said...
...'I do fear it,' Bernhardt said emphatically. He kept his chin
high. 'I am forty, a young man. But I consider sometimes suicide.
It is only fear of being old, do you agree?'
'I go the other way,' Quinn said. 'At least I hope I do.'
'You were in the war,' Bernhardt said. 'You don't think of
suicide now.'
'Maybe later,' Quinn said. He stared at the undifferentiated
wall of trees.(pp.92-3)
An equally telling passage which uses the same oppositions
(centre/periphery, privileged 'rights'/'needs') and links them to an even more
clearly ontological rhetoric can also be found at the point where Bernhardt is
approaching the peripheral landscape of the 'marginales':
Bernhardt made a U-turn on the boulevard and stopped at the
opposite curb. The camp had a wide public quality that made it
seem knowable and unmemorable, like the faces in the buses
waiting out on the highway. Humanity without secrets...They
come one time, maybe for Cinco de Mayo, and then don't leave,'
Bernhardt said as if the sight was an understatement of a much
more illuminating truth. He sniffed significantly. 'I have clients
here,' he said. They climb poles, take electricity, become a
nuisance. Some are electrocuted. Sometimes the army comes with
clubs and beat them at night. They have no rights, only needs, and
so suddenly they are guerrillas.'
'Am I supposed to sympathize?' Quinn said...
...'It is possible to work here without sympathizing. Maybe I
don't like your existence. But...'
'What's that designed to do for me?' Quinn said.
'Your business is complicated,' Bernhardt answered. 'But it is
not the only business. Everyone is marginal.'(p. 106)
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We can, then, move beyond the cultural focus of the persistent signal
oppositions between the American and Mexican and see in the clashing of secure
and contingent, centre and periphery, an engagement with and challenge to texts
or codes of personal being as well as cultural identity which has been 'the
understatement of a much more illuminating truth', namely the truth that
'everyone is marginal'; or everyone is 'ex-centric'.17
It is significant in the context of such a critical engagement that Quinn
begins the novel living self-consciously by an unmistakeably Hemingwayesque
'code': self-consciously enough to have it ('Good Conduct') tattooed on his arm.
More to the point however is that this code is, from the beginning, under assault
in the novel. The ontological movement of the text is one of friction between
Quinn's valorizations of the code-as-security ('In the war you maintained your
crucial distance from things and that kept you alive, and kept everything out in
front of you and locatable'(p.44)) and an acceptance of a textuality, an
'ontological syntax' which neither straightforwardly parodies the 'grammar' of the
code nor accepts its Ideal enclosure (its 'private language' as Wittgenstein would
call it18) whether as minimalist opacity or mythic inviolability but rather struggles
towards a threshold of association,19 variously articulated as 'love', 'trust', 'the
ultimate good luck' - that which 'locates' and provides not a static, 'mythic'
standard, but a new 'grammar', a new 'frame of reference'. As the Italian girl
Quinn meets at the beginning of the novel tells him, both of them 'foreigners in a
strange country' in every sense:
'That's the problem for foreigners in a strange country,' she
said.
'What's that?' he said.
'A frame of reference,' she said. 'You lack a frame of
reference that allows you to take the right mental picture...I trusted
you,' she said, and cleared her throat of smoke. 'You know trust is
at the heart of love and art and all kinds of shit. And you could
have just had me off. What does that shitty tattoo say on your
arm?'
'Good conduct,' Quinn said. 'It's supposed to keep me out of
trouble. But it doesn't work.'
'Well I think you're an asshole,' she said. 'Only asshole trash
have tattoos. You and your fucking muscles.'(p. 12)
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Whereas A Piece ofMy Heart left Newel and Hewes alone and helpless with
their 'fucking muscles', their self-reliant inability to break through their
impenetrably closed codes of obsession and self-consciousness, Ford here begins
to explore the possibilities of regaining a usable 'frame of reference', of re¬
entering the world of otherness (ontologically the world of differance), of 'finding
[ones] way about', in Wittgenstein's phrase.
Crucial to this exploration is the character of Rae, Quinn's lover, and by
extension their relationship, the salvaging of which is of course the actual motive
behind the events of the novel.
There are two main 'entry points' whereby Rae as a character slips through
the generic surface layer of Ford's thriller and into the ontological dynamics
which underlie its more obvious thematic structures of suspense and deferment.
The first links her figurally to the earlier discussion of empirical/signal ambiguity
and to the consequent analysis of Quinn's rigid and 'private' grammar of being
within such an unstable reality; the second involves her as intimately as Quinn
with the figural 'leitmotif of the text, 'luck'.
The first of these tropic 'dislocations' occurs when we learn that she is a
landscape artist, the second when we learn that Quinn met her first at the dog
track (again recalling 'Going to the Dogs') and more importantly when we read
'for a moment, with her close to him, his cheek on the cold glass, he felt himself
fully located for once, and in a world in which time couldn't pass'(p.l57) in the
light of Ford's earlier definition of 'the ultimate good luck':
He liked that, the high-density sensation of solo work at night. It
made you feel out of time and out of real space and located closer
to yourself, as if located was the illusion, the one thing he'd missed
since he'd come back, the ultimate good luck.(p.77)
The implication is that by the end of the novel Quinn's existential
isolationism has crumbled, has given way to an ontological relativism which, far
from Idealistically excluding otherness, requires it; in place of a protective
dissociation characterizing 'the ultimate good luck', then, we find a reciprocal,
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'dangerous' (because now by definition contingent, inessential) association
dependent on Rae.
In order to understand the full significance of this progression however we
must first go back to an analysis of the figural 'layering' of not just the motif of
'luck' but also the deceptively simple fact of Rae's work as a landscape artist. In
this way we can see that Ford's underlying concerns are far more to do with
questions of identity and otherness, being and differance than with romance as
such. Love, like luck, is here arguably as much an ontological as a thematic
textual emblem.
It has already been noted earlier in this study that in Hemingway's best
typological 'performances' the aesthetic and the ontological become one in the
text. Arguably, in The Ultimate Good Luck Ford has created two characters in
whom he can effectively devolve this Modernist authorial strategy, and through
whom he can attempt to deconstruct the ontological impasse it creates. The
Hemingwayesque code that Quinn has attempted to live by since Vietnam has
already been noted, but a more complex link with Hemingway's Modernistic
valorizing of the threatened self is Quinn's artist-like, even Cezanne-like, re¬
creating of the physical world around him:
In Vietnam Quinn had made a minor science of light-study.
Light made all the difference in the way you performed and how
you made out, since everything was a matter of seeing and not
seeing. The right distribution of eastern grey and composite green
on the surface of an empty paddy and a line of coconut palms
could give you a loop, and for a special celestial moment you
wouldn't be there at all, but out of it, in an evening's haze of beach
on Lake Michigan with teals like flecks of grey space skittering
down the flyway toward Indiana, and the entire day would back up
sweetly against a heavy wash of night air. And you could put it
away then, ease your eyes, and wander outside another moment
and join the world before the landscape began to function again as
a war zone.(p.24)
This is not the only 'reference' to art other than the less oblique references
regarding Rae: the following episode interestingly goes on to link the Ideal motif
of art-as-perception with the American/Mexican 'cultural' oppositions which
have already been examined:
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The American women who had set up their easels beside the
cathedral were already in the Portal having coffees, sitting in the
oily shade admiring their intentions...While he watched, a Mexican
boy in a red T-shirt appeared at the wall of the cathedral. The boy
stared at the easels for a moment and at the girls standing on the
stone steps, then darted down the row of easels, kicking the third
legs so that the easels were all flattened in ten seconds, the paints
spilled over the stones, and the boy vanished back in the crowds
down Bustamante. One of the women in the Portal screamed, but
most of them just sat still when they saw the easels go. It was
efficient work, a nice symmetry. The women should've been able
to tell, he thought, that precisely that event would take place. But
they couldn't. It was what made them tourists. They looked and
didn't see.(p.48)
The knowledge that Rae is a landscape painter, then, seems hardly intended
as 'innocent' information by Ford. Surrounding the innocuous sentence 'Rae said
she was a landscape painter from New York'(p.39) is on the one hand a clear
identification of art - specifically landscape art - with the preservation of self
(physically and psychically) in conditions of great danger and on the other hand
an equally clear identification of it with an alienation and consequent
shallowness of perception which exposes to Violation': the artists in the Porto
'look but don't see', which makes them 'tourists' and makes their being, as it were,
'accidental' (again it is worth recalling the Italian girl's diagnosis of 'foreigners in
a strange country' and their lack of 'a frame of reference'). Here Ford is once
more 'doubling' cultural and 'fundamental' or ontological significations. Both of
these apparently incongruous identifications - art with self-preservation and art
with 'blindness' - are important to a reading of Rae's figural significance in the
text, as can be seen when Quinn's reflection on his first meeting with Rae, which
forms the whole of the fifth chapter, is studied.
As if in order to 'prime' this reflection with the sense of a signifying
doubleness, of a layering to the ostensibly simple account of a downbeat, small¬
town pick-up, Ford prepares for their initial meeting with a passage which
shadows what follows with quite explicitly epistemic and ontological dimensions
(again the notion of 'periphery' and 'margin' recall both the cultural and
ontological ramifications of the 'ex-centric'), thus investing any 'reading' of the
relationship which follows with stakes far higher (the gambling metaphor is of
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course Ford's own) than might be assumed should it be taken at its generic face
value:
He had had a sense when he joined the marines that the country
he was skying out of was a known locale, with a character that was
exact and coordinate and that maintained a certain patterned feel.
A thing you could get back with if you had a reason. But that
patterned feel had gotten disrupted somehow, as though
everything whole had separated a little inch, and he had dropped
back in between things, to being on the periphery without a
peripheral perspective...he felt alone without quite feeling bad, like
being in the afterimage of a catastrophe, though he thought he'd
gotten used to catastrophes all right without falling apart.(pp.36-7)
Similarly, Rae herself is introduced in a far from 'innocent' way, raising the
figural 'stakes' with questions at once sardonic and yet, in the context of Quinn's
preceding reflections, suggestively ambivalent:
'What d"you think they do with the ones that don't win?' she
said, and looked back at the suspended screen as though she'd
asked the question to no one in particular, not even herself.
'Shoot 'em,' he said quickly, and took another survey of the
pavilion to see if somebody was coming after her.
'I've got a candidate, then,' she said flatly, 'but he already left, I
guess.'
'You just read this crap between races?' he said. He didn't
know who Fourier was, but he was betting he was somebody who
started a revolution in Jamaica.
Rae smiled appealingly and snapped her head to sweep her
long hair off her shoulders. 'He doesn't know enough,' she said,
and sighed. The guy who knows everything is the guy who runs the
rabbit. He's in control of fate. You don't know him, do you?'(p.38)
It is not surprizing then that when Ford tells us more about her painting we
can quite easily find clues which not only set up subtle and far-reaching links
between herself and Quinn as regards their loss of 'location' (set against this is a
characteristic restlessness - Rae and Frank Oliver, her previous lover, live very
much the lifestyle of Edna and Earl in 'Rock Springs') but more importantly an
implicit critique of the modes of being such a loss can reduce the self to. First
Ford describes her life with Frank Oliver, a description which carefully connects
(through the word 'draw') the act of painting landscapes with the 'act' of
defining/constructing a stable sense of self in opposition to the flux of
circumstance which is, after all, what the rootless lifestyle so often depicted by
Ford represents at its most basic level:
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Frank Oliver drove a big blue and silver Southwind that he'd
stolen, with a painting of Mount Rainier on both sides and a two-
stall horse trailer...and he pulled the trailer around the country to
stock shows and rodeos, wherever he could ride broncs and strip
cars for parts. The Southwind had a big stereo and red velour
swivel chairs and indirect light, and she said the whole thing
surprized her about herself, but she had discovered Cabet and
spent one straight four-month period inside the RV, painting
landscapes out the window, reading and getting stoned in the
mornings with Frank, and riding through towns trying to draw a
good mental picture of whatever she'd been doing for seven years
and not been able to stay exactly current with.(p.40)
A correlation is clearly being set up by Ford between the aesthetic and the
ontological, the process of aesthetic composition being consonant with a process
of self-composition. Even as early as A Piece of My Heart of course such
congruences can be seen to be tenuous at best, fatal at worst (Hewes' obsessive
affair with Beuna is an aesthetic of sorts - a means of 'patterning' an intensity of
feeling), but until Rae this seemed very much just the irredeemable lot of the
'luckless', the dis-located, selves in whom the 'texts' of being itself are 'split',
whose 'narratives' ofmemory, conscience and even action, instead of unifying the
self-in-time, instead of investing it with an integrity of identity, of essence,
dissociate it (Newel admits that "'Everything I think I know is ambiguous...I'm
flying apart a mile a millisecond for that very reason'", and for Quinn 'Memory
seemed like an account full of the wrong currency'(p.94)). Certainly this
'diffraction of self [and] transgression of the identity principle' is still a reality in
The Ultimate Good Luck', the difference now is simply that Ford, through Rae
and through a dynamic rather than parodic treatment of the oppositions between
ontological 'myth' and the existential 'farce' (or 'slapstick' as Newel described it)
of experience, has begun to deconstruct its stoic, isolationist, ultimately sterile
securities. Thus it is Quinn s Oaxaca that becomes littered with broken emblems
of American familiarity and hence security: the false sense of locatedness they
offer is demolished by the black 'farces' of road crashes where the police end up
drinking the spilt Pepsi whilst standing over the forgotten body of the driver,
bombs exploding in shopping centres simply as a diversion for a nearby burglary -
a trick, a practical joke of sorts, the 'slapstick' of Newel's father's death. But what
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gives these threats to the doctine of 'Good Conduct' the final push into
disintegration is not finally violence, but, through Rae, love.
Again, we see the beginnings of this ontological movement in the context of
his meeting with Rae. In Ford's description of their 'first date' we can see
beneath an apparently straightforward exchange the first real intimation in the
book of an interactive, social definition of self, a laconic and subtle step away
from a mode of being exemplified by her life with Frank, simply painting passing
landscapes, never inhabiting any but the landscape of her own 'self contained
system', her own code or text, her own 'soul':
Those little self-contained systems just get smaller,' she said,
when Quinn was almost asleep. They're fine. But they don't
tolerate enough. You know what I mean? You don't, do you?' He
could hear her in a drowse. They're like Frank. They make things
simple. I thought I could get along with that. I should have
figured it out a long time ago that I couldn't.'(p.42)
This step is towards a mode of being which is defined not by 'authority',
whether personal or imposed, but by exploratory (the running of Quinn's hand
over her stomach introduces Rae's '"No judgements on the first date?'") and
inessential ('"don't let me put any pressure on you. I don't want to do that.
This'll be over soon enough.'") relations. As Quinn says of 'naming', "'Somebody
else has to do that'":
'Maybe I'm a bum,' she said. 'I just missed being a hippie...'
...You can't call yourself a bum,' he said. 'Somebody else has
to do that. You don't get it both ways.'
Rae sighed a long sigh. 'But is that what you think about me?'
she said, not interested in it. 'You've been protecting our country's
honour. You should be an authority.'
'I don't know you well enough,' he said, and ran his hand over
her flat stomach.
'No judgements on the first date?'
'I'm not an authority on anything,' he said. That's all...'
...'Don't let me put any pressure on you. I don't want to do
that. This'll be over soon enough.'(p.42)
It is during a later recollection of Quinn's however that perhaps the most
significant movement away from the impasse ofA Piece ofMy Heart is made, a
recollection centred on his parents and his childhood rather than directly on
Rae, though the movement it initiates then bears down very much on their
relationship and in doing so consolidates and dramatically extends the figural
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significances hinted at earlier. The concepts of 'luck' and 'locatedness' are finally
seen not in the isolate, 'mythic' terms of 'Good Conduct' and 'the high density
sensation of solo work at night' (implicitly rejected in Quinn's realisation of his
alienation from his mother's 'character and incorruptibility', both, of course,
ontologically 'loaded' terms for Ford) but in terms arguably prepared for in the
passage quoted above, that is in terms of relations, of social self definition and
finally (though it is only presented negatively at this point, as the implicit
alternative to 'being absorbed right into nothing, into the very luckless thing you
were most afraid of) self-validation:
[Quinn's mother] thought that she herself was totally incorruptible,
and that she should encourage at least obstinacy in them both,
which would do the work character and incorruptibility would've
done if they had existed in them. It was why, Quinn thought, his
father had been glad to lose his hand and quit farming and wanting
to farm, and why his mother had waked up screaming. She didn't
know when you'd gone too far with something and when
obstinance and self-denying became a bigger threat than whatever
loss it kept away in the first place. And his father, finally, had to
learn that in a hard way.
The point was, he knew now, after all those months alone in
the trailer and in the Scout and out in the woods in the tent, that
everybody lives in some relation to the luckless, whether they call
it that or something else, or whether they manage to live near it or
far away. And what mattered most was that you knew the relation
moment to moment, like the one he felt now, the particular
danger, so that your life turned out to be a matter of what you did
to make that bearable, since you couldn't get so far from it as to
make it not exist. Though when you tried to protect yourself
completely and never suffer a loss or a threat, you ended up with
nothing. Or worse, you ended up being absorbed right into
nothing, into the very luckless thing you were most afraid
of. (p. 127)
It is not difficult to support this reading from the text. Almost whenever we
come across an exchange between Quinn and Rae on the problems of their
relationship, we are simultaneously pitched into a consideration of a specific
ontological struggle: the struggle out of false, 'mythic' securities of enclosed,
estranged self hood and into an alternative which for much of the novel is
termed simply 'love', 'locatedness', or by implication (because it offers a new
locatedness) 'the ultimate good luck'.
But the apparent simplicity, even naivety of such a formula is misleading - in
destroying a security of being 'love' is a violation as much as a release, and in a
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novel filled with violations of false securities which are far from unproblematic
we have to go deeper than simple affirmations in order to understand properly
the possibilities for validation towards which Ford seems to be directing the text.
In the following passage, part of Quinn's recollection of the causes of the initial
break-up of his relationship with Rae in Michigan, all these ambiguities can be
clearly traced, the ontological 'shadowing' being particularly obvious in Quinn's
acknowledgement that his dissociation is a condition of being, mirrored, not
caused by, the necessity for survival in war, and the references to the Indian
mysticism (primitive ontology) of alone-ness and its value as protection against
'everything they don't know about' - against otherness, and for Quinn against the
otherness within being, the threatening differance articulated ("'I don't know what
else you call it"') as love:
'I thought you'd ease up. I thought it was because of the war, but
that's not right, is it?'...
...'I couldVe told you that,' he said...
...'I don't know what you expect me to do,' she said.
'Nothing,' he said. 'Anything.' He began to eat his eggs.
'But can you please just tell me what it is you don't like or do
like. I feel by myself even when you are here anymore.'
He looked up at her across the table. 'I don't know what I can
do about that,' he said. You can be by yourself with me.
'And is that good enough for you?' she said.
'I guess so...I'm alone most of the time,' he said.
She smiled at him. 'Does that make you feel powerful? That's
what the Indians think. They think it protects them. Except you
don't need protecting, do you, Harry?'
'Everybody needs protecting,' he said.
'From what?'
'From everything they don't know about.'
'But why do you want to call that being in love?' she said.
'I don't know what else you call it.'
She stood up from the table. 'We make a hell of a couple,' she
said.
'Maybe I'm not a very nice person. You know?' He tried to
catch her eye. 'Maybe something ruined me.'
'I don't know,' Rae said. 'I don't know what you are. But God
knows I wouldn't want to violate you.' She walked out of the
room.(p.79)
We see then in Rae and in Quinn's relationship with her a critique of the
myths of isolate security, but it remains unclear as to how those myths can be
deconstructed without leaving chaos in their place; Ford makes a telling point of
always filling the 'vacuum' left by the deconstruction or violation of American
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myths of security with a far more sinister semiological confusion, and so after the
bombing in the Centro we read:
Bernhardt was weaving toward the carretera, staying near the
curbs and making his turns elaborately. At an intersection the
zocalo appeared suddenly back down the inky streets, the
cathedral kliegs at the end gaseous and silver and imprecise.
Soldiers stood in the middle ground, their rifles picketing the light,
and the shrill sound of whistles came out of the dark. It was like
Mardi<*ras, looking up Orleans toward Jackson Park at 4.00 A.M.,
the odd insulated feeling of time being lost.
'Where're we going?' Quinn said.
The country,' Bernhardt replied expansively. 'Don't worry
about the soldiers.'
'What're they doing?' Rae said from the back seat.
'Searching for paintings, or what they can find. Terrorism is
faulty, it exposes unexpected things. Other peoples' business
sometimes'...
...'I don't see why they close the main streets and leave the
dark ones open,' Rae said. Her voice was flat and expressionless,
like the soldiers' eyes.
'Some streets are secured so they may be used to different
purposes,' Bernhardt said, engaged. 'In the dark if you are not the
army maybe you are a criminal. And if there is a mistake it must
be hidden.'(pp. 134-5)
It is not enough simply to see the inadequacy of enclosure, of self-protection,
since seeing it is not in itself a release from it - there is a risk that has to be
taken, a violation that has to be accepted, a Violence', even 'disaster' (again, de
Man's 'potential catastrophe') that is the other side of the disruptive,
deconstructive violence that threatens in the terrorist bombing:
He thought now, though, watching the lights beginning to
prickle out across the valley and beyond the mountain rim like
greying stars, that the threat of death in that instance was only the
dark side of something else, something he needed - Rae, maybe -
and would have to live with unexplained until he got it, or until he
stopped wanting it anymore, and at the same time stopped wanting
everything else too, which was just a disaster of a different
order.(pp.88-9)
This is perhaps the most important and complex link in the book between
the personal and ontological 'texts' of Quinn and Rae's characters, the link
between a deconstruction of secure identity and the very possibility of
redemption, (a re-writing) of self through that deconstruction, that 'disaster of a
different order', since that disaster, whilst opening up the possibility of
semiological chaos (the 'dark side', the militia after the bombing) also opens up
the possibility of a relation to lives, to an otherness 'limitlessly signifying and
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engrossing' which is inaccessible without the risk, without its obverse of
meaninglessness and arbitrary extinction:
After dark he lay on the bedspread, dressed, waiting for
Bernhardt's car...He thought about a girl he'd fucked when Rae
had left, a nursing-college girl from Ann Arbor...When she had her
clothes off, on the bed inside the trailer, looking cheerful as if
everything was familiar, she said suddenly, 'My father died last
month, see, and I felt like no one had ever made an effort to know
him, not even my mom.' She smiled as if this was what she really
wanted to talk about more than anything. 'And I was really tired,
see, of hearing about movie stars and football players, all kinds of
other people who had died...A lot of great human beings die and
never get any attention, and it makes me angry. Do you know
what I mean? They just disappear'...
...'I guess so,' Quinn said, staring at his boots on the cold floor.
Her life was complicated with events that obligated her, that were
limitlessly signifying and engrossing, but that didn't make any
difference to him. He tried to think of his old man and couldn't,
tried to think if anybody had paid attention to his old man, and
couldn't remember. And it suddenly made him feel trapped, as if
empty space was closing down around him, and made him sick with
longing, a way he thought he wouldn't feel once Rae was out of it,
but that he couldn't keep back now, a feeling of detachment and
impairment, something he didn't want ever to happen and thought
he had figured how to prevent, but had failed.(pp.l31-2)
It is immediately after this recollection that we find Quinn's first attempt to
take that risk:
Rae sat at the foot of the bed. He could smell her perfume in
the dark air, could feel her nervousness. 'I can't be ironic with you,
Harry,' she said quietly. 'I sat out there and wanted to be but I
couldn't. I don't protect myself well enough, do I? I just get mad.'
'Do you still want me to protect you?' he said. He thought he
might be able to, the first time ever.
'I don't know,' she said. 'I don't like the way you think about
things. You look at everything like it disappears down a hole that
nothing ever comes out of. And that scares me.' He listened for
Bernhardt's car in the street. 'Doesn't that make you lonely?'
That's not the right question,' Quinn said.
'I'm sorry, then. What's a good question?' she said.
'Whether it makes any difference to me if I am lonely,' he said.
That's what scares me most,' she said. 'Because it doesn't,
does it?'
'I'm trying to think it does,' he said. She lay beside him on the
bed, and he could feel her heart beating throughout the room. 'I'm
trying real hard right now to think it does.'
Then maybe that's a good sign,' she said. 'I shouldn't ask for a
lot more.'(pp. 132-3)
It is of course impossible to use this terminology of 'risk' in the context of
The Ultimate Good Luck without constantly being reminded of the book's figural
dependency on the notion of 'luck', a notion which, as has been shown, is
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fundamental to Ford's working out of the ontological drama he has set in motion
through the ambivalence of the text's representationalism, the critiques and
deconstruction of mythic securities of cultural and personal identity and pre¬
eminently the figural 'loading' and doubleness of the 'emotional dialectic' of Rae
and Quinn's relationship.
In concluding this reading of Ford's strategies for a re-casting of the question
of a postmodern textualizing of being in The Ultimate Good Luck, it is perhaps
fair to say that although a convincing case can be made for an affirmative
opening out of potentiality in the novel, a strong sense of failure, of compromise,
haunts the ending as it simultaneously closes and opens into inconclusiveness
and progression, a kinetic promise of new, discursive, indeterminate possibilities,
new narratives:
'Do you think you're old enough to live your life unprotected,
Harry?' she said. 'You can't back off from what scares you.'
'Nothing scares me,' he said.
'Happy birthday, then,' she said. 'Happy birthday to you.' She
got out or bed to come with him.(p.201)
The reasons for this are of course debatable, but one overriding factor
seems to present itself quite clearly: the determinism of the (dialectical)
structural principle underlying Ford's movement towards affirmation or
validation. Thus, despite the obvious pains Ford takes in order to prepare us for
the novel's 'conclusions', that optimism still seems uncomfortably manufactured.
Quinn's progress towards an existential awareness of the demands and limits of
responsibility is soundly handled and convincing, resting as it does on his
relationship with Bernhardt rather than Rae and taking us from Bernhardt's
insisting that "'You are involved'"(p.97) after they see the body of the Mexican
boy caught up in the intrigues of Quinn's dilemma (again a dilemma of
responsibility) to Quinn's later realization that he can't 'work that trick now', the
trick of disengagement, protective dissociation, existential isolationism:
At midnight Quinn came and sat beside her. The popping,
clanging of the shooting games was loud and submerging, and he
tried just for a moment to hold things in place. Luck was
infatuated with efficiency. But he couldn't work that trick now.
He thought about driving to St. Louis, headed overseas...He
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remembered perfectly buying a cigar and two quarts of beer in a
paper sack and walking down in the dusk to see the Cards, all so
that he could not think for a time about going to Vietnam. A
pressure seemed released and an inevitability forged, and he
thought about the day with longing. And his mind now seemed to
want that and nothing else.(pp. 158-9)
But when Ford, through the figural 'loading' of Quinn's relationship with
Rae, attempts to create an ontology to support this existential progression, to
underpin its 'moral' of involvement, of relation, with a rationale of textual being,
of a 'rhetorical view of life' which is not primarily parodic (as at first sight any
notion of being-as-text, self-as-rhetoric, would seem inevitably to be) he finally
searches for textual validation in a structuring principle which imposes a
'grammar' as closed as any conventional, metaphysically 'centred' text.
Ford's 'rhetorical view of life' in The Ultimate Good Luck succeeds in
transcending the reductive parodies ofA Piece ofMy Heart then, but in doing so
it comes close to ceding that 'rhetorical view of life' to a 'grammar' of imposed,
moral closure as compromized and compromising as any 'innocent' realist
textualizing of being, however reflexively tropological Ford's imposition may be.
In the story 'Sweethearts', however, (published in 1986) we can see that this
point of rest is also, like the parodic scepticism ofA Piece ofMy Heart, a point of
transition, not settlement.
3
As in The Ultimate Good Luck, Ford in the story 'Sweethearts' places his
protagonist, here the actual narrator, Russell, in a triangular relationship with a
lover and a 'loser' who has some emotional claim on the lover and who thereby
defines the protagonist in 'some relation to the luckless'. Here the similarities
end however, or rather are overturned, since in many ways the story seems
written against the earlier novel, rather than as a re-working of similar tropic
material. Indeed, to begin with Ford actually appears to be parodying the
reconciliations arrived at in the novel. Instead of presenting a character in thrall
to an almost pathological self-centring which deprives him of love and
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consequently of full being, we read the following typically laconic (though, as
usual, ontologically laced) exchange:
From the living room I heard Bobby say, 'So how am I going to
keep up my self-respect. Answer me that.
That's my big problem.'
'You have to get centered,' Arlene said in an upbeat voice. 'Be
within yourself if you can.'
'I feel like I'm catching a cold right now,' Bobby said. 'On the
day I enter prison I catch cold.'
Take Contac,' Arlene said. 'I've got some somewhere.' I
heard a chair scrape the floor. She was going to get it for him.
'I already took that,' Bobby said. 'I had some at home.'
'You'll feel better then,' Arlene said. They'll have Contac in
prison.'
'I put all my faith in women,' Bobby said softly. 'I see now that
was wrong.120
However, though there does seem to be an element of outright subversion in
the relation of the two texts, a far subtler inter-relation of the fictions as partly
complementary, partly antagonistic dynamics arguably offers a more suggestive
and productive reading. Very simply, there are, apart from thematic similarities,
two fundamentally important preoccupations common to each text: the idea of
sympathy and the idea of responsibility, both notions providing for inter-textual
linkages and inversions.
Sympathy for both Russell and Quinn is far from easily achieved, and
superficially this fact would seem to link them. "'Am I supposed to sympathize?"'
Quinn asks Bernhardt when confronted with the 'luckless' (the 'marginales') of
The Ultimate Good Luck, and likewise Russell is throughout ambivalent about
the amount of sympathy he owes Bobby: 'I felt sorry for him, and wanted to be as
sympathetic as I could be'(p.67), he tells us, but this response is undermined
remorselessly in such passages as the following:
And Bobby looked at me then, across the kitchen table, like a
man who knows half of something and who is supposed to know
everything, who sees exactly what trouble he's in and is scared to
death by it.
'I feel like a dead man, you know?' And tears suddenly came
into his pale eyes. 'I'm really sorry,' he said. 'I know you're mad at
me. I'm sorry.' He put his head in his hands then and cried. And I
thought: What else could he do? He couldn't avoid this now. It
was all right.
'It's okay, bud,' I said...
...I did not move to touch him, though maybe I should have.
But Bobby was not my brother, and for a moment I wished I wasn't
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tied to all this. I was sorry I had to see any of it, sorry that each of
us would have to remember it.(pp.68-9)
The notion of responsibility also apparently brings Russell and Quinn
together as characters. 'Good Conduct' could stand as a motto or code for either
of the two men: Russell is quick to define his character in opposition to the
luckless and hence luck-ruled Bobby, 'led away to become a prisoner, like a piece
of useless machinery'. As Russell goes on to comment 'I didn't think anyone
could blame him for anything he ever thought or said or became after that'(p.77),
a deterministic, even fatalistic vision which shapes Russell's perceptions of Bobby
and, oppositionally, himself: 'I did not want to hear about Bobby anymore for a
while. He and I were not alike. Arlene and I had nothing to do with him'(p.78).
In fact, what separates Quinn and Russell as characters is precisely this
degree of common ground: Russell mirrors the Quinn we see through most of
The Ultimate Good Luck - torn between a need for self-protection and isolation
and a desire for openness, for 'love', for relational being - but the irony which
crucially separates the two characters is simply that Russell is caught by this
dissociation whilst in a relationship, whilst living precisely the sort of life Quinn
for so long finds unmanageable. In other words, the affirmations of The Ultimate
Good Luck are not simply left behind in this story, they seem to be actually
challenged and overturned on their own (now seen to be failed) terms. Thus the
mechanics of that affirmation, the dialectical, dynamic structuring of the themes
of sympathy and responsibility, are sabotaged, as it were - the figural 'engines'
(the themes of sympathy, responsibility, the all-encompassing 'motif of luck and
lucklessness, the opposition between dissociation and an
epistemologically/ontologically loaded adequation-through-love) are still there,
but strangely static, 'seized up'. Instead of working (albeit often oppositionally)
within mechanisms geared towards a synthetic adequation and affirmation, then,
they now indicate a 'jamming' of the earlier structural/figural 'mechanics' of
affirmation. In The Ultimate Good Luck the dialectical 'progress' made towards
a potentially exploratory postmodern ontology followed the fairly clear lines of
the sympathy/responsibility dialectics, culminating in: 'with her close to him, his
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cheek on the cold glass, he felt himself fully located for once, and in a world in
which time couldn't pass' and 'He'd see Sonny one more time because he still had
the responsibility to console. But he didn't love Sonny. And sometime in the
afternoon he'd get on the plane with Rae, then that would be all that mattered
anymore, an intimacy that didn't need an outside frame'(p.l61) respectively. In
'Sweethearts' the ontological again shadows these same significances, but to an
opposite end: paralysis and an increased dissociation.
If we follow Russell's responses to Bobby through the text we find, above all,
a strong sense of ambivalence running under the dialogue and under Russell's
reflections on their relationship to one another. On the surface Russell sets
himself up as almost a foil to Bobby - this is why he at first sight seems so similar
to Quinn who is far more straightforwardly defined in opposition to the object of
his problematic sympathies and responsibilities, namely Sonny. But underneath
this surface we can identify several subtle indications that such a simple,
dialectical formula is inadequate, is in fact being consistently subverted, and it is
in this subversion of apparent oppositions, of the seemingly straightforward
binary relation between lucky and luckless, free and imprisoned, innocent and
criminal, that the paralysis of The Ultimate Good Luck's dynamic of adequation
resides.
The first hint of a 'collapsing' or eliding of these oppositions occurs when
Russell first comments on his relationship with Bobby:
Arlene and I had been together almost a year. She had
divorced Bobby long before...She and Bobby had been childhood
sweethearts and run crazy for fifteen years. But when I came into
the picture, things with Bobby were settled, more or less. No one
had hard feelings left, and when he came around I didn't have any
trouble with him. We had things we talked about - our pasts, our
past troubles. It was not the worst you could hope for.(p.62)
There are two things here which disturb the predominant tone of emotional
superficiality - the first only becomes clear later in the story, namely the fact that
Russell is lying when he claims that 'No one had hard feelings left', and the
second again depends upon subsequent information - namely a repeated
identifying of the past (Russell's) with 'troubles'. Taken together and read in the
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light of the later information which 'charges' their at first latent significances,
these facts can be regarded as understated 'signposts' to what becomes an ever
more clear reading of the relationship between the two men as, not an
oppositional encoding of being, but a 'doubling' of apparently disparate codes.
Ford uses the fact of Russell's narrative unreliability to endue the 'surface' code
of his binary relation to Bobby with a powerfully subversive irony, an irony
darkened and strengthened by an undercurrent of ambiguous 'past troubles'.
These early 'hints' are strengthened at several key points in the narrative,
points where the suspicion of unreliability is most acute and where, as a direct
result, the notion of 'past troubles' takes on a colour which threatens to shade our
unclear picture of an earlier Russell all but indistinguishably into our picture of
Bobby. This 'shading' begins with a fairly imprecise suggestiveness:
He stared out the back window for a long time and then he
sniffed and nodded. 'You have to face that empty moment, Russ.'
He cut his eyes at me. 'How often have you done that?'
'Russ's done that, Bob,' Arlene said. 'We've all done that now.
We're adults.'(p.64)
Russell's unwillingness to answer Bobby's question, and Arlene's consequent
defusing and 'levelling' of it is telling, and the sense of a 'doubling' which Russell
is extremely reluctant to acknowledge gets clearer as the narrative proceeds:
Bobby ran his hands back through his hair and stared up at the
ceiling. 'Okay,' he said, 'here's the awful criminal now, ready for
jail.' He looked at us then, and he looked wild, as wild and
desperate as I have ever seen a man look. And it was not for no
reason.
That's off the wall,' Arlene said. That's just completely
boring. I'd never be married to a man who was a fucking criminal.'
She looked at me, but Bobby looked at me too.(p.65)
Here again a seemingly straightforward passage carries a great deal of ambiguity.
Arlene's rejection of Bobby's criminality is followed immediately by the focusing
of both her and Bobby's attention onto Russell, for no obvious reason. This
apparently inconsequential aside by Russell is suddenly charged with both
menace and accusation however in the very next paragraph which also closes
with an (obviously parallel) image of his being 'watched', though now by nothing
less than a security camera:
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'Somebody ought to come take her away,' Bobby said. 'You
know that, Russell? Just put her in a truck and take her away. She
always has such a wonderful fucking outlook. You wonder how
she got in this fix here.' He looked around the little kitchen, which
was shabby and white. At one time Arlene's house had been a
jewelry store, and there was a black security camera above the
kitchen door, though it wasn't connected now.(pp.65-6)
The growing sense of doubleness seen in these ambiguous hints at an eliding
of identities, of codes of conduct and hence being, continues with Russell's
interpretation of a look from Bobby as being a look from 'a man who knows half
of something and who is supposed to know everything', where Bobby is 'halved'
as it were, the other 'half being Russell, his nemesis and 'replacement' in the life
of Arlene. The 'doubling' continues and takes on further menace when Bobby
pulls his gun in the car outside tha jail. Ford re-unites at this point the idea of a
troubled past and a typically self-protective disclaimer from Russell:
'Is it a gun?' Cherry said.
'No, sweetheart,' I said, 'it's not.' I pushed the gun down on the
floor under my foot. I did not know if it was loaded, and I hoped it
wasn't. I wanted Bobby out of the car then. I have had my
troubles, but I am not a person who likes violence or guns.(p.73)
The new association here of 'troubles' with something criminal, even violent
(the 'but' is highly revealing, as is Russell's unsurprized, familiar handling of the
potentially murderous situation when the gun is pulled) almost completes
Russell's unwilling merging with the darker side of Bobby, but when the
'completion' does come it is, interestingly, not simply a 'merging' of past with
present, but a 'bonding' which, in its immediacy, echoes clearly, if ironically, the
'bonding' which reconciles Quinn and Rae, though for Russell and Bobby it
signifies a bonding in failure, in lucklessness, not in adequation and potentiality:
'Maybe I oughta run for it,' Bobby said...eager for things to happen
to him. Suddenly he grabbed both my arms and pushed me back
against the door and pushed his face right up to my face. 'Fight
me,' he whispered and smiled a wild smile. 'Knock the shit out of
me. See what they do.' I pushed against him, and for a moment he
held me there, and I held him, and it was as if we were dancing
without moving...and I knew what he wanted was for me not to let
him go, and for all this to be a dream he could forget about.
'What're you doing?' Arlene said, and she turned around and
glared at us. She was mad, and she wanted Bobby to be in jail
now.
'Are you kissing each other?' she said. 'Is that what you're
doing? Kissing good-bye?'
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'We're kissing each other, that's right,' Bobby said. That's
what we're doing. I always wanted to kiss Russell. We're queers.'
He looked at her then, and I know he wanted to say something
more to her, to tell her that he hated her or that he loved her or
wanted to kill her or that he was sorry. But he couldn't come to
the words for that.(p.74)
Whereas sympathy and responsibility were dialectically set out as the
mechanisms for re-connection, for an ontological re-orientation in The Ultimate
Good Luck, then, the same themes are purposely collapsed or elided in
'Sweethearts': the object of both becomes one with the subject, sympathy
becomes self-deception, responsibility becomes self-protection. Once the irony
of this narrative inversion becomes clear (and it is subtly disguised by Ford,
leaving only a vague, unfocused sense of dis-ease and distrust) the final
paragraph of the story, ostensibly paralleling Quinn's code of 'Good Conduct' but
in fact, through hints and concealments, functioning as above all a cry for release
(Russell is alone: '"we should open up some emotional distance'"(p.75) Arlene
tells him once Bobby is gone, and there is, in the light of the 'doubling' that has
gone before an immense amount of concealed pathos and regret in his final
'coda' on love) effectively lays waste the 'mechanical' affirmations of The
Ultimate Good Luck:
'We don't know where any of this is going, do we?' she said,
and she squeezed my hand tight.
'No,' I said. And I knew that was not a bad thing at all, not for
anyone, in any life.
'You're not going to leave me for some other woman, now, are
you? You're still my sweetheart. I'm not crazy, am I?'
'I never thought that,' I said.
'It's your hole card, you know,' Arlene said. 'You can't leave
twice. Bobby proved that.' She smiled at me again.
And I knew she was right about that, though I did not want to
hear about Bobby anymore for a while. He and I were not
alike...though I knew, then, how you became a criminal in the
world and lost it all. Somehow, and for no apparent reason, your
decisions got tipped over and you lost your hold. And one day you
woke up and you found yourself in the very situation you said you
would never ever be in, and you did not know what was most
important to you anymore. And after that, it was all over. And I
did not want that to happen to me - did not, in fact, think it ever
would. I knew what love was about. It was about not giving
trouble or inviting it. It was about not leaving a woman for the
thought of another one. It was about never being in that place you
said you'd never be in. And it was not about being alone. Never
that. Never that.(p.78)
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After this passage the structuring of adequation can no longer rely on a
simple 'foil' for 'lucklessness' as Quinn is for Sonny and as Russell would have us
believe he is for Bobby. From now on in Ford's fiction the 'relation to the
luckless', (first articulated in The Ultimate Good Luck but finally unconvincingly
worked out through its figural and typological determinism) becomes
internalized, becomes a condition (or grammatical 'form') of life.
Russell closes his narrative with the spectre of aloneness, an aloneness
which, as is clear from Ford's earlier fiction, means not just simple solitude or
loneliness, but a debilitating, dissociating incompleteness of being. It is the same
spectre which haunts Carver's Cathedral in images such as the peat-bog corpse of
'Preservation', in Nelson's threat in 'Vitamins'('"It ain't going to do no good!
Whatever you do, it ain't going to help none!'"(p.364)), and in Myer's inertia,
even helplessness, at the close of The Compartment':
He leaned against the seat and closed his eyes. The men went
on talking and laughing. Their voices came to him as if from a
distance. Soon the voices became part of the train's movements -
and gradually Myer's felt himself being carried, then pulled back,
into sleep.(p.330)
And it is precisely here that both Frank Bascombe's narrative, and the voices
of Carver's Elephant, begin.
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'WHERE DO YOU GO IF YOU'RE ME?': THE RHETORIC OF BEING
IN ELEPHANT AND THE SPORTSWRITER
1
At the close of Carver's story 'Blackbird Pie' we read:
It could be said, for instance, that to take a wife is to take a history.
And if that's so, then I understand that I'm outside history now -
like horses and fog. Or you could say that my history has left me.
Or that I'm having to go on without history. Or that history will
now have to do without me - unless my wife writes more letters, or
tells a friend who keeps a diary, say. Then, years later, someone
can look back on this time, interpret it according to the record, its
scraps and tirades, its silences and innuendoes. That's when it
dawns on me that autobiography is the poor man's history. And
that I am saying goodbye to history. Goodbye, my darling.1
And in this passage, a passage so alien in its ambitions to almost anything
attempted in previous collections, Carver arguably not only articulates what can
now be read as a valedictory summation of the aesthetic impulses and
compulsions integral to his fiction, but also articulates an aspiration to and the
beginnings of an exploration into new aesthetic territory, an exploration
prepared for, as it were, in this collection as a whole. In fact, this passage can be
read as representing an aesthetic 'moment' which could be tentatively identified
as a 'crossing point' for the new realism in general, a point consonant with
Mason's In Country, Jayne Anne Phillips'Machine Dreams, and more significantly
as regards this particular study, The Sportswriter. In all of these novels we find
the same intimate relations obtaining between self, otherness, history and above
all the intractable textuality or the 'fundamental narrative' of life, 'its scraps and
tirades, its silences and innuendoes'. And in all of these novels we are left with a
simultaneously terrible and liberating 'goodbye to history', to Frank Bascombe's
'thin layer of...what? A film? A residue or skin of all the things you've done and
been and said and erred at?',2 to Sam's laying to rest of her father's 'absent
presence', his semiological 'ghost' at the Washington Monument,3 to the
'Machine Dream' itselfwith its 'war movie sounds...So gentle it sounds like a song
[that] goes on softly as the plane falls, year after year, to earth'.4
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It is not difficult to locate the traces of these relations in the earlier, 'dirty
realist' works of these writers. In texts such as Mason's 'Shiloh'5 or Phillips'
'Rayme - A Memoir of the Seventies'6 we see precisely these 'historical' knots of
memory, identity and signification that are articulated in this text by Carver.
Likewise, in returning to the early novels of Richard Ford and the earlier stories
of Carver himself we can see that it is in those texts' treatment of 'history' that
the 'engines' of both their dissociative power and their sometimes adequative
potential are to be found.
For instance, in A Piece of My Heart Newel's complaint that 'Your past is
supposed to give you some way of judging things...shouldn't I have something
besides the assurance that everything will eventually be the same?' is, as has been
shown already, a protest against his impotence in constructing a secure, essential
identity for himself, an ontological history for himself, a memory that doesn't
have to seem 'like an account full of the wrong currency', as Ford describes
Quinn's self-dissociation in The Ultimate Good Luck.1 On a more general level
too, in these novels and in Ford's stories, the 'present' of the narrative is
invariably in conflict with a determining past which, in its dissociation from the
constructs of self-definition, of identity, becomes figured instead as luck. Identity
is predicated on a 'change of luck'; Ford's archetypal fugitives are, above all,
attempting to flee into the present. This is not any ahistorical, narrowly
existentialist movement however - the sanctuary of the present is never inviolate,
rather always laid waste by the marauding 'multiplicity of souls' identity carries
with it from the past. The present, in fact, becomes reflexive, a commentary on
its own making, Newel's hall of mirrors where 'everything will be the same', Sims'
self-created, burning 'wide empire' where he is finally alone 'without a memory of
life's having changed in that particular way...removed and afloat, calmed, as if life
was far away now, as if blackness was all around, as if stars held the only light'.8
In Carver's work also of course we find 'history' as the epicentre of alienation
and dissociation. History, context, is almost inevitably deferred - surnames, the
meeting places of contextual/historical and individual identity are as often as not
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witheld; parents are strangers to their children ('Everything Stuck to Him', The
Third Thing that Killed My Father Off, 'Nobody Said Anything') and children to
their parents ('Why, Honey?', The Father', The Compartment'). Any apparent
'historical' bonds of understanding formed even between contemporaries are
subject to sudden, inexplicable, often terrifying dissolution - Tell the Women
We're Going' for instance opens with a depiction of an ironically cliched small
town 'historical' friendship:
Bill Jamison had always been best friends with Jerry Roberts.
The two grew up in the south area, near the old fairgrounds, went
through grade school and junior high together, and then went on to
Eisenhower, where they took as many of the same teachers as they
could manage, wore each other's shirts and sweaters and pegged
pants, and dated and banged the same girls - whichever came up as
a matter of course.9
only to end with a shocking revelation of the brutalities the unknowable 'sub-
history' latent in the bland, insouciant male commonplaces of the opening
paragraph:
Bill had just wanted to fuck. Or even to see them naked. On
the other hand, it was okay with him if it didn't work out.
He never knew what Jerry wanted. But it started and ended
with a rock. Jerry used the same rock on both girls, first on the girl
called Sharon and then on the one that was supposed to be Bill's.10
Time after time in Carver's stories we see 'history' peel away from characters
like a glue perished by circumstance, by semiological confusion and impotence,
their selves no longer able to hold together the 'multiplicity of souls' that inhabit
the 'I's' tenuous constructions (tenuous grammars) of interpretation and identity.
From what has been argued earlier in this study it is evident that there are
also significant similarities in the ways Carver and Ford attempt to progress
beyond the constant replaying of these dissociative dynamics. The ways in which,
that is, they seek to somehow break the deconstructive axis of history and
identity. Thus we can see in any of Carver's 'adequative' stories certain
fundamental parallels with Ford's The Ultimate Good Luck concerning the
structuring of adequation.
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For example, in 'Will You Please Be Quiet, Please' we see a clear link
between historical and ontological dissociation. Ralph Wyman, having by the
'present' time of the narrative put behind him the previous 'identity' he had as a
drunkard, as 'Jackson', finds the historical deconstruction of the securities of his
marriage (his wife's confessing to a past infidelity) plunging him directly into
'diffraction of the self, a transgression of the identity principle'; Ralph ends up
during his drunken wanderings, his dis-location, in a gambling den, and he joins
in, picking up his cards it should be noted 'as he had seen his father do':
In half an hour he had won two hands, and, without counting
the small pile of chips in front of him, he thought he must still have
fifteen or even twenty dollars. He paid for another drink with a
chip and was suddenly aware that he had come a long way that
evening, a long way in his life. Jackson, he thought. He could be
Jackson.11
What takes this story beyond this fairly typical evocation of dis-location, dis¬
ease and dissociation and allies it with The Ultimate Good Luck (which also deals
with 'historical' dissociation as an index of ontological dis-location of course,
though using the wider 'canvas' of a post-Vietnam rather than post-infidelity
existence) is not just this deconstructive confusion however. In this respect a far
more telling passage occurs immediately after the one cited above:
One man laid down his cards and lit his cigar. He stared at
Ralph as he puffed, then shook out the match and picked up his
cards again. The dealer looked up, resting his open hands on the
table, the black hair very crisp on his dark hands.
'You work here in town?' he said to Ralph.
'I live here,' Ralph said. He felt drained, splendidly empty.
'We playing or not?' a man said. 'Clyde?'
'Hold your water,' the dealer said.
'For Christ's sake,' the man said quietly.
'What did you find out tonight?' the dealer said.
'My wife,' Ralph said. 'I found out.'(pp. 178-9)
Here, in a very elliptical way, using Ralph's drunkenness as a vehicle for a
skewed syntax and so highly ambivalent signification, Carver first opens the door
for Ralph's escape from his sudden alienation. The question 'what did you find
out?' is answered with 'my wife', and the doubleness of sense contained in the
answer is obvious: Ralph has not only found out about his wife's brief (also
drunken) infidelity, he has, far more importantly, in some sense 'discovered' his
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wife as a mysterious, potent, 'dramatic' entity; as a human being, in fact. The
implication is that at last Ralph will have to come to terms with the vision of
Marian he has been disturbed by since their honeymoon, the vision of precisely
this un-containable potentiality:
For their honeymoon they drove to Guadalajara, and while
they both enjoyed visiting the decayed churches and the poorly
lighted museums and the afternoons they spent shopping and
exploring in the marketplace, Ralph was secretly appalled by the
squalor and open lust he saw and was anxious to return to the
safety of California. But the one vision he would always remember
and which disturbed him most of all had nothing to do with
Mexico. It was late afternoon, almost evening, and Marian was
leaning motionless on her arms over the ironwork balustrade of
their rented casita as Ralph came up the dusty road below...She
wore a white blouse with a bright red scarf at her throat, and he
could see her breasts pushing against the white cloth. He had a
bottle of dark, unlabeled wine under his arm, and the whole
incident put Ralph in mind of something from a film, an itensely
dramatic moment into which Marian could be fitted but he could
not.(p.l67)
This suggestion of 'discovery' in its broader, even adequative rather than, as
previously, dissociative and alienating sense, is of course fulfilled at the close of
the narrative. What we see is a denouement which offers a radical, but very
straightforward 'solution' of sorts to the desacralizing of history and hence
identity, even being. The 'solution' entails the abandonment of a 'grammatically'
constructed, discrete, interpretive history/identity and the acceptance of a
'rhetorical', perhaps terrifying but also liberating re-creating (as opposed to re¬
playing) of the past, its constructs and disruptions. It is a movement movement
that escapes solipsism and the impulse towards essence through an acceptance of
otherness and differance, an embracing of the other which is violation of the self,
but also liberation of the self. Thus Ralph's 'turning, marveling at the impossible
changes he felt moving over him' can quite reasonably take its place alongside
Quinn's holding Rae 'erect and cool in his arms...fully located for once, and in a
world in which time couldn't pass'. Alongside this moment too we could as easily
range the narrator of 'Cathedral's' final acceptance of the otherness represented
by the blind guest (who has shared a history with the narrator's wife - the reason,
along with his blindness, for the narrator's initial distrust of him), an acceptance
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that, as in 'A Small, Good Thing', signals an explosion of possibilities, a releasing
of epistemic potential, a 'transgression of the identity principle' in a wholly
positive, suggestive, adequative form:
His fingers rode my fingers as my hand went over the paper. It was
like nothing else in my life up to now...
...I was in my house. I knew that. But I didn't feel like I was
inside anything.1*
Up to a point marked roughly by The Ultimate Good Luck in Ford's work
and the stories mentioned above in Carver's, we can identify a definite attempt to
escape both the complacencies and inevitable dissociations of essentialist
constructs of history/identity through an almost dialectical progression:
otherness is not escaped through solipsism and Idealism (only ever a partial and
evasive defence) but rather embraced into a dynamic as opposed to a monolith
of identity, of being in time.
As has already been noted however, this exploding of the claustrophic
tensions of the essence-history-identity matrix is not sustained by either writer - it
is itself pushed beyond its own limits. The adequative 'resolutions' of The
Ultimate Good Luck, 'Will You Please Be Quiet, Please', 'Cathedral' and even 'A
Small, Good Thing' can, in the light of several of the texts that follow them, be
seen as offering something akin to a general typology of 'making the shock of
connection across the prised-apart worlds' of their fractured, multiplistic,
multivalent postmodern realities. Each of these texts undoubtedly reaches
towards a vision of being which rather than protecting a mythic, unsustainable
essence, inevitably dissociative once deconstructed, actually offers itself up to
deconstruction through an acceptance of a reality of being, an ontology, which is
irreducibly plural, inessential, 'potentially catastrophic' and terrifying but by the
same token potentially expansive and liberating. In figuring this adequation as
physically relational however, the adequative movement can only appear in the
rhetoric of the texts as a type of a more fundamental epistemological dynamic.
With 'Sweethearts' Ford begins a highly significant movement away from this
205
typological 'shock of connection', a movement towards exploring the more
intricate adequative dynamics of rhetorical self-hood. Consequently, with The
Sportswriter, the typological adequative rhetoric of The Ultimate Good Luck is
moved inwards to become an autobiographical adequative rhetoric - the
rhetorical self ceases to occur simply as a dialectical component of adequation,
of re-connection, and occurs as a site in itself for the outworking of adequative
dialectics (and a similar movement can be traced between, say, 'A Small, Good
Thing' and 'Blackbird Pie'). In both Ford's novel and Carver's final collection of
stories the 'realist' fictional text characteristically ceases to function as a
structural occasion for a representative adequation, as a type of postmodern
mimesis, and becomes that rhetorical adequation, becomes in itself a
postmoderm mimetic dynamic.
The 'history' we find in both texts, of course, is 'the poor man's history', is
autobiography. Both texts locate themselves then at the crux of the problematics
regarding history, textuality, identity and essence which have been typologically
wrestled with in earlier fictions. Here however there is no resort to a 'structural'
salvation - otherness (or more accurately differance) is now as much an inner as
an external reality, inhabits memory as much as circumstance, love as much as
luck. Each text not only addresses but, through its rhetorical explorations
actually consists of the dynamics of textual being, postmodern self-hood, and
hence enacts rather than simply figures a postmodern mimesis and adequation.
There is of course an apparent paradox inherent in the above contention. If
the question of history is, in all these texts, so fundamentally and inextricably
bound up with those texts' problematics of identity, how is the 'goodbye to
history', our departure point for interpreting the textual enactments of these
problematics, to be read other than as a retreat from the very textualizing of
being it is here seen as consummating for postmodern realism? Certainly this
'goodbye' involves a negation; but not necessarily a negation of textuality, of the
ultimately reflexive awareness of the 'fundamental narrative' which is the 'real' of
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this new realism, however closely 'history' in this sense and textuality are
obviously entwined in the fiction (whether the cultural/ideological histories of
Abish, Mason and Phillips or the 'personal' histories of Handke, Ford and
Carver). Rather it is a negation of the 'history of subjects', history as 'the
metaphysical enclosure'. Thus Currie's comments on the negation involved in
de-centring 'the concept "Man"' can apply equally well to the negation involved in
'saying goodbye to history', to autobiography, to the 'metaphysical enclosure' of
the constructed, always historical, text of self-hood:
Negation...implies a correlative positive belief in the necessity for
disbelief. Postmodern fiction and post-structuralist criticism may
well have displaced or decentred the concept 'Man', but we can no
sooner dispense with the category of the subject than step outside
the metaphysical enclosure; the ideological position of the subject
can only be unsettled, reconstituted and resituated. This radical
decentring does not aim at further dehumanizing an already
degraded and threatened race, even if it records that degradation,
but rather at freeing the subject from illusory notions of'the self,
'the individual' and, in terms of fiction, the psychologism of the
sovereign subject-character.13
Arguably, then, we see in the journey towards 'negation' in 'Blackbird Pie',
not a capitualtion in the face of ambiguity, deferment and dissociation, but a
'stepping out', a breaking free of 'the metaphysical enclosure'. Precisely the same
can be said of The Sportswriter and in moving between these two texts, and the
text of Elephant as a collection, it is arguably possible to delineate the broad
dimensions of a common, if unstated and certainly unprogrammatic, re-casting
and releasing not only of postmodern reflexivity, but also, rather ironically, the
realist heritage with it. Both 'traditions' of course offer their own form of
'metaphysical enclosure', whether the enclosure is walled by mirrors or windows.
Carver and Ford's earlier attempts at 'stepping out' also involved in some senses
the construction of, admittedly less metaphysical, but equally enclosing,
parameters - typological and structural dialectics (though dialectical resolution is
significantly 'exploded' in 'A Small, Good Thing' and 'Sweethearts'). Not
surprizingly, therefore, we see in 'Blackbird Pie', which in many ways 'distills' the
'negation' in question, an almost systematic engagement with all these
problematics of 'enclosure', these engagements meshing with and echoing the
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more isolated and the more extensively constructed engagements of Elephant
and The Sportswriter respectively. Obviously, at the root of these engagements is
the question of textuality, and indeed, this is where Carver's narrator begins:
It was a thick envelope, but not so thick it couldn't be pushed
under the door. My name was written on the envelope, and what
was inside purported to be a letter from my wife. I say 'purported'
because even though the grievances could only have come from
someone who'd spent twenty-three years observing me on an
intimate, day-to-day basis, the charges were outrageous and
completely out of keeping with my wife's character. Most
important, however, the handwriting was not my wife's
handwriting. But if it wasn't her handwriting, then whose was it?14
This first paragraph of 'Blackbird Pie' is littered with both direct and
indirect engagements with the sorts of 'metaphysical enclosures' discussed above:
the letter from his wife that the narrator receives resists 'closure' on at least two
fundamental counts - firstly it is not in his wife's handwriting, secondly its charges
are 'outrageous and completely out of keeping with [his] wife's character'. At
once, then, the inherently ambiguous nature of textuality is foregrounded, not
simply to unsettle the 'metaphysical enclosure' of 'realism', but more importantly
the enclosures of identity which textuality, whether representational or reflexive,
concretizes. This text is ontologicaHy indeterminate - it resists both stable
referentiality (its 'window' onto the narrator's character is, we are told, distorted)
and reflexivity (it can hardly function as a mirror of anything, least of all its
creator since its author is unknown). The point of all this, the point of
structuring a fiction around such a 'mutant' text, is, working with the concept of
disrupted 'enclosures', less obscure than it might otherwise seem. History, the
most ubiquitous of all 'metaphysical enclosures', is linked explicitly by Carver to
the textual enigma of the letter. A distinct sense of narrative unreliability is set
against an elaborate, almost psychotic, assertion of reliability by the narrator.
The disruptive, identity-threatening, epistemological category-denying text is
conveniently lost, then offered back to us as memory. It has been enclosed, then,
by this ever more dubious narrator, like his possessions ('I usually don't throw
anything away'), his knowledge, his life-support system of facts, his security of
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being; all enclosed like 'the famous four and twenty that were set before the
king':
I wish now I'd kept the letter, so I could reproduce it down to
the last comma, the last uncharitable exclamation point. The tone
is what I'm talking about now, not just the content. But I didn't
keep it, I'm sorry to say. I lost it, or else misplaced it. Later, after
the sorry business I'm about to relate, I was cleaning out my desk
and may have accidentally thrown it away - which is
uncharacteristic ofme, since I usually don't throw anything away.
In any case, I have a good memory. I can recall every word of
what I read. My memory is such that I used to win prizes in school
because of my ability to remember names and dates, inventions,
battles, treaties, alliances, and the like. I always scored highest on
factual tests, and in later years, in the 'real world', as it's called, my
memory stood me in good stead. For instance, if I were asked
right now to give the details of the Council of Trent or the Treaty
ofUtrecht, or to talk about Carthage...I could do so...Thermopylae,
Shiloh, or the Maxim gun. Easy. Tannenburg? Simple as
blackbird pie. The famous four and twenty that were set before
the king.(pp.91-2)
Not surprizingly, such a move simply confirms an already broadly hinted at
narrative unreliability:
Things stick in my head. I remember. So when I say I can re¬
create the letter - the portion which I read which catalogues the
charges against me -1 mean what I say.
In part, the letter went as follows...(pp.92-3)
This selectivity in the narrator's 'reproduction' of the letter ('In part') brings
us roughly to the point reached by Ford in 'Sweethearts', again a story which sets
the notion of enclosure (it is, after all, a narrative built around the taking of a
man to prison) into figural play. Narrative unreliability works in both texts as an
index of 'historical enclosure', a means of re-writing, or at least substantially
editing, the texts of self-hood. 'Instead of beginning to read the letter through,
from start to finish, or even starting at the point where I'd stopped earlier',
Carver's narrator tells us:
I took pages at random and held them under the table lamp,
picking out a line here and a line there. This allowed me to
juxtapose the charges made against me until the entire
indictment...took on quite another character - one more
acceptable, since it had lost its chronology and, with it, a little of its
punch, (p.100)
But where 'Sweethearts' ends 'Blackbird Pie' effectively begins. While Ford's
text closes on a hint that the 'enclosing' impulse towards protection, towards
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security, can numb the self not just to a personal history, to an 'historic' other or
differcuice that is the past self, but also, unwittingly, to otherness in general (thus
the ironic, already defeated, 'never alone, never that'), Carver's text uses this
dissociative 'spillage' not as a conclusive, if ironic, 'moral', but as a catalyst for a
further broadening of the tensions and problematics being explored:
I don't know what else to say in regard to this matter of the
handwriting. How much more can I say and still retain credibility?
We were alone in the house. No one else - to my knowledge,
anyway - was in the house and could have penned the letter. Yet I
remain convinced to this day that it was not her handwriting that
covered the pages of the letter. After all, I'd been reading my
wife's handwriting since before she was my wife. As far back as
what might be called our prehistory days - the time she went away
to school as a girl, wearing a grey-and-white school uniform...I
would estimate...that I received seventeen hundred or possibly
eighteen hundred and fifty handwritten letters from her, not to
mention hundreds, maybe thousands, more informal notes ('On
your way home, please pick up dry cleaning, and some spinach
pasta from Corti Bros').(p.95)
What we see in the above passage is a fundamental departure from the
adequative resolutions of earlier stories. Previously, for both Carver and Ford,
love has functioned as an essentially wordless potentiality in the texts. The
repetitiveness of the formulation 'What We Talk About When We Talk About
Love' foregrounds not only the textualizing of love, but also the irony inherent in
discursive attempts to textualize and hence 'enclose' love. Thus the wordlessness
of Ralph Wyman, the 'It's really something' of 'Cathedral'. In Ford's work too of
course we find the wordless communion of 'the ultimate good luck'. With 'A
Small, Good Thing' and 'Sweethearts' the 'release' into wordlessness begins to
break down, but it is only with such later texts as 'Blackbird Pie' and Ford's The
Sportswriter that a deeper, richer complexity is achieved. Whereas in Carver's
earlier stories love could be wordless and so escape the 'metaphysical enclosure'
of definition (again, one thinks of 'What We Talk About When We Talk About
Love'), now the unspeakable itself is opened up and seen to be yet another
enclosure; love is still not 'grammatical', is not definable, but it does have its
rhetoric, its texts, its own historicity.
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At this point in the story therefore we find the adequative movement which
seemed all but resolved in a story such as 'Cathedral' now, after the 'preparatory'
restlessness of 'A Small, Good Thing', exploded into discursive struggle, into
semiological multivalence, once again. Communion, adequation, love itself is no
longer exempt from the rhetorical 'slipperiness' of 'the fundamental narrative', of
textual being - even love has its histories, the 'multiplicity of souls' of differance,
its deconstructive traces. Love too is now deprived of essence, becomes
relational, transitive, textual. Its own 'metaphysical enclosure', however benign
its constructions, however revelatory its 'discovery', is also, in this passage, served
notice on. Love, association, is now also to be deconstructed, then. We see here
not only a 'transgression of the identity principle', but a transgression, an invasion
of, identity itself, its 'private language', its honesties and vulnerabilities as well as
its dissemblances, its protective 'grammatical' carrapaces of illusory essence.
Thus, when the narrator offers us' a kind of abstract' of the letter, we find images
of both the former and the latter, both systematic protection of an 'identity
principle' ('...withdrawing farther into...a shelL.Your "work'") and simple
intimacies ('...talcum powder sprayed over the bathroom...The children...the
loneliness'(p.lOO)) scrambled together, deprived of any hierarchy of dissociative
effect. The point, it seems, is simply that the metaphorically depicted, solipsistic
evasions of intimacy cannot be unproblematically presented as indices of
dislocated, dissociative being and hence 'remedied' through the sort of dialectical
communion, the intimacy (the title of another key story in this collection of
course), that we see in 'Cathedral' or Ford's The Ultimate Good Luck. Otherness
inhabits intimacy too; otherness, or more properly now differance, is, we see in
these later texts, no longer simply a problem of external relations, but of inner
dissociation. History, the textualizing of being, is now no longer just a strategy
for preserving an embattled, always illusory integrity of self, an 'identity
principle'; rather it is the very problematic which makes such an integrity
impossible in the first place.
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History, or textuality, with all its ambiguities, slippages and deferments
moves inwards. The textualizing of being is no longer just a strategy for
ontological self-preservation, and the abandonment of such self-enclosure is no
longer the simple ticket to adequative potentiality we see in 'Will You Please Be
Quiet, Please' and The Ultimate Good Luck. In fact, there is no such
abandonment possible, except in death. The narrator of 'Blackbird Pie', in
frantically attempting to contain, to enclose the ambiguities of the letter through
editing, 'historical' explanations and 'proofs', simply reveals an even more
fundamental ambiguity than the problem of the handwriting - the Voice' of the
letter is remarkably similar to his own narrating, historian's 'voice' (The time has
come and gone for us - us, you and me - to put all our cards on the table. Thee
and me. Lancelot and Guinevere. Abelard and Hgloise. Troilus and Cressida.
Pyramus and Thisbe. JAJ and Nora Barnacle, etc.'(p.98-9)) and the
idiosyncracies of the writer of the letter mirror (very wittily) his own:
Secondly, my wife never underlined her words for emphasis.
Never. I don't recall a single instance of her doing this - not once
in our entire married life, not to mention the letters I received
from her before we were married. It would be reasonable enough,
I suppose, to point out that it could happen to anyone. That is,
anyone could find himself in a situation that is completely atypical
and, given the pressure of the moment, do something totally out of
character and draw a line, the merest line, under a word, or maybe
under an entire sentence.(p.96)
Identity becomes more fluid here than ever, then. If the 'identity principle' is
violated, confused and transgressed in the earlier new realism then here the very
flux of identity itself (both the narrator's and his wife's) becomes a mixture, a
hybrid, a 'multiplicity of souls' in the most fundamental, intimate sense possible.
Dissociation here begins to shade into more than a hint of madness, of a
dissociation not just from a constructed image of self, but from even the most
integral, minimal grounds of self-hood. In pulling us back from this conclusion,
Carver makes it clear that the confusion, the mystery, is essentially figural; the
suspicion of madness, of a schizophrenia of sorts, is a metaphor. As in all
Carver's fiction the psychological is primarily a figure for the epistemological, or,
as here, the ontological. Therefore just as the reader begins to 'solve' the
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mysterious text of the letter in terms of madness, in terms of a psychological
dissociation, Carver has the wife actually confront the narrator with the words:
"'You didn't read my letter, did you? You might have skimmed it, but you didn't
read it. Admit it!'"(p.l02). The important point made by this 'teasing' is simply
that the depth of dissociation now being explored cannot be catered for by the
figure of a relationship between two people, only by states of mind, of being,
which realize an internal otherness, an integral differance. It is as if Abrams*
'deconstructive angel' is to be figured now not in terms of demonic 'invasion', but
of demonic possession.
Very interestingly, this key shifting of the history/identity deconstructive
matrix inwards can be traced through several other of the stories in Elephant. In
'Whoever Was Using This Bed' for instance, we see an 'invasive' mystery (the
phone call from and for an unknown stranger) shifting 'historical' conflict ('after
Iris and I started living together, my former wife, or else one of my kids, used to
call up when we were asleep and want to harangue us'(p.28)) inwards into an
alternately very funny and chilling confrontation with the most basic ongoing
historical conflict of all - mortality, the physical history of the final
'deconstruction':
She takes some of her hair between her fingers. Then she
pushes it behind her ear, looks at me, and says, 'Lately I've been
feeling this vein in my forehead. It pulses sometimes. It throbs.
Do you know what I'm talking about? I don't know if you've ever
had anything like that. I hate to think about it, but probably one of
these days, I'll have a stroke or something. Isn't that how they
happen? A vein in your head bursts? That's probably what'll
happen to me, eventually. My mother, my grandmother, and one
of my aunts died of stroke. There's a history of stroke in my
family. It can run in the family, you know. It's hereditary, just like
heart disease, or being too fat, or whatever.'(p.34)
There then follows a long litany of the couples' minor ailments, any or all of
which could be fatal. Again, as with the evocation of mental illness in 'Blackbird
Pie' however, this physical 'alienation' from self is primarily a metaphor, a means
of figuring the inescapable intimacy with which the self is bound to otherness, to
dissociation, to the deconstructive demon; the intimacy of 'the selfs radical ex-
centricity to itself in Lacan's phrase.15 It is as inescapable a relation as that of
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the self to the body and hence to death's 'otherness' and unknowableness. Thus
the disease evoked on the physical level is meshed almost seamlessly by Carver
into the existential (or ontological) dis-ease evoked first by their post-phone call
conversation:
She takes my drink and puts it on the table, next to the phone.
She puts her arms around me and holds me and lets her head rest
on my shoulder. But here's the thing. What I've just said to her,
what I've been thinking about off and on all day, well, I feel as if
I've crossed some kind of invisible line. I feel as if I've come to a
place I never thought I'd have to come to. And I don't know how I
got here. It's a strange place. It's a place where a little harmless
dreaming and then some sleepy, early-morning talk has led me into
considerations of death and aimhilation...
and then by the re-interruption of the mysterious caller:
The phone rings. We let go of each other, and I reach to
answer it. 'Hello,' I say.
'Hello, there,' the woman says back.
It's the same woman who called this morning, but she isn't
drunk now. At least, I don't think she is; she doesn't sound drunk.
She is speaking quietly, reasonably, and she is asking me if I can
put her in touch with Bud Roberts. She apologises. She hates to
trouble me, she says, but this is an urgent matter. She's sorry for
any trouble she might be giving...
...Then it's my turn to talk. This is what I say to her: 'Bud
Roberts doesn't live here. He is not at this number, and I don't
expect he ever will be. I will never, never lay eyes on this man
you're talking about. Please don't ever call here again. Just don't,
OK? Do you hear me? If you're not careful, I'll ring your neck for
you.'
The gall of that woman,' Iris says.
My hands are shaking. I think my voice is doing things. But
while I'm trying to tell all this to the woman, while I'm trying to
make myself understood, my wife moves quickly and bends over,
and that's it. The line goes dead, and I can't hear anything, (pp.43-
4)
At the close of this call and of the story the narrator's Voice is doing things',
he is 'trying to make [himself] understood'; the 'movement' of the story is
completed in this overwhelming sense of a loss of semiological and hence self-
control, of 'un-selfing' almost; a sense, then, of possession rather than externally
figured conflict. The voice on the phone is forgotten and suddenly the narrator is
pitted against himself. When the line goes dead, when Iris 'pulls the plug', the
resonances are not of the 'external' dissociations of a failed marriage with which
the narrative opens, but of a figure (a life-support machine) for a more integral
dissociation of being itself.16 Iris wants the narrator to promise to 'pull the plug'
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on her if the occasion ever arises. The narrator is unable to give a quick answer
(again semiological confusion and impotence dislocates the 'intimacy': 'What am
I supposed to say? They haven't written the book on this one yet') and finally
'"What about you?"' Iris asks:
She hasn't moved. She's still waiting for her answer...I think
about it some more, and then I say what I mean. 'No. Don't
unplug me. I don't want to be unplugged. Leave me hooked up
just as long as possible...Let me keep going, OK? Right to the
bitter end. Invite my friends in to say goodbye. Don't do anything
rash.'
'Be serious,' she says. This is a very serious matter we're
discussing.'
'I am serious. Don't unplug me. It's as simple as that.'
She nods. 'OK, then. I promise you I won't.'(p.41)
In 'Intimacy' too we find an exploration of historicity which moves inwards,
though this time it is structured not just on the fact of a past relationship, but
primarily on the specific problem of a writer's response to a failed relationship.
In other words the 'outer' becomes art, the 'inner' the personal abasement and
forgiveness sought by the narrator. Again much is made of a dissociation from
self which is represented by a rhetoric of madness: 'You're crazy as a
bedbug'(p.46), 'I know why you're here, even if you don't'(p.47), and "you have
yourself confused with somebody else'(p.50) his ex-wife asserts, and the narrator
himself admits of his continued one-sided contact with her 'I don't know what I
had in mind'(p.45). More important than this vocabulary of dissociation however
is the dissociation worked by the fact of this story. The narrator is reminded of a
moment of 'madness' by his ex-wife, an occasion when she attacked him with a
knife, and this, in being ironically linked to memory/history ('something to
remember me by') opens up not just a series of problematics relating to his
previous re-writing of their shared past, but also of course the problematic of (re¬
writing the supposedly cathartic encounter represented by this, now narrated,
visit:
I should have nicked your arm with it at least. At least that.
Well, you didn't, I say. I thought you were going to cut me
with it, but you didn't. I took it away from you.
She says, You were always lucky...Even a little would have
been something to remember me by.
I remember a lot, I say...then wish I hadn't.
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She says, Amen, brother. That's the bone of contention here,
if you hadn't noticed. That's the whole problem. But like I said, in
my opinion you remember the wrong things. You remember the
low, shameful things. That's why you got interested when I brought
up the knife.(p.48)
'Memory', then, is 'the whole problem'. Or rather the (inevitably partial,
because textual) making of memory into history in the process of its
textualization. But if this is 'the whole problem', then there must arise the
presumption that this text itself is equally dissociative, regardless of its moment
of reconciliation. The text itself therefore now doesn't 'know itself, is 'possessed'
by doubleness, by differcmce. The wordlessness of the narrator's abasement is
'violated' by this 'new' text, which, in textualizing, in becoming part of 'the whole
problem', becomes reflexive and dissociative ('What am I doing on the floor? I
wish I could say...It's crazy, but I'm still on my knees...'(p.51)), 'performing'
exactly the dissociation being ostensibly confronted and transcended.
In previous stories of Carver's this tension would almost certainly not have
surfaced. Wordlessness was previously an end point, never a point of departure
for further dissociative and reflexive complexities; in 'Are You A Doctor?' the
wordlessness is symptomatic of a conclusive alienation, in 'Cathedral' of a
conclusive adequation, but in both cases the limit to the textual exploration is all
but identically placed. Here, however, instead of closing the text, the 'moment'
of wordlessness actually releases the text into a paradoxical, though kinetic,
adequation:
She says, Get up now. What is it? You still want something
from me. What do you want? Want me to forgive you? Is that why
you're doing this? That's it, isn't it? That's the reason you came all
this way. Thte knife thing kind of perked you up, too. I think you'd
forgotten about that. But you needed me to remind you. OK, I'll
say something if you'll just go.
She says, I forgive you.
She says, Are you satisfied now? Is that better? Are you
happy? He's happy now, she says.
But I'm still there, knees to the floor...
...She moves closer. She's about three inches from my face.
We haven't been this close in a long time. I take these little
breaths that she can't hear, and I wait. I think my heart slows way
down, I think.
She says, You just tell it like you have to, I guess, and forget
the rest. Like always. You been doing that for so long now
anyway it shouldn't be hard for you.
216
She says, There, I've done it. You're free, aren't you? At least
you think you are anyway. Free at last. That's a joke, but don't
laugh. Anyway, you feel better, don't you?(p.52)
The point of acceptance, of understanding which this text has been
simultaneously promising and deferring has been finally attained not through
wordlessness but an acceptance of the inevitability of being, even at its most
'intimate', becoming textualized since being-in-time is always 'possessed' by
differance, 'the "reference" within the Now to a past Now'17, the awareness of
which Carver's narrator terms 'the dark view of things'(p.48). Of course this
tentative adequation through acceptance is by its very nature far from absolute
or conclusive; 'Free at last. That's a joke' as the narrator's ex-wife puts it. But in
using the writer as a figure of an all but universal condition of being - the self-
conscious and hence 'historical' self is above all and inescapably a textualizing self
- the narrative not only locates the 'Derridean' deconstructive angel's dissociative
alienations in the nature of being itself, but also the 'Wittgensteinian' liberation
of otherness, of multiplicity, of the rhetorical release from the 'grammar' of
'knowing' and interpreting, of containing and enclosing. The final movement is a
release on a multitude of levels:
So she walks me to the front door, which has been standing
open all this while. The door that was letting in light and fresh air
this morning, and sounds off the street, all of which we had
ignored. I looked outside and, Jesus, there's this white moon
hanging in the morning sky. I can't think when I've ever seen
anything so remarkable. But I'm afraid to comment on it. I am. I
don't know what might happen. I might break into tears even. I
might not understand a word I'd say.(p.53)
Likewise, in 'Blackbird Pie' we find alienation and release not dialectically
separated, but concurrent one with the other. If dissociation is in being and not
just the external relations of being, then so is the 'negative side' of dissociative
otherness, it's release. The narrator's confusion and alienation is finally allowed
expression through the arrival of horses in the fog around the house, and more
importantly that expression for once free of the constructs, the historical
doubling that has so far hallmarked his enclosing narrative. Now we find the
admission 'I don't know how to say this other than it was'(p.lOl), an admission
and acceptance of defeat that allows for the beginning not of any typological,
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structural reconciliation, but of a released 'symbolic energy', figured by a 'surge
of power' from the mysterious irreducible fact of the horses, their irreducibility
opening the door to his first unprotected, un-qualified, un-textualized
confrontation with the otherness that is his estranged wife (his 'history'):
'What is it?' I said to my wife. 'For God's sake, what's happening
here, anyway?'
She didn't answer. The horse moved a few steps but
continued pulling and eating the grass. The other horse was
munching grass as well. My wife moved with the horse, hanging on
to its mane. I put my hand against the horse's neck and felt a surge
of power run up my arm to the shoulder. I shivered. My wife was
still crying. I felt helpless, but I was scared, too.
'Can you tell me what's going on?' I said. 'Why are you dressed
like this? What's that suitcase doing on the front porch? Where
did these horses come from? For God's sake, can you tell me
what's happening?'
My wife began to croon to the horse. Croon! Then she
stopped and said, 'You didn't read my letter, did you? You might
have skimmed it, but you didn't read it. Admit it!'(pp.l01-2)
It is as a direct consequence of this that the narrator can finally realize that
his enclosures have failed him, a realization that compromises and deconstructs
his securities of being, though the realization is not a wholly destructive one. In
the end we find him 'stepping outside' the 'metaphysical enclosure' of his
stiflingly textualized life, into the 'far more' of that deconstruction's release from
knowledge into mystery, from 'grammar' into 'rhetoric', from 'history' into time,
from a protective, enclosing reflexivity to 'horses and fog':
There's still the question of the handwriting. That's a
bewilderment. But the handwriting business isn't the important
thing, of course. How could it be after the consequences of the
letter? Not the letter itself but the things I can't forget that were in
the letter. No, the letter is not paramount at all - there's far more
to this than somebody's handwriting. The 'far more' has to do with
subtle things. It could be said, for instance, that to take a wife is to
take a history. And if that's so, then I understand that I'm outside
history now - like horses and fog.(p.!09)
2
Turning from Elephant to The Sportswriter we again find a strategic reliance both
on the psychological dissociation manipulated by Carver in 'Blackbird Pie' and
the figure of the writer-narrator so central to 'Intimacy'. The psychological
figuring of Frank Bascombe's dreaminess, for instance, can in many ways be seen
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as the rhetorical apotheosis of Carver's hints at a dissociative 'losing' of self
which, as we have seen, run through all the texts so far discussed in this context.
Also, as regards the figural use of a writer-narrator, Bascombe (allowed the
discursive freedom of the novel) is a perfect vehicle for exploring the
implications raised by Carver's 'model' textualizers, the 'model' historians of
'Blackbird Pie' and 'Intimacy'. Bascombe, in being an ex-literary writer as well as
a sportswriter offers an analytical as well as figural exploration of the textualizing
impulse and its paradoxical 'angel' of dissociation and release:
Why, you might ask, would a man give up a promising literary
career - there were some good notices - to become a sportswriter?
It's a good question. For now let me say only this: if
sportswriting teaches you anything, and there is much truth to it as
well as plenty of lies, it is that for your life to be worth anything
you must sooner or later face the possibility of terrible, searing
regret. Though you must also manage to avoid it or your life will
be ruined.
I believe I have done these two things. Faced down regret.
Avoided ruin. And I am still here to tell about it.(p.lO)
But above all what links The Sportswriter to the stories of Carver's just
analyzed is a shared dependence on the rhetoric of history as a framework for
these paradoxical dissociations and liberations. We see this in Bascombe's
invocation of regret, a 'double' invocation of course - sportswriting both exposes
the self to 'the possibility of terrible, searing regret', to history as dissociation, but
also provides a means of 'facing down regret', of a 'goodbye to history', even. In
fact, the theme of sportswriting in this novel is arguably nothing less than the
theme of history in the broad sense in which it is found in these later postmodern
realist texts. When Bascombe offers us two basically contradictory (again,
paradoxical) 'versions' of his 'metaphysics' of the work of sportswriting, it is not
difficult to recognize an opposition, or tension, which has become very familiar
through not only this concluding chapter, but, expressed with different
vocabularies, the whole of this thesis; the tension, that is, between
historical/ontological enclosure ('grammar', 'transcendental form') and
historical/ontological release ('rhetoric' or 'deconstructive grammar', 'transitive
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being'). Bascombe, then, firstly offers us this 'moral' derived from his adopted
world of sportswriting:
Everyone should live alone at some time in a life. Not like when
you're a kid, summers, or in a single dorm room in some crappy
school. But when you're grown up. Then be alone. It can be all
right. You can end up more within yourself, as the best athletes
are, which is worth it. (A basketball player who goes for his
patented outside jumper becomes nothing more than the simple
wish personified that the ball go in the hole.)(pp.l2-3)
Just one paragraph later however we find this moral of being Vithin oneself
challenged head on by how he does in fact 'face down regret' in his textualizing
world:
Very early you come to the realization that nothing will ever take
you away from yourself. But in these literal and anonymous cities
of the nation, your Milwaukees... your Detroits, even your New
Jerseys, something hopeful and unexpected can take place. A
woman I met at the college where I briefly taught once told me I
had too many choices, that I was not driven enough by dire
necessity. But that is just an illusion and her mistake. Choices are
what we all need. And when I walk out into the bricky warp of
these American cities, that is exactly what I feel. Choices aplenty.
Things I don't know anything about but might like are here,
possibly waiting for me. Even if they aren't. The exhilaration of a
new arrival. Good light in a restaurant that especially pleases you.
A cab driver with an interesting life history to tell. The casual,
lilting voice of a woman you don't know, but that you're allowed to
listen to in a bar you've never been in, at a time when you would
otherwise have been alone. These things are waiting for you. And
what could be better? More mysterious? More worth
anticipating? Nothing. Not a thing.(pp.l3-4)
Now 'nothing will ever take you away from yourself but the Ideality of self-
containment could not be more categorically rejected. The 'Ideal', 'essentialist'
impulse to (self-) containment is counterpointed against the relative ('nothing
will ever take you away from yourself. But...') transitive, inessentialist 'moral' of
'choices', The exhilaration of a new arrival', anticipation, mystery, possibility.
The grounds of this tension are of course of far more significance than a
simple critique of sportswriting. Ford very early on locates this constantly
recurring enclosure/release tension or dynamic in the very being of Bascombe.
It is a tension which his choice of career simply mirrors; a tension which
simultaneously threatens to dissociate and promises to liberate at the most
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fundamental, ontological level. Bascombe, on meeting X, his ex-wife, at the
cemetery, wonders:
what my own voice will sound like. Will it be a convincing truth-
telling voice? Or a pseudo-sincere, phony, ex-husband one that
will stir up trouble? I have a voice that is really mine, a frank,
vaguely rural voice more or less like a used car salesman: a no-
frills voice that hopes to uncover simple truth by a straight-on
application of the facts. I used to practice it when I was in college.
'Well, okay, look at it this way,' I'd say right out loud. 'All right, all
right.' 'Yeah, but look here.' As much as any, this constitutes my
sportswriter voice, though I have stopped practicing by now.(p.l7)
In other words, the tension between a containing, enclosing impulse and an
unstated but implicit disruption 'pollutes' even Bascombe's narratorial index of
self-hood: his voice. 'I have a voice that is really mine', we read, and then
discover that in fact this is also a voice that can be categorized (immediately
implying a hidden multiplicity) as his 'sportswriter voice' which, moreover, he
used to practice.
Authenticity, or security of being, is once more an Ideality which is subtly but
unmistakebly subverted, deconstructed. The impression is further strengthened
just a little later when Bascombe again ambiguously connects authenticity of
voice/being with performance: 'I have spoken in a voice which pleases me, a
voice that is really mine'(p.l8). Furthermore, in a nearby passage he offers us a
revealing insight into his ex-wife's evaluation of his character, his nature, which,
familiarly by now, constructs an opposition (even, wittily, a 'civil war') between
enclosure (the 'straightforward', the empirical) and multiplicity (the ambiguous,
the semiological):
She also told me, without being particularly critical, that she
considered me a loner, which suiprized me too. She said that it
was a mistake to have made as few superficial friends as I have
done in my life, and to have concentrated only on the few things I
have concentrated on - her, for one. My children, for another.
Sportswriting and being an ordinary citizen. This did not leave me
well enough armored for the unexpected, was her opinion. She
said this was because I didn't know my parents very well, had gone
to a military school, and grown up in the south, which was full of
betrayers and secret-keepers ana untrustworthy people, which I
agree is true, though I never knew any of them. All that
originated, she said, with the outcome of the Civil War. It was
much better to have grown up, she said, as she did, in a place with
no apparent character, where there is nothing ambiguous around
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to confuse you or complicate things, where the only thing anybody
ever thought seriously about was the weather.(pp.l8-9)
The 'Civil War' linkage of history and ontological dissociation is perhaps the
most significant of all the figures which occur in these early examples of
structural tension since it makes the first explicit link of this kind, though of
course all of Bascombe's dissociations are depicted in the context of at least a
personal history.18 It is significant because it grounds these ontological tensions
firmly in a context of textuality per se rather than simply a mode of textualizing
experience, namely sportswriting. In other words, sportswriting is not a luminous
metaphor, it is a problematic, a locus of conflict, not a cohering index. Ford has
Bascombe open the second chapter, after this layering of the principle of conflict,
with a discourse not on sportswriting, but explicitly on history:
All we really want is to get to the point where the past can
explain nothing about us and we can get on with life. Whose
history can ever reveal very much? In my view Americans put too
much emphasis on their pasts as a way of defining themselves,
which can be death-dealing...
...My own history I think of as a postcard with changing scenes
on one side but no particular or memorable messages on the back.
You can get detached from your beginnings, as we all know, and
not by any malevolent designs, just by life itself, fate, the tug of the
ever present. The stamp of our parents on us and of the past in
general is, to my mind, overworked since at some point we are
whole and by ourselves upon the earth, and there is nothing that
can change that for better or worse, and so we might as well think
about something more promising.
I was born into an ordinary, modern existence in 1945, an only
child to decent parents of no irregular point of view, no particular
sense of their place in history's continuum, just two people afloat
on the world and expectant like most others in time, without a
daunting conviction about their own consequence. This seems like
a fine lineage to me still, (p.30)
The conflict, the dynamic which runs through and animates The Sportswriter
is a problematic not, finally, of perception, though perception is used as its index,
but of being. Textuality in this problematic is, as it is in 'Intimacy' or 'Blackbird
Pie', underneath as well as in ways of telling, 'possessing' being as much as the
expression and the constructions of being. Thus the evasions, omissions and
paradoxes inherent in Bascombe's use of sportswriting as an epistemic 'grammar'
for being-in-the-world are one and the same as those inherent in his personal
'grammar' or index of being-in-time, his own history, in exploring the
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problematics of the former (which structure the text) we explore the underlying
dynamics of the latter.
The use of conflict as structure is all but continuous in Ford's novel, but
three places in the text can perhaps be isolated as structural 'keystones' in
Bascombe's own 'bricky warp' of 'choices aplenty', of 'new arrivals' and new
voices.19 The first of these is his meeting with his wife in the cemetery, the
second his interviewing of Herb Wallagher, the paraplegic ex-football star, and
the third his relationship with Vicki Arcenault culminating in the Easter Sunday
they spend at her parents' home.
Bascombe's meeting with X at the cemetery is the substance, of course, of
much of the first chapter and since all of the passages analyzed above (the very
last excluded) are also drawn from this part of the book it is perhaps hardly
surprizing that the conflicts inherent in those passages in many ways mirror,
amplify and comment on tensions and conflicts figured in this relationship. The
account of their meeting also sets up a very significant pattern to the tensions
and conflicts already discussed however, namely a pattern of paradoxical failure.
As if in direct opposition to The Ultimate Good Luck, Ford here uses a
relationship not to reconcile the historical/ontological tensions common to both
novels, but rather to push them into new implications. In this sense the pattern is
one of 'failure', then, but it is paradoxical in that it is precisely this continuous
'stepping out' of the dialectical pressure towards a structural reconciliation (at
every level) that allows the text to begin to escape 'transcendental form' and
'metaphysical enclosure', and that thereby begins to achieve the only tenable
postmodern adequation which is the rhetorical release, in Bascombe's phrase, 'to
the rest of our lives'(p.25). In a very important sense, therefore, it can be said
that The Sportswriter is a novel of failure, just as 'Blackbird Pie' is a story of
failure. Beginning with this opening meeting at the cemetery and moving
through the two other key episodes mentioned, the terms of that paradoxical
223
failure (and what else could a truly postmodern adequation be but a paradoxical
failure?) can arguably be drawn out of this subtle and complex text.
We can characterize this paradoxical failure as found in this first chapter as
being, broadly, the failure of classical/Modernistic literature. The failure, that is,
of a certain general mode of textual valorization. Thus Bascombe sets up an
explicit opposition between his own textual adequations (sportswriting) and the
pretensions of more privileged and self-privileging modes of textualizing
existence:
If there's another thing that sportswriting teaches you, it is that
there are no transcendent themes in life. In all cases things are
here and they're over, and that has to be enough. The other view
is a lie of literature and the liberal arts, which is why I did not
succeed as a teacher, and another reason I put my novel away in
the drawer and have not taken it out.(p.22)
This apparently simple opposition is highly problematic however. 'In all
cases things are here and they're over' is of course a blatant evasion. Ralph's
death, two years gone, is far from 'over' for Bascombe, and in his habitual
dreaminess and optimism 'things' are rarely 'here'. The 'unreliability' of the claim
operates reflexively too of course - Bascombe is in the very act of narrating a
novel, a piece of literature.
This does not negate the failure however, it rather negates Bascombe's
alternative and prepares us for its failure also. A much more convincing
undermining of the valorizing pretensions of 'literature' occurs far less self¬
consciously (Bascombe himself is here using literature in precisely that valorizing
way which he has just repudiated) as the focal point of Bascombe and X's
meeting:
She is waiting for me to say a word now, to liberate us from
that old misery of memory and life...And I am her boy, happy to do
that very thing - let my optimism win back a day or at least the
morning or a moment when it all seems lost to grief. My one
redeeming strength of character may be that I am good when the
chips are down. With success I am worse.
'Why don't I read a poem,' I say, and smile a happy old
rejected suitor's smile...
...Last year I brought Housman's To An Athlete Dying Young'
and made the mistake of not reading it over beforehand. I had not
read it since I was in college, but the title made me remember it as
something that would be good to read. Which it wasn't. If
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anything, it was much too literal and dreamily so about real
athletes, a subject I have strong feelings about. Ralph in fact had
not been much of an athlete. I barely got past 'townsman of a
stiller town', before I had to stop and just sit staring at the little
headstone of red marble, incised with the little words RALPH
BASCOMBE.(p.23)
Ironically, then, the "word' which is meant to 'liberate us from that old misery
of memory and life' plunges them into exactly that. The rhetoric of failure
surrounding the remembered episode creates an inevitability of failure - failure
is in language, we realise, not simply of it, or of any particular mode of language,
whether speech, literature or sportswriting: Bascombe's 'word...to liberate us'
fails, he smiles 'a happy old rejected suitor's smile', 'with success [he is] worse'.
And as the above quote suggests, if it is in language, it is in being, and so now
there is no escape from this failure, no retreat into the wordless embraces of The
Ultimate Good Luck; the point of rest is only another text of 'failure', of loss, of
'that old misery ofmemory and life', the written name of their dead son.
Even when the poem changes, then, the failure inevitably remains. Frank
produces Roethke's 'meditation, starting it in his *best, most plausible voice, as if
[his] dead son could hear it down below':
X has already begun to shake her head before I am to the
second line, and I stop and look to her to see where the trouble is.
She puches out her lower lip and sits her stone. 'I don't like
that poem,' she says matter-of-factly.
I knew she would know it and have a strong opinion about it.
She is still an opinionated Michigan girl, who thinks about things
with certainty and is disappointed when the rest of the world
doesn't...I feel tension rising off me like a fever now. It is possible
that reading a poem over a little boy who never cared about poems
is not a good idea...
...'I shouldn't really say I don't like it,' X says coldly. 'I just
don't believe it, is all.'
It is a poem about letting the everyday make you happy -
insects, shadows, the colour of a woman's hair - something else I
have strong beliefs about. 'When I read it, I always think it's me
talking,' I say.
'I don't think those things in that poem would make anybody
happy. They might not make you miserable. But that's all,' X says
and slips down off the stone...She probably has a lesson at seven,
or a follow-through seminar, and her mind is ready to be far, far
away.(pp.24-5)
The artificial distinction set up by Bascombe between on the one hand a
literature of 'transcendent themes' and on the other a literature of transience is,
then, taken apart. The failure of textuality is textuality; no matter if a particular
225
text avoids a 'transcendent' valorization, it is still open to 'disbelief (belief, after
all, being what marshalls the 'multiplicity of souls' inhabiting any 'orderly activity',
any 'grammar' ofmeaning), to the differance it must also be possessed of.
But if this episode provides a framework of failure for the novel, it also
provides a framework for the paradox which 'inhabits' this ontological failure.
According to Nietzsche, hope is the first sign of defeat, but for Frank Bascombe,
the formula can be reversed. Defeat is the occasion for hope; dissociation and
separation the multivalent occasion for release. Bascombe's rejected suitor is, in
a darker but also more radically vital sense than he evasively imagines, '"released
to the rest of [his life]'"(p.25):
I hear the bells of St. Leo the Great chime six o'clock, and for
some reason I have a feeling I won't see her for a long time, that
something is over and something begun, though I cannot tell you
for the life of me what those somethings might be.(p.29)
It is an end and a beginning, Frank senses, and though he again fails in his
prediction that he "won't see her again for a long time' the peculiar receptivity to
anticipation that the prediction embodies now becomes the flawed, unreliable
but authentic engine of the novel's own paradoxical liberations which, as we shall
see, release into failure as much as from it: 'We are having to make everything up
now', as Frank puts it, 'since nothing is ours by right'(p.26). In strict context this
realization springs from a longing for 'the sweet specificity of marriage, its firm
ballast and sail'(p.26), but in the wider context of the novel as a whole it stands as
Bascombe's clearest insight, and, again paradoxically, his clearest affirmation
since what the novel explores above all is the impossibility of 'sweet specificity';
the tenuousness of any deceptively 'firm ballast and sail'.
Both of the two key events still to be analyzed in this reading of the novel
are mentioned in this first chapter, are anticipated, and both presume relief from
'having to make everything up now'; thus "'Make a contribution" will be my angle'
Frank confidently tells us of his visit to Herb Wallagher, 'It is the kind of story I
enjoy and find easy to write'(p.ll). And he again depends on the given, on a
presumption of 'firm ballast and sail' when anticipating taking Vicki to the
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midwest: 'But I will soon show her the midwest, where old normalcy floats heavy
on the humid air'(p.l3). It is of course in the deconstruction of such
presumptions and more importantly in the consequent struggles of Bascombe to
'find [his] way about' in the deconstructed world of his 'unravelled' texts, his lost
securities of being, that the novel's adequative potential lies. The disrupting of a
hoped-for aesthetic 'ballast and sail' for Bascombe's mourning/dissociation in
this first chapter and the ambivalent release it offers is followed not by a leap to
resolution, but a further disrupting of epistemic securities, namely sportswriting.
The complexities raised by Frank Bascombe's meeting with Herb are
carefully prepared for by Ford. The narrative 'space' between Bascombe's first
mention of it and the event is heavily punctuated with digressions on
sportswriting and more importantly athletes. The most interesting of these
digressions actually concerns itself with the very specific problem raised by
Herb's 'post-athleticism' - his forced re-entry into 'the world' from football. In
this passage in fact we find the outline of a speculative 'metaphysics' aimed at
dealing with, at 'enclosing' Herb's condition:
At this moment it may be of interest to say a word about
athletes, whom I have always admired without feeling the need to
be one or to take them at all seriously, and yet who seem to me as
literal and within themselves as the ancient Greeks (though with
their enterprises always hopeful).
Athletes, by and large, are people who are happy to let their
actions speak for them, happy to be what they do. As a result,
when you talk to an athlete, as I do all the time...he's never likely
to feel the least bit divided, or alienated, or one ounce of
existential dread...you can bet he isn't worried one bit about you
and what you're thinking. His is a rare selfishness that means he
isn't looking around the sides of his emotions to wonder about
alternatives for what he's saying or thinking about...
...Years of athletic training teach this; the necessity of
relinquishing doubt and ambiguity and self-inquiry in favor of a
pleasant, self-championing one-dimensionality which has instant
rewards in sports. You can even ruin everything with athletes
simply by speaking to them in your own everyday voice, a voice
possibly full of contingency and speculation. It will scare them to
death by demonstrating that the world - where they often don't do
too well and sometimes fall into depressions and financial
imbroglios and worse once their careers are over - is complexer
than what their training has prepared them for.(pp.68-9)
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This construction of Bascombe's is to some extent borne out by his meeting
with Herb - certainly Herb has fallen into 'depressions...and worse', in fact a
degree of madness, as a result of his career ending. However, this passage is, we
find, far more revealing of Bascombe than Herb in the final analysis. Indeed, the
interview with Herb in many ways inverts the 'metaphysics' of Bascombe's
ontology of athletics, a 'metaphysics' and ontology which is his own haven from
the dis-locatedness of his inner life. Not far from this passage is an earlier
reflection on sportswriting which explicitly confirms this 'parasitical' security of
being clung to by Bascombe:
I had no more interest in what I might write next - the next
sentence, the next day - than I cared what a rock weighed on Mars.
Nor did I think that writing a novel could make me interested
again.
Though I minded like all get out the loss of anticipation. And
the glossy sports magazine promised me that there would always be
something to look forward to, every two weeks..And it wouldn't be
something too hard to handle in words...I was as comfortable as an
old towel in a locker room, had plenty of opinions and had always
admired athletes anyway. The good-spirited, manly presence of
naked whites and Negroes has always made me feel well-located,
and I was never out ofplace asking a few easy-to-answer questions
and being somewhat less imposing than everybody around, (p.49
Italics mine)
By the time the actual interview takes place then, we are prepared for the
fact that what is ostensibly an occasion for disclosure (an interview) is in fact, if
Frank gets his way, to be an occasion for enclosure. The 'relinquishing [of] doubt
and ambiguity and self-inquiry' is, despite Frank's disclaimer with regard to this
'metaphysic' ('it may be of interest to say a word about athletes, who I have
always admired without feeling the need to be one or to take them at all
seriously') a better description of his own sportswriting, rather than of Herb's
athletic, ethos. And again a suggestive linkage with the question of history is
made here, shadowing the more obvious evasions and enclosures. The hint is
clear - the ironic, often grotesquely comic distance Bascombe effects between
himself and Herb is simply another rhetorical evasion/enclosure (Frank's '"I'm
keeping my distance from him, Mrs Wallagher'"(p.l60) is skilfully double-
layered). The rhetoric of craziness and pessimism hardly begins to deal with the
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disturbance and disruption wrought on the presumptions, the metaphysical
containments that Frank has brought to the interview and by extension to his
protective epistemic shelter from the grief, the loss, finally the differance that
'possesses' him, the shell of his sportswriting. Bascombe suggests walking to the
lake to conduct the interview, since he used to visit it when he was in college.
The first 'foreboding' regarding the interview is Herb's ignoring of this
reminiscence:
He is not interested in my past, though that's no crime since I am
not much interested myself...
The door opens behind the storm-glass and a slender, pretty
black woman...steps half out onto the step. She gives me a watery
half-smile...
...'I'm keeping my distance from him, Mrs Wallagher.' I give
her a friendly smile to match the frail one she has given me...
...'Okay now, Frank, what's this bunch of lies supposed to be
about,' Herb says gruffly as we whirl along...
...'I've got my mind on an update on Herb Wallagher, Herb.
How he's doing, what're his plans, how life's treating him. Maybe a
little inspirational business on the subject of character for people
with their own worries. Maybe a touch of optimism in the soup...
...I know readers would be interested in hearing about your job
as spirit coach. Guys you played with taking their cue from you on
going the extra half-mile. That kind of thing.'
'I'm not going to be doing that anymore, Frank,' Herb says
grimly, pushing harder on his wheels. 'I'm planning to retire.'
'Why so, Herb?' (Not the best news for starters.)
'I just wasn't getting the job done down there, Frank. Too
much bullshit involved.'
An uneasy silence descends as we cross the road to Walled
Lake.(pp.160-1)
Already, then, at the beginning of the interview we find several indicators as
to the underlying dynamic of the situation. The reference to history has already
been noted, also, the reference to Frank's keeping his distance, but this second
point is now further strengthened and tied far more directly to the
rhetorical/epistemic concerns initially and perhaps seemingly tenuously
attributed to it. Thus Frank refers to the interview as 'an update on Herb
Wallagher, Herb,' immediately and strikingly splitting or dissociating, even
alienating the physical presence of his subject, Herb, from the rhetorical
construct he has in mind, Herb Wallagher, now referred to in the third person.
The impression of an alienation of sorts from physical being is of course
suggested by Herb's physical debilitation, but figural significance is layered on
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figural significance, and we learn that Frank has in mind an article on Herb's
work as 'influence', as 'spirit coach' in fact, and the sense of dissociation is
complete - dissociation from Frank, who wants only a rhetorical construct to fit
his own constructed securities, and of course from Herb's own self.
The 'uneasy silence' that descends as they reach the lake figures a dis-ease
on a variety of levels, then, as indeed does the bizarre breaking of it:
'It's funny,' Herb says, where he can see the lake from an
elevation. 'When I first saw you, you had a halo around your head.
A big gold halo. Do you ever notice that, Frank?' Herb whips his
big head around and grins at me, then looks back at the empty
lake.
'I never have, Herb.' I take a seat on the pipe bannister that
runs the length of the dock at the end of which two aluminium
boats ride in the shallow water.
'No?' Herb says. 'Well.' He pauses a moment in reverie. 'I'm
glad you came, Frank,' he says, but does not look at me.
'I'm glad to be here, Herb.'
'I get mad sometimes, Frank, you know? God damn it. I just
get boiling.' Herb suddenly whacks both his big open hands on the
black armrests, and shakes his head.(p.l62)
This first real sign of Herb's 'craziness' takes us on to a richly figurative
plane; the reference to the halo connects up to a whole figural sub-strata in the
novel, namely Catholicism, the episodes in the novel taking place over an Easter
weekend and one of the most enduring images in the book being the near life-
size wooden Jesus outside the Arcenault home. Not that religion as such is a
'theme' of the novel, however; Catholicism figures far more as a type of the
aesthetic/epistemic/ontological contradictions in constant conflict in the novel.
'"I think he's the tackiest thing in the entire world and I'm a Catholic"' (p.250)
comments Vicki on the wooden Jesus, and there is pointedly no resurrection for
Frank at the close of the weekend, only Walter Luckett's death, a perhaps final
alienation from his ex-wife and a less than exalted fling with a temporary young
reporter at the office. Through the halo image the interview slips not into
religious symbolism, then, but the more familiar tensions of semiological and
epistemological imperatives. This becomes clear in the next exchange between
the two men:
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'Do you have any theories about art, Frank?' Herb says...'I
mean do you, uh, have any fully developed concepts of, say, how
what the artist sees relates to what is finally put on the canvas?'
'I guess not,' I say. 'I like Winslow Homer a lot.'
'All right: He's a good one. He's plenty good,' Herb says, and
smiles a helpless smile up at me...
...'How long did you play pro ball, Herb?'
'Eleven years,' Herb says moodily...'You know I've been
reading Ulysses Grant, Frank.' He nods profoundly. 'When Grant
was dying, you know, he said, "I think I am a verb instead of a
personal pronoun. A verb signifies to be; to do; to suffer. I signify
all three"...what the hell do you think he meant by that? A verb?'
Herb looks up at me with face full of worry. 'I've been worried
about that for weeks.'
'I couldn't begin to say, Herb. Maybe he was taking stock.
Sometimes we think things are more important than they are.'
That doesn't sound good, though, does it?'...
...'It's hard to say.'
'Your halo's gone now, Frank. You know it? You've become
like the rest of the people.'(pp.162-3)
The halo disappears, it seems, as a result of Frank's evasiveness, his
unwillingness to engage with Herb's craziness/dissociation. Of course the reason
for this unwillingness is no mystery given Frank's by now familiar reluctance to
do anything other than enclose such dislocations with his 'optimism'. Herb's
dilemma is precisely Frank's - both men are living 'post-existences' (verbs follow
pronouns). Frank more than Herb, in fact, could be characterized as a 'verb'
rather than as a 'personal pronoun'. We see him after all as a succession of
'voices', a succession of 'evasive actions', a rhetorical dynamic (always subsuming
the disruptive, the 'semiotic'20 and re-presenting it as the 'moral', as contained
significance) rather than an essence expressing a self through discourse. Thus
Frank loses his status as a potential coherer of existence, as a potential conferer
of identity - all he can in fact offer is further rhetorical dissociation, is enclosure,
the constructing of a Herb Wallagher rather than the disclosure involved in
actually connecting with the 'I', the 'pronoun' that is Herb. Consequently, Frank
has recourse only to his mechanism of enclosure, his 'metaphysics' of
sportswriting, a bland metaphysics which Ford significantly holds in tension with
the grim physics of the situation - Herb's paralysis, the chill off the black water of
the lake:
There is major silence now that Herb has told me what it's like
not to have his legs to use. It is not an empty moment, not for me
anyway, and I am not discouraged. I would still like to think
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there's the possibility for a story here. Maybe by going off his
medicine Herb will finally come back to his senses with some
unexpected and interesting ideas to bring up and end up talking a
blue streak. That happens every day.
'Do you ever miss playing football, Herb?' I say, and smile
hopefully.
'What?' Herb is drawn back from a muse the glassy lake has
momentarily fostered. He looks at me as though he had never
seen me before...The wind has wandered back now and a chill
picks up off the black water...
...Herb stares at me reproachfully. 'You're an asshole, Frank,
you know that?'
'Why do you say that?'
'You don't know me.'(pp. 164-5)
Herb's final rebuke here, "you don't know me', is the essence of Frank's
failure in this episode, since it cuts two ways: Frank could be rebuking himself
with the same accusation. Instead, right up to the very end of the disastrous
interview Frank's discourse still refuses to acknowledge the ontological
implications of the evasion he has been caught in:
'We didn't talk much about football,' Herb says thoughtfully.
He is now as sane and reflective as an old sextant.
'I guess it didn't seem it was much on your mind, Herb.'
'It really seems insignificant now, Frank. It's really a pretty
crummy preparation for life, I've come to believe.'
'But I'd still think it had some lessons to teach to the people
who played it. Perseverance. Team work. Comradeship. That
kind of thing.'(p,167)
Inevitably then, the disruption which Herb unleashes is sublimated, still
possessing, still inhabiting Frank, but merely emerging as a quaking diaphragm,
and is finally evaded, tellingly, through an insistence on the hierarchy, or the
grammar, of the occasion:
For some reason Herb seems to be having a hard time making
his head be still. It's wandering all around. 'You couldn't really
like sports, Frank,' he says. 'You don't look like a guy who likes
sports.'
'I like some better than others.' It is not that uncommon a
question, really.
'But wouldn't you rather talk about something else?' Herb
shakes his big head, still wondrous. 'What about Winslow Homer?'
'I'd talk to you about him, Herb. Any time. Writing about
something is a lot different from doing the thing itself. Does that
clear anything up?' For some reason my diaphragm, or its vicinity,
feels like it is quaking again.
'Pret-ty interesting, Frank.' Herb nods at me with genuine
admiration. 'I'm not sure it explains a goddamn thing, but it's
interesting. I'll give you that.'
'It's pretty hard to explain your own life, Herb.' I'm sure my
quaking is visible, though maybe not to Herb, for whom the whole
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world might quake all the time...'I think I've said enough. I'm
supposed to be asking you questions.'
'I'm a verb, Frank. Verbs don't answer questions.'
'Don't think that way, Herb.' My diaphragm is crackling,
(pp. 168-9)
Just as literature 'fails' in the first chapter then, sportswriting fails here.
What is presented as disclosure is revealed as enclosure. Again we are back to:
'All we really want is to get to the point where the past can explain nothing about
us and we can get on with life. Whose history can ever reveal very much?' We
are back, that is, to the paradoxical evasion of disclosure in the name of
disclosure, and this is where the dynamic of the third key disruption begins, that
of his attempted relationship with Vicki, this third failure functioning as the
apotheosis of the deconstructive collapses that have already undermined Frank's
ontology, his 'rhetoric of life', over this weekend.
Again, it is prepared for carefully, and again we find the semiological (with
X the question of Voice' and poetry, with Herb sportswriting, aesthetics and
Ulysses Grant's Verbal being', now the memory of a relationship with a literary
deconstructionist) inextricably bound up with the ostensibly psychological
problematic in hand, shading the psychological once more into epistemological
and ontological figural resonances:
Full disclosure never does anybody any favors, and in any event
there are few enough people in the world who are sufficiently
within themselves to make such disclosure pretty unreliable right
from the start...
...I remember, in fact, the Lebanese woman I knew at
Berkshire College saying to me, after I told her how much I loved
her: 'I'll always tell you the truth, unless of course I'm lying to you.'
Which at first I didn't think was a very good idea; though stewing
over it after a while I realized that it was actually a piece of great
luck. I was being promised truth and mystery - not an easy
combination. There would be important things I would and
wouldn't know...and all I had to do was agree, and be forever freed.
She was a literary deconstructionist and had a mind trained for
that kind of distinction.(p.83)
At first this now physically as opposed to rhetorically relational impulse
towards 'full disclosure' seems to be an impulse to release, to a 'stepping out' of
the protective, metaphysical carapace of enclosure of Bascombe's 'verbal' 'post-
existence'. As Frank says of the typical one-night affairs he found himself drawn
to after Ralph's death:
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All at once I was longing with all my worth to be part of that life,
longing to enter completely into that little existence of hers as a
full (if brief) participant...'I love you,' I've heard myself say more
than once to a Becky, Sharon, Susie or Marge I hadn't known
longer than four hours and fifteen minutes! And being absolutely
certain I did; and, to prove it, loosing a barrage of pryings, human-
interest questions - demands, in other words, to know as many of
the whys and whos and whats of her life as I could.(p.l35)
In any of Ford's earlier novels and even stories this impulse to 'enter
completely' another existence would signal a redemptive escape from the Ideal
solipsism of his characters' typical ontological self-protectionism. Here however
there is no redemption, only the ongoing struggle between enclosure and
disclosure, in all its disguises. Bascombe goes on to explain:
All of it the better to get into her life, lose that terrible distance
that separated us, for a few drifting hours close the door, simulate
intimacy, interest, anticipation, then resolve them all in a night's
squiggly romance and closure...
...This, of course, was the world's worst, most craven cynicism.
Not the invigorating little roll in the hay part, which shouldn't
bother anyone, but the demand for full-disclosure when I had
nothing to disclose in return.(pp. 135-6)
Of course it is not that Bascombe literally has nothing to disclose; far from it.
It is simply that the relational impulse is driven not by an acceptance or openness
to otherness, but an overwhelming impulse to an almost womb-like enclosure,
the physical expression of his psychological dreaminess and his ontological
escapism (the spectre of deconstruction is evoked in opposition to this again):
What I was doing, though I didn't figure it out until long after
I'd spent three months at Berkshire College - living with Selma
Jassim, who wasn't interested in disclosure - was trying to be within
myself by being as nearly as possible within somebody else. It is
not a new approach to romance. And it doesn't work. In fact, it
leads to a terrible dreaminess and the worst kind of abstraction
and unreachableness.(p.l36)
When Bascombe attempts to say a 'goodbye to history' in the form of a new¬
found love for Vicki, then, the interrelations made between the alienations of the
past and the 'otherness' or differance within instincts and emotions (within being
itself) are fully consistent with the problematics already found to be implicit in
the more obviously semiological domains of written textuality:
A lot happens to you in your life and comes to bear midway:
your parents can die (mine, though, died years before), your
marriage can change and even depart, a child can succumb, your
profession can start to seem hollow. You can lose all hope...And
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correspondingly it is hard to say what causes what, since in one
important sense everything causes everything else.
So with all this true, how can I say I 'love' Vicki Arcenault?
How can I trust my instincts all over again?...
...And the answer like most other reliable answers is in parts.
I have relinquished a great deal. I've stopped worrying about
being completely within someone else since you can't be
anyway...I've also become less..."writerly serious,' and worry less
about the complexities of things, looking at life in more simple and
literal ways. I have also stopped looking around what I feel to
something else I might be feeling...
...When you are fully in your emotions, when they are simple
and appealing enough to be in, and the distance is closed between
what you feel and what you might also feel, then your instincts can
be trusted.(p,138)
This tentative 'goodbye to history' is, however, simply the ironic introduction
to the disintegration, or the deconstruction, of the relationship Frank sees as his
chance to close 'the distance...between what you feel and what you might also
feel', to abolish otherness and with it diffSrance. He finds himself going through
Vicki's purse despite himself, and ends up shamefaced in the bathroom, figurally
confronting differance, his own otherness, in the bathroom mirror:
I resemble a wretched sex-offender - cigaret dangling in my fingers,
blue-piped pajamas rumpled, my face gaunt from gasping, the
stern light pinching my eyes narrow as Everett's. I am not a pretty
sight, and I'm not a bit happy to see myself here...I have gone
poking around after full disclosure before my disavowal of it is
barely out of my mouth - a disappointing testimony to self-
delusion, even more disappointing than finding dagger-head
Everett's picture in Vicki's pocketbook where, after all, it had
every right to be and I had none.(p.l41)
Vicki's discovery of his prying is the first obvious nail in their relationship's
coffin, though Ford makes it clear that the link between Frank's failure with X,
with Herb and now with Vicki, is effectively seamless, not a matter of simple
circumstance:
A big handsome tear leaves her eye, goes off her nose and vanishes
into the pillow. I have managed to make two different people cry
inside of two hours. I am doing something wrong. Though
what?(p.l78)
It perhaps goes without saying that if we extend the two hours to twenty-four
it also includes X at the cemetery. And Bascombe's initial answer to his own
question - 'Cynicism' - is less revealing than his proposed solution, again a
premature, desperate 'goodbye to history':
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My only hope now is to deny everything - friendship,
disillusionment, embarrassment, the future, the past - and make
my stand for the present. If I can hold her close in this cold-hot
afternoon...maybe I will love her after all, and she me, and all this
will just have been the result of too little sleep in a strange town,
schnapps and Herb.(p.l78)
In the end however, the only goodbye which lifts their spirits is the goodbye
to their present-, the day becomes a failure and they finally agree to return to New
Jersey, and it is, ironically, only then that Frank feels 'the sky of this long day
lighten about me now for the first time, and the clouds begin at last to
ascend'(p.l83).
Bascombe's Easter Sunday begins, significantly, with a 'historical' reference
to dissociation, and in some ways a return to it, an ironic commentary perhaps on
his thoughts of the night before outside Vicki's apartment after their return from
Detroit, 'left alone in [his] Malibu, staring at the glossy moon as if it were all of
mystery and anticipation, all the things we are happy to leave and happier yet to
see come toward us new again'(p.l85):
A gray, silvermane mist inhabits my room. I lie on the floor of
the upstairs sleeping porch, fully clothed, my head cushioned by
the boards, which are cold and morning-slicked by mist. In this
posture I would often wake up in the months after X left...still
dressed and stiff as a mummy, with no memory of moving. I do not
yet know what to make of it. Back then it didn't necessarily seem a
bad sign, and it doesn't now. And though a longing permeates the
cool morning, it is familiar enough, and I'm happy to lie still and
listen to my heart harmlessly thump. It is Easter.(p.209)
This passage is also of course an ironic commentary on another historical
'text', the resurrection account. Whilst Jesus ascends, leaving his grave-clothes
behind as the sign of his ascension; Bascombe wakes 'still dressed and stiff as a
mummy, with no memory of moving'. The ironic doubling is far from gratuitous -
the resurrection motif recurs throughout Bascombe's account of his journey to
and afternoon spent at the Arcenaults'. Each use of the motif has its own shades
of significance, but it can be seen that whatever the 'shading', each reference
brings us more or less obliquely back to the dynamics of enclosure/disclosure
and being-in-time, of textuality and history.
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Of course the dialectic of the resurrection motif is a problematic one in the
context of this most resolutely a-transcendent of novels; irony is, as has already
been indicated, a dominant factor, and its primary manifestation as regards this
motif is as structural deferment - we find a recurring rhetoric of resurrection
persistently undercut by a structural breakdown of its dialectic. As with the two
previous key breakdowns or failures already examined, the terms of this
deconstruction are ultimately, if elliptically, rooted in questions of textuality and
history, in the semiology of (postmodern) being.
For instance, when Frank stops off on his journey for a drink in Sweet Lou's
Sportsman's B'ar we find his sportswriting optimism all set to construct the sort
of textual resurrection (Lou, he discovers, was a football star) he has so far been
denied both at Ralph's grave and during his interview with Herb:
'Where's Lou today?' I ask after I've ordered a whiskey. I
would, in fact, like to meet him, maybe set up a Where Are They
Now feature: 'Former Giant lugnut Lou Calgagno once had a
dream. Not to run a fumble in for a touchdown or to play in a
league championship or to enter the Hall of Fame, but to own a
little watering trough in his downstate Jersey home of Bamber, a
quiet, traditional place where friends and fans could come and
reminisce about the old glory days....'(p.246)
But again the attempted textualization proves inadequate:
'Lou who?' the woman says, lighting a cigarette and blowing
smoke away from me out the corner of her mouth...
...'I used to be a big fan of his,' I say, though this isn't true. I'm
not sure I ever heard of him. To be honest, I feel like an idiot.
'He's dead. He's been dead maybe, thirty years? That's
approximately where he is.'
'I'm sorry to know that,' I say.
'Right. Lou was a real nunce,' the woman says, finishing
wiping out the ashtray.
'And he was a big nunce. I was married to him.' She pours
herself a cup of coffee and stares at me. 'I don't wanna ruin your
dreams. But. You know?'(pp.246-7)
In fact Lou was gunned down by gangsters, denying Frank even a 'moral', if
downbeat, closure - 'Not the way these things usually turn out and not exactly
what you'd want to read about before dinner behind a chilled martini'(247).
Even the semiological 'life' Lou still has, the pictures of him on the walls which
first prompt Frank's interest in a textual 'resurrection', are finally desacralized,
stripped of significance, 'emptied' by his widow's indifference, a further ironical
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indictment of the sign as transcendent signifier, of the text as valorizing,
'resurrecting' transcendental form:
I cluck my tongue and look at Lou's widow. 'It's nice you keep
the place this way.'
'He had it in his will that all these had to be left up, or I'd have
changed it, what, a hundred years ago? It has to stay a B'ar, too,
and buy from his distributorship. Otherwise I lose it to his guinea
cousins in Teaneck. So I ignore him. I forget whose picture it is,
really.(p.247)
Once at the Arcenault household the impulse to textualize becomes even
more dominant - Bascombe now not simply textualizing the being of strangers,
but himself through internalized role-playing:
I had sheltered hope that her dad and I could become bosom
buddies even if Vicki and I didn't work things out. He and I could
still be friends. If his tire went flat some ramy night in Haddam or
Hightstown or anyplace within my area code, he could call me up.
I'd drive out to get him, we'd have a drink while the tire was being
fixed at Frenchy's and he would go off into the Jersey darkness
certain he had a friend worthy of his trust and who looked down
life's corridor more or less the way he did. Maybe we could take
the brother fishing at Manasquan (no need to bring the women in
on it). Vicki could be married to Sweet Lou Calcagno's stepson
over in Bamber, have a wonderful life as a beer distributor's wife
with all the hullygully of kids. And I could be the trusted family
friend with a heart of gold. I'd renounce my failed suitor's glower
for the demeanor of a wise old uncle. That would be enough for
me, just the natural playing out of the pleasing present.(p.255)
Frank's hopes for such a new, 'enclosed' life are further boosted by Vicki's
father, Wade, who is quick to link the idea of a paradise to that of enclosure:
This is our little Garden of Eden down here, and we want to keep
it so the outsiders don't ruin it for us, which is why I don't mind
driving fifty miles to work. Though I guess I shouldn't be closing
the drawbridge.' His clear eyes sparkle with admission. 'We're all
from someplace else these days, Frank.'(p.268)
When Wade takes Frank down into the basement, into his 'devil's dungeon', then,
this enclosure inevitably carries resonances of a pre-resurrection entomb^ment,
of a prelude to, we are led to suppose, Frank's new life and 'heart of gold'.
Certainly Ford is quick to paint this episode in the cellar on an ironically cosmic,
transcendent scale:
Wade is fiddling with metal objects, possibly the shade of a
utility lamp, a fuse-box door, possibly a oox of keys. 'Ahh, the
Christ,' he mutters.
Suddenly a light flutters on, not a utility lamp but a
shimmering white fluorescence in the raftered ceiling. What I see
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first in the light is not, I think, what I'm supposed to see. I see a
big picture of the world photographed from outer space, fastened
to the cinderblock wall above Wade's workbench. In it, all of
space is blue and empty, and North America clear as in a dream,
from miles away, in perfect outline white against a dark
surrounding sea.
'What d'you think, Frank?' Wade says with pride.
My eyes try to find him, but instead find, directly in front ofme
where I could touch it, a big black car - so close I can't make out
what it is, though it certainly is a car, with plenty of chrome and a
glassy black finish. CHRYSLER is lettered above big wide
louvered grillwork.
'By God, Wade,' I say.(p.269)
The renovated black Chrysler becomes a touchstone, as it were, for a
tentative communion between the two men. Its presence both dissociates and
reflects Bascombe:
Wade and I are silent in the presence of his Chrysler and each
other.
This situation could, of course, result in disaster, as many such
situations do. A fear of what he may innocently ask me now, or a
greater fear that I may have nothing special to say in answer and
be left standing here as mute as a rocker panel - these make me
wish I were back upstairs seeing the Knicks whip tar out of the
Cavaliers, cheek-by-jowl with my old friend Cade. Sports is a first-
rate safety valve when you and your whole value system are
brought under friendly but unexpected scrutiny.
'Just what kind of fellow are you?' would be a perfectly natural
curiosity. 'What are your intentions regarding my daughter?' ('I'm
not at all sure' would not be much of an answer.) 'Who in the
world do you think you are?' (I'd be stumped.) Suddenly I feel
cold, though Wade doesn't seem to have any tricks up his sleeve.
He is someone with codes I respect and that I would like to like
me. All the best signs, in other words, are not so different from all
the worst. Wade puts his fingertips to the porcelain-black fender
and stares at them. I'm sure if I were closer every feature of me
would be spelled out clear as a mirror.(p.271)
But the almost religious, even funereal solemnity its cold, black presence seems
to demand also releases Frank (unwillingly) from his evasions, from his sports:
'Frank, where're your parents?' Wade looks gravely at me.
They're both dead, Wade,' I say. 'A long time now.'
'Mine, too.' He nods. 'Both of 'em gone. We all come from
nowhere in the end, right?'
'I guess I don't really mind that part,' I say.(p.272)
Finally Frank is even dispossessed of his ultimate instrument of
dissemblance (and hence self-dissociation), his voice: 'By being direct and
unambiguous and nothing like what I expected, he has left me nothing to
say'(p.273). When he does finally speak we find him for the first time in the
novel acknowledging historicity and locatedness: "'Wade, what part of Texas did
239
you grow up in?" I say, and grin hopefully'(p.274). Finally, tying all these
glimmerings of an 'awakening' firmly together into an explicitly 'resurrective'
dynamic, we are given Wade's parable-like story of a man's faked death and
subsequent release into a new life. It is significant that when Wade asks Frank
midway through the story to guess what the man chose to do seeing that he had
been 'signally' though not physically annihilated Frank responds: '"I've got a
pretty good idea." (Who in a modern world wouldn't?)'(p.276).
This story however is very much an axis for the use of the resurrection motif
- on the one hand it is an explicit valorization of circumstance (Wade goes on to
identify the same process in his own, far more mundanely 'transformed' life: "'We
both just had new lives served to us, and a conviction to do something with
them'"(p.276)). On the other hand it marks the beginning of a progressive
desacralizing of the motif, an ironic undercutting of its promise (the
transformative possibility of chance) on its own terms, deconstructing not the
experience as such, but the 'resurrective' valorization of it; Wade's 'resurrected'
friend works in his 'new life' on the Turnpike with Wade:
[Wade] wants me to know that he's discovered something
important late in life, something worth knowing when very few
people ever discover anything by just living. He'd like to pass some
wisdom along from the for-what-it's-worth department, though I
can't help wondering what his friend's wife would think if she ever
came through Exit 9 at just the right moment. It could
happen.(pp.276-7)
Wade's disclosures initially seem to offer the chance of a 'resurrective',
reciprocal communion, but again we find dissociation not in the problematics of
an 'external' relationship, but in the deeper dislocations of self; Frank is drawn to
the 'damn good ordinary life' he now associates with Wade and the possibility
that he might 'Forge a commitment in Sherri-Lyn Woods'(p.278), but:
For some reason I am nervous and embarrassed. My hands are
still cold and stiff, and I stuff them inside my pants pockets and
stare at Wade blank as a tomb door. That I withold at just this
moment is a major failing in my character.(p.279)
The reference to 'a tomb door' is of course significant. Frank's attempted
'resurrection' is paralyzed not because he has no point of contact with Wade, not
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because the 'tomb door' stands between them, but because it stands within him, it
is an inner, even ontological 'death' that makes his hands 'cold and stiff, his 'soul'
helpless behind the 'tomb' of his face, his identity.
When they leave the basement and sit to table, Frank finds himself
struggling to articulate through another sports 'metaphor' just this helplessness, a
helplessness not understood by Wade or any of the self-possessed Arcenaults.
Frank begins by evoking a political question from Wade (interestingly recalling
again the historical/anticipation dialectical present of Frank's Verbal', always
kinetic, slippery present of being) through a familiar resort to sportswriting
rhetoric. Wade asks for Frank's opinion on the political state of the nation, and
is answered with:
'I haven't paid much attention to politics the last few years, to
tell the truth...
...I write sports, Wade. If I can write a piece for the magazine
on, say, what's happening to the team concept here in America,
and do a good job there, I feel pretty good about things. Pretty
patriotic, like I'm not isolating myself .(pp.284-5)
He then goes on to explain his theory of 'team concept', and central to it is a
pervasive sense of dis-location from identity (team membership), a dissociation
of duty and motive, immersion (enclosure) and alienation, role ('"The way these
guys use team concept is too much like a machine to me, Wade...It's just the
nineteenth century idea - dynamos and all that baloney'") and self ("'to play or
not to play; to play well or not so well. To give his all...What if I just don't want
to win that bad, or can't'"(p.286)), which is at bottom for Frank the very type of
his ontological dis-ease.
Indeed, Bascombe goes on to use terms which directly recall Herb's
verb/pronoun distinction - "'It's an event, not a thing. It's time but not a watch.
You can't reduce it to mechanics and roles'"(p.287). And while such u rhetoric
looks back to the disruptions of the interview with Herb, they also point, in the
use of the term 'roles', to Frank's definitive disruption-to-come with Vicki. His
long explanations, his last attempt to construct a role for himself in the 'team' of
the Arcenault family (the 'uncle' with the 'heart of gold' now becomes a 'drunk
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old uncle* speaking 'in a voice she's never heard') are what finally alienate him
irrevocably from Vicki:
Vicki is staring down at her full plate, but glances up once out
the tops of her eyes and gives me a disheartened sour-mouth of
disgust. There is trouble, as I've suspected, on the horizon. I have
talked too much to suit her and, worse, said the wrong things. And
worse yet, jabbered on like a drunk old uncle in a voice she's never
heard, a secular Norman Vincent Pealeish tone I use for the
speaker's bureau and that even makes me squeamish sometimes
when I hear it on tape. This may have amounted to a betrayal, a
devalued intimacy, an illusion torn, causing doubt to bloom into
dislike. Our own talk is always of the jokey-quippy-irony style and
lets us leap happily over 'certain things' to other 'certain things' -
cozy intimacy, sex and rapture, ours in a heartbeat. But now I may
have stepped out of what she thinks she knows and feels safe
about...rniere is no betrayal like voice betrayal, I can tell you
that.(p.288-9)
The final deconstruction of Frank's hoped-for resurrection soon follows. X
phones with the news that Walter Luckett, Frank's one male male friend in the
novel (another alienated, dissociated self seeking resurrection, a 'goodbye to
history') has committed suicide. Suddenly the resurrection motif is completely
overturned - the 'goodbye to history' is not identifiable with resurrection,
however ironic, nor with anything transcendent, figuratively or literally. As
Frank reflects, staring at the sky- and heaven-suggesting pale blue ceiling of the
bedroom he is taking X's phone call in: 'In the pale blue ceiling I wish I could see
something I recognized. Almost anything would do...Though of course there is
nothing to see above me'(p.295). His Easter Sunday, fulfilling the ominous
beginning of it, closes not with resurrection, but 'Preemptive, ill-meant death...Its
gluey odors are spread over me. I can smell them myself(p.297). And as if to
put the final seal on this inversion, this disruption, we find Frank's repudiation of
Christ's resurrection mirroring the complete failure of his desacralized own.
Frank's prediction as to a 'modern' Christ's fate:
I cast a wintry eye at Lynette's spurious beigey Jesus nailed to the
siding. He makes life a perfect misery for as many as he can, then
never takes the heat. He should try resurrection in today's
complex world. He'd fall right off His cross on His ass. He
couldn't sell newspapers.(p.300)
parallels his own humiliation as he's knocked to the ground by Vicki in response
to his final attempt to 'enclose' both her and by extension himself in 'love':
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'You just think you want some little life like Lynette's to complain
about, but I'm going to give you the best of all worlds. You don't
know how happy you're going to be.' I give her a big signpost grin
and step forward to put my arms around her, but she busts me full
in the mouth with a mean little itchy fist that catches me midstride
and sends me to the turf.(p.301)
As in the bedroom he is left staring upwards, now 'on his ass' like his predicted
Christ, under 'rending clouds'. Far from beginning again, life, at the very close of
this Easter Sunday chapter seems to have ruinously passed him by:
And for a time then I sit where I've fallen beside my car and stare
up at the rending clouds, trying to make the world around me stop
its terrifying spin. Eveiything has seemed beckoning and ahead,
though I am unsure now if life has not suddenly passed me like a
big rumbling semi and left me flattened here by the road.(p.303)
The paradoxical 'release' which inhabited the failure opening the novel has
already been noted, but not the release claimed to inhabit the typologically
identical failures of Herb's interview and Vicki's rejection. It is certainly present
however, though not fully realized until Bascombe himself has had time to accept
them. Even before Frank leaves the Arcenault's a tension arises in the language
of his recollection which makes the previously straightforward identification of
new life with Vicki/the Arcenault family much more tenuous:
I get onto my knees...where she sits, thighs crossed regally and
entombed in taught panty hose. 'A man's on his knees to plead
and beg with you to marry him...How can you say no?'
'It ain't gon be hard,' she says giggling, embarrassed at me for
yet another reason.
'Frank?'
My name. Unexpected. Called from somewhere in the
unexplored cave of the house.(p.292)
Here, just before Frank hears the news about Walter Luckett, we find the
recurring figure of entombment identified with images previously redolent of life
and acceptance. The implication is, of course, that Frank's losing of both Vicki
and her family is as close to resurrection, to escape from entombment (enclosure
again) as he is ever likely to get. But in the end even the most flexible use of the
resurrection motif is inadequate to describe the 'stepping out' which such failure
is 'possessed' by. In a passage which through its rhetoric of invisibility and its
rhetoric of reincarnation recalls and transfigures both Herb's 'verbal being' and
the struggle towards a finally unattainable resurrection we find Bascombe for the
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first time acknowledging a 'setting free...sole and sovereign, without props',
without the need to enclose, without the need for sportswriting/'history':
Where, in fact, do you go if you're me?
Where do sportswriters go when the day is, in every way, done,
and the possibilities so limited that neither good nor bad seems a
threat?...For the moment, I'm beyond all hopes, much as I was on
the night X burned her hope chest while I watched the stars.
Walter would say that I have become neither the seer nor the
thing seen...Invisibility, in truth, is not so bad. We should all try to
know it better, use it to our advantage...since at one time or other -
like it or not - we all become invisible, loosed from body and duty,
left to drift on the night breeze, to do as we will, to cast about for
what we would like to be when we next occur. That, let me
promise you, is not an empty moment. And further yet from real
regret...Just to slide away like a whisper down the wind is no small
freedom, and if we're lucky enough to win such a setting-free, even
if it's bad events that cause it, we should use it, for it is the only
naturally occurring consolation that comes to us, sole and
sovereign, without props or the forbearance of others - among
whom I mean to include God himself, who does not let us stay
invisible long, since that is a state he reserves for himself.
God does not help those who are invisible too.(p.345)
In closing his narrative in the past tense Bascombe does more than achieve a
switch in perspective; he achieves, paradoxically, a 'goodbye' to the history that
the present tense was always struggling to contain. By the close of the novel
defeat is no longer to be enclosed by its (present) tense, but accepted as
something beyond enclosure, as being 'outside history...like horses and fog', like
the white moon of 'Intimacy':
I never properly wrote about Herb Wallagher and had to accept
defeat there. Some life is only life, and unconjugatable, just as to
some questions there are no answers. Just nothing to say...
...Things occur to me differently now, just as they might to a
character at the end of a good short story.(p.375)
Release from history-as-enclosure is, paradoxically then, found in an
acceptance as opposed to a rhetorical denial of being as past as well as present
and the anticipated future. An embracing of 'the "reference" within the Now to a
past Now'. As Bascombe says of the fact that he has discovered 'honest-to-
goodness relatives'(p.376) in Florida: 'And truthfully, when I drive back up
Highway 24...I am usually (if only momentarily) glad to have a past, even an
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imputed and remote one...It is not a burden, though I've always thought of it as
one'(p.377). In other words, 'possession' by historical otherness, though a
'potentially catastrophic' curse of being-in-time is also, when accepted, its
mystery and doorway out of the self-protecting, so often wounded and alienated
I s' 'metaphysical enclosures': 'the thing we say we'll never do is the very thing,
after all, we want to do most'(p.378) Frank concludes, and The only truth that
can never be a lie, let me tell you, is life itself - the thing that happens'(p.380).
The self can be released from the 'residue or skin' of the knowable, hence
enclosed and enclosing, past only because the self has, or is inhabited by, a past
'outside history', outside because though past it is, finally, unknowable, perhaps
beyond even memory; is the irreducible, primal otherness or differance
possessing and releasing being-in-time. As if consciously echoing Peter Curried
'step outside the metaphysical enclosure', Ford is careful to have Bascombe end
the novel walking out, stepping, again paradoxically, both into and out of history,
and through this contradiction, this paradox, out of the Ideal containments of
metaphysics into the otherness of 'negation', into 'transitive essence' and
'accidental being', into freedom:
I walked out of the condos onto the flat lithesome beach this
morning, and took a walk in my swimming trunks and no shirt on.
And I thought that one natural effect of life is to cover you in a
thin layer of...what? A film? A residue or skin of all the things
you've done and been and said and erred at? I'm not sure. But
you are under it, and for a long time, and only rarely do you know
it, except that for some unexpected reason or opportunity you
come out - for an hour or even a moment - and you suddenly feel
pretty good. And in that magical instant you realize how long it's
been since you felt just that way. Have you been ill, you ask. Is life
itself an illness or a syndrome? Who knows? We've all felt that
way, I'm confident, since there's no way that I could feel what
hundreds of millions of other citizens haven't.
Only suddenly, then, you are out of it - that film, that skin of
life - as when you were a kid. And you think: this must've been the
way it was once in my life, though you didn't know it then, and don't
really even remember it - a feeling of wind on your cheeks and
your arms, of being released, let loose, of being the light-floater.
And since that is not how it has been for a long time, you want, this
time, to make it last, this glistening one moment, this cool air, this
new living, so that you can preserve a feeling of it, inasmuch as
when it comes again it may be just too late. You may just be too
old. And in truth, of course, this may be the last time that you will
ever feel this way again.(pp.380-l)
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Carver both opens and closes Elephant with figures of just such a paradoxical
release. In 'Boxes' we find containment (the boxes that hold the narrator's
mother's possessions as she restlessly moves from home to home across the
country) and release (that restlessness, that constant journey into possibility)
both figured in the same image, just as for the narrator the otherness of
womanhood comes to represent both the containment of the womb (of history)
and the centrifugal pull outwards now not into dissociation and ennui but the
'other side' of that negation which is potentiality.21
In 'Errand' we find these dynamics shifted away from the 'physical' figures of
birth and parenthood and into the more explicitly historical figures of biography.
The present tense of 'Boxes' gives way to the past tense, as it does in The
Sportswriter, and again we find the 'goodbye to history' made possible in the
postmodern realist text by its embrace and acceptance, an acceptance mirroring
the aesthetic embracing of Chekhov in the story. Not that this final adequative
movement is identifiable with biography (enclosure) as such; rather it escapes
both enclosure and dissociation through 'stepping outside', through 'closing its
hand' not on illusory essences but on that which is 'outside history', tellable only
as irreducible story, a movement that is a mirror itself to the rhetorical dynamic
from enclosure to the refusal to 'give up the attempt to find one's way about' of
postmodern life. It is this paradoxically adequative refusal to 'leave the room as
it is', this refusal to 'silence' that which signifies 'in excess' of 'meaning', and a
correlative determination to take the deconstructive, the contingent, ultimately
the inexplicable to oneself that lies behind the final, 'ex-centric' gesture of
acceptance figured here at the very close of this last collection:
Do you understand what I'm saying, Olga said to the young
man. Leave the glasses. Don't worry about them...Leave the room
as it is. Everything is ready now. We're ready. Will you go?
But at that moment the young man was thinking of the cork
still resting near the toe of his shoe. To retrieve it he would have
to bend over, still gripping the vase. He would do this. He leaned
over. Without looking down, he reached out and closed it into his
hand.(p.!24)
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The women in question are the narrator's mother and lover respectively.
See 'Boxes', Elephant and Other Stories, pp.22-3. See also the release into
acceptance/potentiality at the close of 'Elephant' - again the figure of
containment (the loaning of money) becomes the Vehicle' also of release.
The narrator speeds away with George in 'his big unpaid-for car', Elephant
and Other Stories, p.90.
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CONCLUSION
Of course Carver exploits the freedom, the release he has won in Elephant
further with A New Path to the Waterfall, a text which significantly structures
poetry and prose, Chekhov and Carver into an aesthetic matrix which is itself a
liberation and not merely a figuring of it, which is an uncompromising, even
joyful embrace of otherness, a freeing not just of Currie's 'sovereign subject-
character' through the exploding of the history/being/text matrix, but the
sovereign author too, Carver's own paradoxical embrace and 'goodbye to history'.
And Ford also, with Wildlife, seems to exploit, less radically but still positively,
the release from the ironic typologies which contained his fiction previous to The
Sportswriter. More importantly as regards the perspective of this study as a
whole, it can be seen that the 'achieved' liberations of the these later texts are
primary examples of a distinctive, already hugely influential and perhaps even
transformative aesthetic re-orientation in contemporary American fiction.
This thesis began with an analysis of the death of realism, or rather an
analysis of its obituaries. But what the 'new realist' fictions of the writers
discussed in this study have made imperative is not just defiance in the face of
this dismissal, far less a reactionary rejection of the postmodern, rather a
fundamental re-casting of the binary, 'ultimist' terms of its attempted
dispatchment. For Carver and Ford, as for Abish, Handke, Mason and Frederick
Barthelme, there can no longer be any inviolate boundary line between the
discourses and the phenomenal conditions of life. The fictional worlds of all
these writers are haunted, terrorized and illuminated by their plethora of signs,
their always disposable, ubiqitous and yet tenuous cultural shards of
meaningfulness, identity and security. The physical and emotional menace that
is their other hallmark cannot be finally unravelled from the 'new German', 'new
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Kentucky' and anonymous mid-West landscapes of those worlds. Reflexivity is
not an alternative to the depiction of the mundane 'real' for these writers, it is in
fact the one common imperative in their realism, their mimesis.
Furthermore, though a similar imperative can be traced all the way back to
the Gothic and Romance discourses of Poe, Hawthorne and Melville, and pre¬
eminently through the American Modernism of Anderson, Stein and
Hemingway, the new realism even at its most significantly indebted is a re-
discovery and not a re-assertion, an aesthetic and epistemic process, not a
principle. Carver and Ford, more than any other American writers, have
exploratively pushed the distinctive radicalism of Hemingway's vernacular
realism far beyond its stoic and mythopoeic Ideal containments. Even in the
context of the bleakest of Carver's early stories, or the harshest of Ford's first
novels there are only the ironic, postmodern shadows of the more static
posturings which mar so many of Hemingway's Modernist 'performances'. There
is in fact always to be found in their darkest ironies, subversions and dislocations
a structural unease with any stasis, whether the Modernistic stasis of mythopoeic
valorization, or the postmodern paralysis of stark reflexive ultimacy.
In the end it is just this unease, this kinetic restlessness that must be seen as
the mimetic and adequative ground of both Ford's and Carver's realism. It is the
reflexive imperative as fully assimilated into contemporary fiction as it is into
contemporary existence - Butor's 'fundamental narrative'. The fictional worlds of
Carver and Ford are, like the worlds of Abish, Handke and Mason, places
'defined by Wittgenstein, Chomsky and other theorists of language and reality'1
simply because the empirical world of late capitalist Western culture itself is, if
not defined by such theorists, then surely only properly definable in all its
reflexive, parodic, suggestive multivalence according to such distinctions as they
draw, dangers they reveal, lacunae they acknowledge and paradoxical liberations
they welcome.
Finally, then, it can be argued that the new realism as a whole, and Carver
and Ford in particular, have transformed an exhausted realism's containments
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into a vital, exploratory mode, forging in the face of a corrosive ultimacy both an
adequative epistemology of textual telling and liberating ontology of textual
being. To close ironically, since the concluding words are those of the arch-
prophet of realism's doom, their authentic and powerful postmodern narratives
are nothing if not consummate examples of a mode of fiction 'not only
passionately formal...but passionately about things in life as well'.2
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